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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Sklarek B, Dal Mas DE, Knauff M. Probabilistic and Deductive Reasoning in the Human Brain. Neuroimage 2023; 275:120180. [PMID: 37211191 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.120180] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2023] [Revised: 05/17/2023] [Accepted: 05/18/2023] [Indexed: 05/23/2023] Open
Abstract
Reasoning is a process of inference from given premises to new conclusions. Deductive reasoning is truth-preserving and conclusions can only be either true or false. Probabilistic reasoning is based on degrees of belief and conclusions can be more or less likely. While deductive reasoning requires people to focus on the logical structure of the inference and ignore its content, probabilistic reasoning requires the retrieval of prior knowledge from memory. Recently, however, some researchers have denied that deductive reasoning is a faculty of the human mind. What looks like deductive inference might actually also be probabilistic inference, only with extreme probabilities. We tested this assumption in an fMRI experiment with two groups of participants: one group was instructed to reason deductively, the other received probabilistic instructions. They could freely choose between a binary and a graded response to each problem. The conditional probability and the logical validity of the inferences were systematically varied. Results show that prior knowledge was only used in the probabilistic reasoning group. These participants gave graded responses more often than those in the deductive reasoning group and their reasoning was accompanied by activations in the hippocampus. Participants in the deductive group mostly gave binary responses and their reasoning was accompanied by activations in the anterior cingulate cortex, inferior frontal cortex, and parietal regions. These findings show that (1) deductive and probabilistic reasoning rely on different neurocognitive processes, (2) people can suppress their prior knowledge to reason deductively, and (3) not all inferences can be reduced to probabilistic reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Benjamin Sklarek
- Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen
| | - Dennis E Dal Mas
- Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen
| | - Markus Knauff
- Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen
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Specificity effects in reasoning with counterintuitive and arbitrary conditionals. Mem Cognit 2021; 50:366-377. [PMID: 34558020 PMCID: PMC8821064 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-021-01235-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/25/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
When people have prior knowledge about an inference, they accept conclusions from specific conditionals (e.g., “If Jack does sports, then Jack loses weight”) more strongly than for unspecific conditionals (e.g., “If a person does sports, then the person loses weight”). But can specific phrasings also elevate the acceptance of conclusions from unbelievable conditionals? In Experiment 1, we varied the specificity of counterintuitive conditionals, which described the opposite of what is expected according to everyday experiences (“If Lena/a person studies hard, then Lena/the person will not do well on the test”). In Experiment 2, we varied the specificity of arbitrary conditionals, which had no obvious link between antecedent and consequent (“If Mary/a person goes shopping, then Mary/ the person gets pimples”). All conditionals were embedded in MP and AC inferences. Participants were instructed to reason as in daily life and to evaluate the conclusions on a 7-point Likert scale. Our results showed a specificity effect in both experiments: participants gave higher acceptance ratings for specific than for unspecific conditionals.
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Abstract
A major hypothesis about conditionals is the Equation in which the probability of a conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability: p(if A then C) = p(C|A). Probabilistic theories often treat it as axiomatic, whereas it follows from the meanings of conditionals in the theory of mental models. In this theory, intuitive models (system 1) do not represent what is false, and so produce errors in estimates of p(if A then C), yielding instead p(A & C). Deliberative models (system 2) are normative, and yield the proportion of cases of A in which C holds, i.e., the Equation. Intuitive estimates of the probability of a conditional about unique events: If covid-19 disappears in the USA, then Biden will run for a second term, together with those of each of its clauses, are liable to yield joint probability distributions that sum to over 100%. The error, which is inconsistent with the probability calculus, is massive when participants estimate the joint probabilities of conditionals with each of the different possibilities to which they refer. This result and others under review corroborate the model theory.
