Anger as a moral emotion: A “bird’s eye“ systematic review

Emotion-Driven Moral Evaluation: A Mechanistic Study Based on the Drift-Diffusion Model

BACKGROUND

Moral evaluation is identified as the first stage in the theory of moral judgment, and academics believe that it may align with the social intuitionist model. This study aims to prove that the model's emotional dominance hypothesis applies to moral evaluation by presenting a computational decision-making model that mathematically formalizes this emotional dominance decision-making process. We also compared different types of valence evaluation tasks to test the emotional priority hypothesis.

METHODS

We used a convenience sampling method to randomly recruit 30 enrolled college students. The drift-diffusion model was employed to analyze reaction times for words with various emotional and moral valences Additionally, we designed different valence evaluation tasks based on the response relevance hypothesis and evaluated the processing order through reaction time comparisons.

RESULTS

The analysis revealed that the emotional mechanism of immoral evaluation differs from moral evaluation. An increase in emotional valence accelerates the speed of evidence accumulation (v) for moral evaluation (M = 1.21, 0.2% < 0 < 99.8%) but lowers decision caution (a) in immoral evaluation (M = -0.64, 96.1% < 0 < 3.9%). In contrast, moral valence does not have a significant influence on evaluation processes (v, M = -0.28, 72.1% < 0 < 27.9%; a, M = -0.32, 79.3% < 0 < 20.7%). Furthermore, We found no significant difference in reaction times between moral and immoral words in the emotional evaluation task (F(1,29) = 0.55, p = 0.464, partial η2 = 0.02), but a significant difference existed in the moral evaluation task (F(1,29) = 17.99, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.38), indicating that the tendency of relatively fast immoral evaluation in emotional evaluation tasks may be caused by emotional priority.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings support the intuitive model's emotional dominance hypothesis and introduce a new emotional mechanism into moral evaluation. This study clarifies the distinct emotional processes in moral and immoral evaluations, fills a gap in the research on moral evaluation, and offers insights into human decision-making in moral contexts.

Consensus, controversy, and chaos in the attribution of characteristics to the morally exceptional

OBJECTIVE

What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.

METHOD

Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.

RESULTS

Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.

CONCLUSION

Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.