Anatomical and Functional Modularity in Cognitive Science: Shifting the Focus

Debates on the dorsomedial prefrontal/dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: insights for future research

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex/dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dmPFC/dACC) is a brain area subject to many theories and debates over its function(s). Even its precise anatomical borders are subject to much controversy. In the past decades, the dmPFC/dACC has been associated with more than 15 different cognitive processes, which sometimes appear quite unrelated (e.g. body perception, cognitive conflict). As a result, understanding what the dmPFC/dACC does has become a real challenge for many neuroscientists. Several theories of this brain area's function(s) have been developed, leading to successive and competitive publications bearing different models, which sometimes contradict each other. During the last two decades, the lively scientific exchanges around the dmPFC/dACC have promoted fruitful research in cognitive neuroscience. In this review, we provide an overview of the anatomy of the dmPFC/dACC, summarize the state of the art of functions that have been associated with this brain area and present the main theories aiming at explaining the dmPFC/dACC function(s). We explore the commonalities and the arguments between the different theories. Finally, we explain what can be learned from these debates for future investigations of the dmPFC/dACC and other brain regions' functions.

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience aims to build mechanistic explanations of behavior by mapping abilities described at the organismal level via the subpersonal level of computation onto specific brain networks. We provide an integrative review of these commitments and their mismatch with empirical research findings. Context-dependent neural tuning, neural reuse, degeneracy, plasticity, functional recovery, and the neural correlates of enculturated skills each show that there is a lack of stable mappings between organismal, computational, and neural levels of analysis. We furthermore highlight recent research suggesting that task context at the organismal level determines the dynamic parcellation of functional components at the neural level. Such instability prevents the establishment of specific computational descriptions of neural function, which remains a central goal of many brain mappers - including those who are sympathetic to the notion of many-to-many mappings between organismal and neural levels. This between-level instability presents a deep epistemological challenge and requires a reorientation of methodological and theoretical commitments within cognitive neuroscience. We demonstrate the need for change to brain mapping efforts in the face of instability if cognitive neuroscience is to maintain its central goal of constructing computational mechanistic explanations of behavior; we show that such explanations must be contextual at all levels.

Who are you talking to? The role of addressee identity in utterance comprehension

Experimental evidence suggests that speaker and addressee quickly adapt to each other from the earliest moments of sentence processing, and that interlocutor-related information is rapidly integrated with other sources of nonpragmatic information (e.g., semantic, morphosyntactic, etc.). These findings have been taken as support for one-step models of sentence comprehension. The results from the present event-related potential study challenge this theoretical framework providing a case where discourse level information is integrated only at a late stage of processing, when morphosyntactic analysis has been already initiated. We considered the case of Basque allocutive agreement, where information about addressee gender is encoded in verbal inflection. Two different types of Basque grammatical violations were presented together with the corresponding control conditions: one could be detected based on a morphosyntactic mismatch (person agreement violation), while the other could be detected only if the addressee's gender was considered (allocutive violation). Morphosyntactic violations elicited greater N400 effects followed by P600 effects, while allocutive violations elicited only P600 effects. These results provide new constraints to one-step accounts as they represent a case where speakers do not immediately adjust to the addressee's perspective. We propose that the relevance of discourse-level information might be a crucial variable to reconcile the dichotomy between one- and two-step models.

Realization in biology?

It is widely assumed that functional and dispositional properties are not identical to their physical base, but that there is some kind of asymmetrical ontological dependence between them. In this regard, a popular idea is that the former are realized by the latter, which, under the non-identity assumption, is generally understood to be a non-causal, constitutive relation. In this paper we examine two of the most widely accepted approaches to realization, the so-called 'flat view' and the 'dimensioned view', and we analyze their explanatory relevance in the light of a number of examples from the life sciences, paying special attention to developmental phenomena. Our conclusion is that the emphasis placed by modern-day biology on such properties as variability, evolvability, and a whole collection of phenomena like modularity, robustness, and developmental constraint or developmental bias requires the adoption of a much more dynamic perspective than traditional realization frameworks are able to capture.

