Co-evolution of physical and social sciences in synthetic biology

Governing biotechnology to provide safety and security and address ethical, legal, and social implications

The field of biotechnology has produced a wide variety of materials and products which are rapidly entering the commercial marketplace. While many developments promise revolutionary benefits, some of them pose uncertain or largely untested risks and may spur debate, consternation, and outrage from individuals and groups who may be affected by their development and use. In this paper we show that the success of any advanced genetic development and usage requires that the creators establish technical soundness, ensure safety and security, and transparently represent the product's ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI). We further identify how failures to address ELSI can manifest as significant roadblocks to product acceptance and adoption and advocate for use of the "safety-by-design" governance philosophy. This approach requires addressing risk and ELSI needs early and often in the technology development process to support innovation while providing security and safety for workers, the public, and the broader environment. This paper identifies and evaluates major ELSI challenges and perspectives to suggest a methodology for implementing safety-by-design in a manner consistent with local institutions and politics. We anticipate the need for safety-by-design approach to grow and permeate biotechnology governance structures as the field expands in scientific and technological complexity, increases in public attention and prominence, and further impacts human health and the environment.

Translating advances in microbial bioproduction to sustainable biotechnology

Advances in synthetic biology have radically changed our ability to rewire microorganisms and significantly improved the scalable production of a vast array of drop-in biopolymers and biofuels. The success of a drop-in bioproduct is contingent on market competition with petrochemical analogues and weighted upon relative economic and environmental metrics. While the quantification of comparative trade-offs is critical for accurate process-level decision making, the translation of industrial ecology to synthetic biology is often ambiguous and assessment accuracy has proven challenging. In this review, we explore strategies for evaluating industrial biotechnology through life cycle and techno-economic assessment, then contextualize how recent developments in synthetic biology have improved process viability by expanding feedstock availability and the productivity of microbes. By juxtaposing biological and industrial constraints, we highlight major obstacles between the disparate disciplines that hinder accurate process evaluation. The convergence of these disciplines is crucial in shifting towards carbon neutrality and a circular bioeconomy.

Comparing the Emergence of Technical and Social Sciences Research in Artificial Intelligence

Applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be examined from perspectives of different disciplines and research areas ranging from computer science and security, engineering, policymaking, and sociology. The technical scholarship of emerging technologies usually precedes the discussion of their societal implications but can benefit from social science insight in scientific development. Therefore, there is an urgent need for scientists and engineers developing AI algorithms and applications to actively engage with scholars in the social sciences. Without collaborative engagement, developers may encounter resistance to the approval and adoption of their technological advancements. This paper reviews a dataset, collected by Elsevier from the Scopus database, of papers on AI application published between 1997 and 2018, and examines how the co-development of technical and social science communities has grown throughout AI's earliest to latest stages of development. Thus far, more AI research exists that combines social science and technical explorations than AI scholarship of social sciences alone, and both categories are dwarfed by technical research. Moreover, we identify a relative absence of AI research related to its societal implications such as governance, ethics, or moral implications of the technology. The future of AI scholarship will benefit from both technical and social science examinations of the discipline's risk assessment, governance, and public engagement needs, to foster advances in AI that are sustainable, risk-informed, and societally beneficial.

80 questions for UK biological security

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.

Safe-by-Design: Stakeholders' Perceptions and Expectations of How to Deal with Uncertain Risks of Emerging Biotechnologies in the Netherlands

Advanced gene editing techniques such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR)/Cas have increased the pace of developments in the field of industrial biotechnology. Such techniques imply new possibilities when working with living organisms, possibly leading to uncertain risks. In the Netherlands, current policy fails to address these uncertain risks because risk classification is determined process-wise (i.e., genetically modified organism [GMO] and non-GMO), there is a strong focus on quantifiable risks, and the linearity within current governance (science-policy-society) hinders iterative communication between stakeholders, leaving limited room to anticipate uncertainties at an early stage of development. A suggested concept to overcome these shortcomings is the Safe-by-Design (SbD) approach, which, theoretically, allows stakeholders to iteratively incorporate safety measures throughout a technology's development process, creating a dynamic environment for the anticipation of uncertain risks. Although this concept originates from chemical engineering and is already widely applied in nanotechnology, for the field of biotechnology, there is no agreed upon definition yet. To explore the possibilities of SbD for future governance of biotechnology, we should gain insight in how various stakeholders perceive notions of risk, safety, and inherent safety, and what this implies for the applicability of SbD for risk governance concerning industrial biotechnology. Our empirical research reveals three main themes: (1) diverging expectations with regard to safety and risks, and to establish an acceptable level of risk; (2) different applications of SbD and inherent safety, namely, product- and process-wise; and (3) unclarity in allocating responsibilities to stakeholders in the development process of a biotechnology and within society.