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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Knauff M. Everyday reasoning with unfamiliar conditionals. THINKING & REASONING 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1823478] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Markus Knauff
- Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
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Macchi L, Caravona L, Poli F, Bagassi M, Franchella MAG. Speak your mind and I will make it right: the case of “selection task”. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2019.1707207] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Laura Macchi
- Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano, Italy
| | - Laura Caravona
- Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano, Italy
| | - Francesco Poli
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Maria Bagassi
- Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano, Italy
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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Knauff M. Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules. THINKING & REASONING 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1401000] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Markus Knauff
- Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Richter B, Knauff M. Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning. THINKING & REASONING 2015. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1117988] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Knauff M. When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2015; 69:1480-97. [PMID: 26292145 DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1085067] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., "If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter") people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants' reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal "should" (i.e., " . . . then this person should be punished"), or with "will" (i.e., " . . . then this person will be punished") and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with "should" we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal "will" this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Markus Knauff
- a Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science , Justus Liebig University Giessen , Giessen , Germany
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Evans JSBT, Stanovich KE. Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2015; 8:223-41. [PMID: 26172965 DOI: 10.1177/1745691612460685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1221] [Impact Index Per Article: 135.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Keith E Stanovich
- Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
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Abstract
Causal knowledge plays a crucial role in human thought, but the nature of causal representation and inference remains a puzzle. Can human causal inference be captured by relations of probabilistic dependency, or does it draw on richer forms of representation? This article explores this question by reviewing research in reasoning, decision making, various forms of judgment, and attribution. We endorse causal Bayesian networks as the best normative framework and as a productive guide to theory building. However, it is incomplete as an account of causal thinking. On the basis of a range of experimental work, we identify three hallmarks of causal reasoning-the role of mechanism, narrative, and mental simulation-all of which go beyond mere probabilistic knowledge. We propose that the hallmarks are closely related. Mental simulations are representations over time of mechanisms. When multiple actors are involved, these simulations are aggregated into narratives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steven A Sloman
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912;
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Liu IM, Chou TH. A Probabilistic Approach to Conditional Reasoning Development. JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT 2014. [DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2013.879874] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Douven I, Verbrugge S. The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cogn Sci 2013; 37:711-30. [DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2012] [Revised: 07/11/2012] [Accepted: 07/19/2012] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Igor Douven
- Faculty of Philosophy; University of Groningen
| | - Sara Verbrugge
- Laboratory of Experimental Psychology; University of Leuven
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Evans JS. Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications. DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 2011. [DOI: 10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 160] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
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A successive-conditionalization approach to disjunctive and syllogistic reasoning. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2011; 76:676-92. [PMID: 21761215 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-011-0363-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2011] [Accepted: 06/30/2011] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
With p and q each standing for a familiar event, a disjunctive statement, "either p or q", seems quite different from its material conditional, "if not p then q". The notions of sufficiency and necessity seem specific to conditional statements. It is surprising, however, to find that perceived sufficiency and necessity affect disjunctive reasoning in the way they affect conditional reasoning. With B and C each standing for a category name, a universal statement, "all B are C", seems stronger than its logically equivalent conditional statement, "if B then C". However, the effects of perceived sufficiency or necessity were found to be as pronounced in conditional reasoning as in syllogistic reasoning. Furthermore, two experiments also showed that (a) MP (modus ponens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning was as difficult as MT (modus tollens)-comparable disjunctive reasoning, and that (b) MT-comparable syllogisms were easier to solve than MT problems in conditional reasoning.
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Effect of the Representation of Semantic Relations of Conditionals on Conditional Reasoning. ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA SINICA 2011. [DOI: 10.3724/sp.j.1041.2010.01137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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Evans JSBT, Handley SJ, Neilens H, Over D. The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2010; 63:892-909. [PMID: 19728225 DOI: 10.1080/17470210903111821] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.
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Bonnefon JF, Eid M, Vautier S, Jmel S. A Mixed Rasch Model of Dual-Process Conditional Reasoning. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2008; 61:809-24. [PMID: 17853230 DOI: 10.1080/17470210701434573] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
A fine-grained dual-process approach to conditional reasoning is advocated: Responses to conditional syllogisms are reached through the operation of either one of two systems, each of which can rely on two different mechanisms. System1 relies either on pragmatic implicatures or on the retrieval of information from semantic memory; System2 operates first through inhibition of System1, then (but not always) through activation of analytical processes. It follows that reasoners will fall into one of four groups of increasing reasoning ability, each group being uniquely characterized by (a) the modal pattern of individual answers to blocks of affirming the consequent (AC), denying the antecedent (DA), and modus tollens (MT) syllogisms featuring the same conditional; and (b) the average rate of determinate answers to AC, DA, and MT. This account receives indirect support from the extant literature and direct support from a mixed Rasch model of responses given to 18 syllogisms by 486 adult reasoners.
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Reasoning with conditionals: Does every counterexample count? It’s frequency that counts. Mem Cognit 2007; 35:2060-74. [PMID: 18265621 DOI: 10.3758/bf03192938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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