The search of "canonical" explanations for the cerebral cortex

This paper addresses a fundamental line of research in neuroscience: the identification of a putative neural processing core of the cerebral cortex, often claimed to be "canonical". This "canonical" core would be shared by the entire cortex, and would explain why it is so powerful and diversified in tasks and functions, yet so uniform in architecture. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the search for canonical explanations over the past 40 years, discussing the theoretical frameworks informing this research. It will highlight a bias that, in my opinion, has limited the success of this research project, that of overlooking the dimension of cortical development. The earliest explanation of the cerebral cortex as canonical was attempted by David Marr, deriving putative cortical circuits from general mathematical laws, loosely following a deductive-nomological account. Although Marr's theory turned out to be incorrect, one of its merits was to have put the issue of cortical circuit development at the top of his agenda. This aspect has been largely neglected in much of the research on canonical models that has followed. Models proposed in the 1980s were conceived as mechanistic. They identified a small number of components that interacted as a basic circuit, with each component defined as a function. More recent models have been presented as idealized canonical computations, distinct from mechanistic explanations, due to the lack of identifiable cortical components. Currently, the entire enterprise of coming up with a single canonical explanation has been criticized as being misguided, and the premise of the uniformity of the cortex has been strongly challenged. This debate is analyzed here. The legacy of the canonical circuit concept is reflected in both positive and negative ways in recent large-scale brain projects, such as the Human Brain Project. One positive aspect is that these projects might achieve the aim of producing detailed simulations of cortical electrical activity, a negative one regards whether they will be able to find ways of simulating how circuits actually develop.

How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?

Work on functional neuroimaging of cognition falls into two categories. The first aims at localizing specific cognitive subsystems in specific brain regions. In this research, the cognitive subsystems in question need to be defined independently of the neuroimaging data because the interpretation of the data requires such definition; so functional neuroimaging is informed by cognitive theories rather than informing them. The second category uses neuroimaging data to test cognitive theories. As cognitive theories are expressed in cognitive terms, such theories have to be embellished by explicit proposals about relationships between cognition and the brain if they are to become capable of generating predictions about the results of experiments that use functional neuroimaging. Whether functional neuroimaging can succeed in informing a cognitive theory depends critically upon the plausibility of such supplementary proposals. It is also critical to avoid the "consistency fallacy." When neuroimaging data from an experiment are consistent with predictions from a particular cognitive theory, this cannot be offered as evidence in support of that theory unless it can be shown that there were possible other outcomes of the experiment that are inconsistent with the theory-outcomes that would have falsified predictions from the theory had they been obtained.

Modularity and mental architecture

Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor's landmark book The Modularity of Mind. According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor's critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all aspects of cognitive architecture, including high-level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:641-649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Neural reuse: a fundamental organizational principle of the brain

An emerging class of theories concerning the functional structure of the brain takes the reuse of neural circuitry for various cognitive purposes to be a central organizational principle. According to these theories, it is quite common for neural circuits established for one purpose to be exapted (exploited, recycled, redeployed) during evolution or normal development, and be put to different uses, often without losing their original functions. Neural reuse theories thus differ from the usual understanding of the role of neural plasticity (which is, after all, a kind of reuse) in brain organization along the following lines: According to neural reuse, circuits can continue to acquire new uses after an initial or original function is established; the acquisition of new uses need not involve unusual circumstances such as injury or loss of established function; and the acquisition of a new use need not involve (much) local change to circuit structure (e.g., it might involve only the establishment of functional connections to new neural partners). Thus, neural reuse theories offer a distinct perspective on several topics of general interest, such as: the evolution and development of the brain, including (for instance) the evolutionary-developmental pathway supporting primate tool use and human language; the degree of modularity in brain organization; the degree of localization of cognitive function; and the cortical parcellation problem and the prospects (and proper methods to employ) for function to structure mapping. The idea also has some practical implications in the areas of rehabilitative medicine and machine interface design.

The dynamics of ontogeny: a neuroconstructivist perspective on genes, brains, cognition and behavior

For years, the view that the human cognitive system is as a Swiss army knife with innately specified functional modules that come online one by one or can be impaired independently of other modules, has dominated cognitive science. In this chapter, we start out by questioning this view and argue it needs to be replaced by a dynamic neuroconstructivist approach in which genes, brain, behavior, and environment interact multidirectionally throughout development. Using examples from the recent literature, we then highlight how a static modular view of the brain remains deeply ingrained in (1) behavioral, (2) neuroimaging, and (3) genetics research on typical and atypical cognitive development. Finally, we discuss future contributions of the neuroconstructivist approach to developmental research in particular, and cognitive neuroscience in general.

The Leabra architecture: Specialization without modularity

The posterior cortex, hippocampus, and prefrontal cortex in the Leabra architecture are specialized in terms of various neural parameters, and thus are predilections for learning and processing, but domain-general in terms of cognitive functions such as face recognition. Also, these areas are not encapsulated and violate Fodorian criteria for modularity. Anderson's terminology obscures these important points, but we applaud his overall message.