Biological Materials: The Next Frontier for Cell-Free Synthetic Biology

Advancements in cell-free synthetic biology are enabling innovations in sustainable biomanufacturing, that may ultimately shift the global manufacturing paradigm toward localized and ecologically harmonized production processes. Cell-free synthetic biology strategies have been developed for the bioproduction of fine chemicals, biofuels and biological materials. Cell-free workflows typically utilize combinations of purified enzymes, cell extracts for biotransformation or cell-free protein synthesis reactions, to assemble and characterize biosynthetic pathways. Importantly, cell-free reactions can combine the advantages of chemical engineering with metabolic engineering, through the direct addition of co-factors, substrates and chemicals -including those that are cytotoxic. Cell-free synthetic biology is also amenable to automatable design cycles through which an array of biological materials and their underpinning biosynthetic pathways can be tested and optimized in parallel. Whilst challenges still remain, recent convergences between the materials sciences and these advancements in cell-free synthetic biology enable new frontiers for materials research.

Developing synthetic biology in Argentina: the Latin American TECNOx community as an alternative way for growth of the field

Synthetic biology emerged in the USA and Europe twenty years ago and quickly developed innovative research and technology as a result of continued funding. Synthetic biology is also growing in many developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where it could have a large economic impact by helping its use of genetic biodiversity in order to boost existing industries. Starting in 2011, Argentine synthetic biology developed along an idiosyncratic path. In 2011-2012, the main focus was not exclusively research but also on community building through teaching and participation in iGEM, following the template of the early "MIT school" of synthetic biology. In 2013-2015, activities diversified and included society-centered projects, social science studies on synthetic biology and bioart. Standard research outputs such as articles and industrial applications helped consolidate several academic working groups. Since 2016, the lack of a critical mass of researchers and a funding crisis were partially compensated by establishing links with Latin American synthetic biologists and with other socially oriented open technology collectives. The TECNOx community is a central node in this growing research and technology network. The first four annual TECNOx meetings brought together synthetic biologists with other open science and engineering platforms and explored the relationship of Latin American technologies with entrepreneurship, open hardware, ethics and human rights. In sum, the socioeconomic context encouraged Latin American synthetic biology to develop in a meandering and diversifying manner. This revealed alternative ways for growth of the field that may be relevant to other developing countries.

A quantitative risk assessment method for synthetic biology products in the environment

The need to prevent possible adverse environmental health impacts resulting from synthetic biology (SynBio) products is widely acknowledged in both the SynBio risk literature and the global regulatory community. To-date, however, discussions of potential risks of SynBio products have been largely speculative, and the limited attempts to characterize the risks of SynBio products have been non-uniform and entirely qualitative. As the SynBio discipline continues to accelerate and bring forth novel, highly-engineered life forms, a standardized risk assessment framework will become critical for ensuring that the environmental risks of these products are characterized in a consistent, reliable, and objective manner that incorporates all SynBio-unique risk factors. In their current forms, established risk assessment frameworks - including those that address traditional genetically modified organisms - fall short of the features required of this standard framework. To address this gap, we propose the Quantitative Risk Assessment Method for Synthetic Biology Products (QRA-SynBio) - an incremental build on established risk assessment methodologies that supplements traditional paradigms with the SynBio risk factors that are currently absent, and necessitates quantitative analysis for more transparent and objective risk characterizations. We demonstrate through a hypothetical case study that the proposed framework facilitates defensible quantification of the environmental risks of SynBio products in both foreseeable and hypothetical use scenarios. Additionally, we show how the quantitative nature of the proposed method can promote increased experimental investigation into the true likelihood of hazard and exposure parameters and highlight the most sensitive parameters where uncertainty should be reduced, ultimately leading to more targeted SynBio risk research and yielding more precise characterizations of risk.