Test-retest reliability of the simon task: a short version proposal

Don't SNARC me now! Intraindividual variability of cognitive phenomena - Insights from the Ironman paradigm

Two implicit generalizations are often made from group-level studies in cognitive experimental psychology and their common statistical analysis in the general linear model: (1) Group-level phenomena are assumed to be present in every participant with variations between participants being often treated as random error in data analyses; (2) phenomena are assumed to be stable over time. In this preregistered study, we investigated the validity of these generalizations in the commonly used parity judgment task. In the proposed Ironman paradigm, the intraindividual presence and stability of three popular numerical cognition effects were tested in 10 participants on 30 days: the SNARC (Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes, i.e., faster left-/right-sided responses to small/large magnitude numbers, respectively; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993), MARC (Linguistic Markedness of Response Codes; i.e., faster left-/right-sided responses to odd/even numbers, respectively; Nuerk, Iversen, & Willmes, 2004), and Odd (i.e., faster responses to even numbers; Hines, 1990) effects. We replicated the group-level effects; however, they were reliably present in only four to five (SNARC), six (MARC) or five (Odd) of 10 participants. Fluctuations seemed unsystematic, although the SNARC effect decreased over time along with reaction times. No correlation between the SNARC and MARC effects and sleep duration, tiredness, daytime, and consumption of stimulants were detected in most participants. These results challenge the frequent generalizations from group-level phenomena to individual participants and from single sessions to typical behavior. The innovative Ironman paradigm combined with bootstrap analyses permits unique insights into the intraindividual presence and stability of cognitive phenomena.

Decision-Making in Patients with Vasovagal Syncope: A Preliminary Study

The aim of this study was to evaluate the differences in performance during a decisional conflict task between subjects with emotional/blood phobia and those with an orthostatic vasovagal syncope. A total of 332 young subjects were included, from which 99 were excluded because of their condition or treatment. The subjects were classified into four groups depending on their responses to a questionnaire: 98 in a control group, 10 in an emotional/blood phobia syncope group, 38 in an orthostatic syncope group, and 87 in an unclear status group. This former group was excluded. The subjects performed a decisional conflict task to quantify their conflict-management ability. The task was the computer version of the Simon Task. Emotional/blood phobia syncope subjects showed a delayed reaction time when faced with decisional conflict in comparison with the control and orthostatic syncope subjects (55.8 ± 17.7 ms, 20.5 ± 4.9 ms, and 13.4 ± 9.2 ms, respectively, p ≤ 0.05). Our result suggests that emotional/blood phobia and orthostatic syncope are two clinical entities. Decisions could be a target of management in patients with emotional/blood phobia syncope. The altered decision-making of subjects with emotion/blood phobia syncope emphasized the role of higher cerebral functions in blood pressure control.

Determinants of elementary-school academic achievement: Component cognitive abilities and memory integration

Children are on a quest for knowledge. To achieve it, children must integrate separate but related episodes of learning. The theoretical model of memory integration posits that the process is supported by component cognitive abilities. In turn, memory integration predicts accumulation of a knowledge base. We tested this model in two studies (data collected in 2016-2018) with second (8-year-olds; n = 391; 196 female; 36% Black, 27% Hispanic/Latinx, 29% White, and 8% multiracial) and third (9-year-olds; n = 282; 148 female; 36% Black, 31% Hispanic/Latinx, 27% White, and 5% multiracial) graders. The results support the theoretical model and the role of verbal comprehension in learning new information, and also indicate that verbal comprehension alone is not sufficient to build knowledge.