Backtracking and the ethics of framing: lessons from voles and vasopressin

'Managing values' in health economics modelling: Philosophical and practical considerations

Stakeholder involvement has been proposed as a key strategy for appropriately managing value-laden decisions or 'value judgments' in health economics modelling. Philosophers of science, however, conceive of stakeholder involvement in research in conflicting ways, and also propose alternative strategies for 'managing values' in science. Furthermore, all proposed strategies for managing values in science raise philosophical questions and practical challenges that are difficult to resolve. As a result, health economists who seek to appropriately inform value judgments in modelling must currently go without straightforward guidance. There is a need to further explore how health economists should manage value judgments in modelling, taking into account philosophical debates and contextual constraints. This paper discusses core proposals for managing values in science and identifies philosophical questions and practical challenges these proposals leave unresolved. It further considers how this could potentially inform processes to manage value judgments in health economics modelling, using examples from an ongoing modelling project called LEAP (Lifetime Exposures and Asthma Outcomes Projection). We conclude that all strategies to 'manage values' in health economics modelling have strengths and weaknesses, but are generally compatible with one another, suggesting that health economists may use a combination of strategies. Further research is needed to explore the effects of strategies to 'manage values' in health economics modelling.

Shaping the Qualities, Values and Standards of Science. How Reporting Guidelines Improve the Transparency of Biomedical Research

What is scientific quality and how can it be achieved? Recent developments in clinical biomedicine gave prominence to transparency as a new core value for scientific research. Without transparency, other characteristics and values remain unknown. But how can abstract concepts and values be implemented in day-to-day scientific practices and what gets lost on the way? In order to answer this question, this study investigates the role of the PRISMA reporting guideline for writing systematic reviews and meta-analyses. By combining a document analysis and expert interviews with its developers, it attempts to bridge the gap between research practice and current modes of evaluation. Beside showing how the guideline was designed to be applicable and acceptable as a new standard, the analysis revealed crucial distinctions between transparency as an abstract quality goal and its practical implementation in the form of specifically formulated rules. Although PRISMA relies on transparency in order to be meaningful, it blurs the concept in order to circumvent some of its main disadvantages.

Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere

Philosophers now commonly reject the value free ideal for science by arguing that non-epistemic values, including personal or social values, are permissible within the core of scientific research. However, little attention has been paid to the normative political consequences of this position. This paper explores these consequences and shows how political theory is fruitful for proceeding in a world without value-neutral science. I draw attention to an oft-overlooked argument employed by proponents of the value free ideal I dub the "political legitimacy argument." This argument claims that the value-free ideal follows directly from the foundational principles of liberal democracy. If so, then the use of value-laden scientific information within democratic decision making would be illegitimate on purely political grounds. Despite highlighting this unaddressed and important argument, I show how it can be rejected. By appealing to deliberative democratic theory, I demonstrate scientific information can be value-laden and politically legitimate. The deliberative democratic account I develop is well suited for capturing the intuitions of many opponents of the value free ideal and points to a new set of questions for those interested in values in science.

The value-ladenness of transparency in science: Lessons from Lyme disease

Both philosophers and scientists have recently promoted transparency as an important element of responsible scientific practice. Philosophers have placed particular emphasis on the ways that transparency can assist with efforts to manage value judgments in science responsibly. This paper examines a potential challenge to this approach, namely, that efforts to promote transparency can themselves be value-laden. This is particularly problematic when transparency incorporates second-order value judgments that are underwritten by the same values at stake in the desire for transparency about the first-order value judgments involved in scientific research. The paper uses a case study involving research on Lyme disease to illustrate this worry, but it responds by elucidating a range of scenarios in which transparency can still play an effective role in managing value judgments responsibly.

Non-epistemic values in shaping the parameters for evaluating the effectiveness of candidate vaccines: the case of an Ebola vaccine trial

This paper examines the case of Ebola, ça Suffit trial which was conducted in Guinea during Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 2015. I demonstrate that various non-epistemic considerations may legitimately influence the criteria for evaluating the efficacy and effectiveness of a candidate vaccine. Such non-epistemic considerations, which are social, ethical, and pragmatic, can be better placed and addressed in scientific research by appealing to non-epistemic values. I consider two significant features any newly developed vaccine should possess; (1) the duration of immunity the vaccine provides; and (2) safety with respect to the side effects of the vaccine. Then, I argue that social and ethical values are relevant and desirable in setting the parameters for evaluating these two features of vaccines. The parameters that are employed for setting up the criteria for assessing the features might have far-reaching implications on the well-being of society in general, and the health conditions of several thousand people in particular. The reason is that these features can play a decisive role during the evaluation of the efficacy and effectiveness of the vaccine. I conclude by showing why it is necessary to reject the concept of epistemic priority, at least when scientists engage in policy-oriented research.

Values in environmental research: Citizens' views of scientists who acknowledge values

Scientists who perform environmental research on policy-relevant topics face challenges when communicating about how values may have influenced their research. This study examines how citizens view scientists who publicly acknowledge values. Specifically, we investigate whether it matters: if citizens share or oppose a scientist’s values, if a scientist’s conclusions seem contrary to or consistent with the scientist’s values, and if a scientist is assessing the state of the science or making a policy recommendation. We conducted two 3x2 factorial design online experiments. Experiment 1 featured a hypothetical scientist assessing the state of the science on the public-health effects of exposure to Bisphenol A (BPA), and Experiment 2 featured a scientist making a policy recommendation on use of BPA. We manipulated whether or not the scientist expressed values and whether the scientist’s conclusion appeared contrary to or consistent with the scientist’s values, and we accounted for whether or not subjects’ values aligned with the scientist’s values. We analyzed our data with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques. Our results provide at least preliminary evidence that acknowledging values may reduce the perceived credibility of scientists within the general public, but this effect differs depending on whether scientists and citizens share values, whether scientists draw conclusions that run contrary to their values, and whether scientists make policy recommendations.

Science, policy, and the transparency of values

BACKGROUND

Opposing groups of scientists have recently engaged in a heated dispute over a preliminary European Commission (EC) report on its regulatory policy for endocrine-disrupting chemicals. In addition to the scientific issues at stake, a central question has been how scientists can maintain their objectivity when informing policy makers.

OBJECTIVES

Drawing from current ethical, conceptual, and empirical studies of objectivity and conflicts of interest in scientific research, we propose guiding principles for communicating scientific findings in a manner that promotes objectivity, public trust, and policy relevance.

DISCUSSION

Both conceptual and empirical studies of scientific reasoning have shown that it is unrealistic to prevent policy-relevant scientific research from being influenced by value judgments. Conceptually, the current dispute over the EC report illustrates how scientists are forced to make value judgments about appropriate standards of evidence when informing public policy. Empirical studies provide further evidence that scientists are unavoidably influenced by a variety of potentially subconscious financial, social, political, and personal interests and values.

CONCLUSIONS

When scientific evidence is inconclusive and major regulatory decisions are at stake, it is unrealistic to think that values can be excluded from scientific reasoning. Thus, efforts to suppress or hide interests or values may actually damage scientific objectivity and public trust, whereas a willingness to bring implicit interests and values into the open may be the best path to promoting good science and policy.