Meylan A. In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance.
ERKENNTNIS 2022;
89:207-221. [PMID:
38303984 PMCID:
PMC10827968 DOI:
10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2019] [Accepted: 02/20/2022] [Indexed: 02/03/2024]
Abstract
The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard's alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
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