Robust, unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard's alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

Friend and foe? Self-deception in organisations

Purpose

Self-deception is generally deemed an adaptive psychological mechanism that ensures well-being, a sense of identity and social advancement. However, self-deception becomes maladaptive in organised environments that undermine the critical thinking essential to development and change. The purpose of this paper is to advance a theoretical model of self-deception, specifying and contextualising its intrapersonal and relational components in organisations. Further, it provides guidelines for practitioners to identify self-deception tactics, and minimise maladaptive self-deception.

Design/methodology/approach

Drawing on affective coping, system justification and self-categorisation theories, the paper illustrates how the interplay of intrapersonal and relational factors with organisational practices explain self-deception.

Findings

Maladaptive self-deception is pervasive in organisations that deter critical reflection, and intensify motivated biases to self-enhance and self-protect.

Originality/value

This paper proposes a socially and organisationally embedded model of self-deception, specifies how self-deception develops and manifests in organisations, and suggests ways of identifying and managing self-deception towards positive organisational development and change.