Smelling matter

Imaging the living brain: An argument for ruthless reductionism from olfactory neurobiology

Should theories of "higher-level" cognitive effects originate in "lower-level" molecular mechanisms? This paper supports reductionist explanations of sensory perception via molecular mechanisms in neurobiology. It shows that molecular and cellular mechanisms must constitute the material foundation to derive better theories and models for neuroscience. In support of "bottom-up theorizing", I explore the recent application of a new real-time molecular imaging technique (SCAPE microscopy) to mixture coding in olfaction. Seemingly emergent "higher-level" psychological effects in odor perception, irreducible to the physical stimulus, are linked back to underlying molecular mechanisms at the receptor level. The SCAPE study has notable theoretical impact. It provides a possible answer to the neurocomputational challenge in olfaction from combinatorial coding at the periphery: how does the brain discriminate different complex mixtures from widespread and overlapping receptor activation? The failure of previous reductionist structure-odor explanations is shown to reside in misconceptualizations of the critical causal elements involved. Causally fundamental features are not of parts independently of a mechanism. Components and their relevant features are units via their causal role within a mechanism. Here, new technologies allow revisiting our understanding of the ontology and levels of organization of a system.

Accounting for Subjectivity in Experimental Research on Human Olfaction

Although olfaction is a modality with great interindividual perceptual disparities, its subjective dimension has been let aside in modern research, in line with the overall neglect of consciousness in experimental psychology. However, following the renewed interest for the neural bases of consciousness, some methodological leads have been proposed to include subjectivity in experimental protocols. Here, we argue that adapting such methods to the field of olfaction will allow to rigorously acquire subjective reports, and we present several ways to do so. This will improve the understanding of diversity in odor perception and its underlying neural mechanisms.

Odors: from chemical structures to gaseous plumes

We are immersed within an odorous sea of chemical currents that we parse into individual odors with complex structures. Odors have been posited as determined by the structural relation between the molecules that compose the chemical compounds and their interactions with the receptor site. But, naturally occurring smells are parsed from gaseous odor plumes. To give a comprehensive account of the nature of odors the chemosciences must account for these large distributed entities as well. We offer a focused review of what is known about the perception of odor plumes for olfactory navigation and tracking, which we then connect to what is known about the role odorants play as properties of the plume in determining odor identity with respect to odor quality. We end by motivating our central claim that more research needs to be conducted on the role that odorants play within the odor plume in determining odor identity.

A Critique of Olfactory Objects

Does the sense of smell involve the perception of odor objects? General discussion of perceptual objecthood centers on three criteria: stimulus representation, perceptual constancy, and figure-ground segregation. These criteria, derived from theories of vision, have been applied to olfaction in recent philosophical debates about psychology. An inherent problem with such framing of olfactory objecthood is that philosophers explicitly ignore the constitutive factors of the sensory systems that underpin the implementation of these criteria. The biological basis of odor coding is fundamentally different from the coding principles of the visual system. This article analyzes the three measures of perceptual objecthood against the biological background of the olfactory system. It contrasts the coding principles in olfaction with the visual system to show why these criteria of objecthood fail to be instantiated in odor perception. The argument demonstrates that olfaction affords perceptual categorization without the need to form odor objects.