Color experience in blindsight?

To see or not to see--thalamo-cortical networks during blindsight and perceptual suppression

Even during moments when we fail to be fully aware of our environment, our brains never go silent. Instead, it appears that the brain can also operate in an alternate, unconscious mode. Delineating unconscious from conscious neural processes is a promising first step toward investigating how awareness emerges from brain activity. Here we focus on recent insights into the neuronal processes that contribute to visual function in the absence of a conscious visual percept. Drawing on insights from findings on the phenomenon of blindsight that results from injury to primary visual cortex and the results of experimentally induced perceptual suppression, we describe what kind of visual information the visual system analyzes unconsciously and we discuss the neuronal routing and responses that accompany this process. We conclude that unconscious processing of certain visual stimulus attributes, such as the presence of visual motion or the emotional expression of a face can occur in a geniculo-cortical circuit that runs independent from and in parallel to the predominant route through primary visual cortex. We speculate that in contrast, bidirectional neuronal interactions between cortex and the thalamic pulvinar nucleus that support large-scale neuronal integration and visual awareness are impeded during blindsight and perceptual suppression.

Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience

Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 blindsight differs from ordinary visual experience in lacking the particularity, transparency and fine-grainedness often taken to be essential to visual experience, at least in veridical cases. I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight provides a counterexample to the view that these characteristics are essential to veridical visual experience and that this gives us reason to resist the view that visual experience is essentially a perceptual relation to external objects. In the second part of the paper I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight yields important insights into the effects of attentional modulation on perceptual content and that cases of attentional modulation of appearance are not at odds with the view that the phenomenology of visual experience flows from its content.

The case for characterising type-2 blindsight as a genuinely visual phenomenon

Type-2 blindsight is often characterised as involving a non-visual form of awareness that blindsight subjects experience under certain presentation conditions. This paper evaluates the claim that type-2 awareness is non-visual and the proposal that it is a cognitive form of awareness. It is argued that, contrary to the standard account, type-2 awareness is best characterised as visual both because it satisfies certain criteria for being visual and because it can accommodate facts about the phenomenon that the cognitive account cannot. The conclusion is made that type-2 blindsight is best characterised as involving a form of abnormal, degraded visual awareness.

Unconscious influences on decision making in blindsight

Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue that an explanation for blindsight need not appeal to unconscious brain processes, citing research indicating that the condition merely reflects degraded visual experience. We reply that other evidence suggests blindsighters' predictive behavior under forced choice reflects cognitive access to low-level visual information that does not correlate with visual consciousness. Therefore, while we grant that visual consciousness may be required for full visual experience, we argue that it may not be needed for decision making and judgment.