Are memories of sexual trauma fragmented?

The Return of Repression? Evidence From Cognitive Psychology

The controversy over alleged repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) was among the most contentious ever to embroil psychology and psychiatry. Adapting paradigms from cognitive psychology, my research group tested hypotheses pertinent to repressed memory and false memory interpretations of recovered memories. We tested adults who: (1) report recovering memories of CSA after not having thought about their abuse for years; (2) report never having forgotten their CSA; (3) believe they harbor "repressed" memories of CSA; and (4) deny having been sexually abused. We tested hypotheses about mechanisms that might figure in the inability to recall memories of one's abuse and those that might render one susceptible to developing false memories of abuse. The purpose of this article is to summarize this work. Finally, I draw on the work of Lionel Penrose to speculate about why the popularity of the concept of repressed memories of trauma-or its synonym, dissociative amnesia for trauma-may be rising today.

Judges and lawyers' beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: further guidance required

This article examines continuing misunderstanding about memory function especially for trauma, across three UK samples (N = 717). Delayed allegations of child sexual and physical abuse are prevalent in Western legal systems and often rely upon uncorroborated memory testimony to prove guilt. U.K. legal professionals and jurors typically assess the reliability of such memory recall via common sense, yet decades of scientific research show common sense beliefs often conflict with science. Recent international surveys show controversial notions of repression and accurate memory recovery remain strongly endorsed. In historical cases, these notions may lead to wrongful convictions. The current study surveyed the U.K. public, lawyers, and mental health professionals' beliefs about repression, dissociative amnesia and false memories. Study findings give unique data on judges' and barristers' beliefs. Overall, the study findings reinforce international scientists' concerns of a science - knowledge-gap. Repression was strongly endorsed by lay, legal and clinical participants (> 78%) as was dissociative amnesia (> 87%). Moreover, suboptimal professional legal education and juror guidance may increase misunderstanding. Correcting beliefs about memory function, and extending the contribution of memory science in the courtroom remains an important quest for cognitive scientists.

Myths of trauma memory: on the oversimplification of effects of attention narrowing under stress

The present article addresses claims commonly made by prosecution witnesses in sexual assault trials: that attention narrows under stress, and that these attended aspects of the event are encoded in a way that ensures accuracy and resistance to fading and distortion. We provide evidence to contradict such claims. Given that what is encoded is largely the gist of one's interpretation of experience, we discuss the way in which attention and emotion can bias the interpretation of experience. We illustrate with issues of memory reports in cases of acquaintance rape, where the primary issue is the presence or absence of consent. We provide some specific illustrations concerning effects of emotion on interpretation of sexual consent. Finally, based on what is known regarding priming effects on memory retrieval and judgment, we conclude with discussion of the potential of some "trauma-informed" interviewing strategies to promote false memories (such as FETI: Forensic Experiential Trauma Interview).

Cognitions and Metacognitive Beliefs in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

OBJECTIVE

There has been an increasing interest in understanding what contributes to the development and what maintains posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The cognitive model emphasizes that it is a disturbance of the autobiographical memory for the trauma, cognitive beliefs and maladaptive behaviour that maintain trauma symptoms. Interventions are based on cognitive restructuring and behaviour experiments to modify these beliefs. In contrast, the metacognitive model emphasizes that it is the metacognitive beliefs that give rise to the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS) that maintain trauma symptoms. The focus of treatment is reducing CAS and working on metacognitive beliefs. The aim of this study was to explore the contribution of cognitions and metacognitive beliefs to trauma symptoms and investigate what predicts symptom burden in traumatized patients.

METHOD

Participants (N = 290) diagnosed with PTSD were included, and hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed to explore if cognitions and metacognitive beliefs explained additional and independent variance in trauma symptoms while controlling for age and gender.

RESULTS

Both cognitions and metacognitive beliefs contributed independently and significantly to predicting trauma symptoms.

CONCLUSION

The results provide further support for investigating what maintains trauma symptoms and what to target in treatment. This may have clinical implications for our theoretical and practical understanding of PTSD.

Inaccuracy in the Scientific Record and Open Postpublication Critique

There is growing evidence that the published psychological literature is marred by multiple errors and inaccuracies and often fails to reflect the changing nature of the knowledge base. At least four types of error are common-citation error, methodological error, statistical error, and interpretation error. In the face of the apparent inevitability of these inaccuracies, core scientific values such as openness and transparency require that correction mechanisms are readily available. In this article, I reviewed standard mechanisms in psychology journals and found them to have limitations. The effects of more widely enabling open postpublication critique in the same journal in addition to conventional peer review are considered. This mechanism is well established in medicine and the life sciences but rare in psychology and may assist psychological science to correct itself.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

Are memories of sexual trauma fragmented? A post publication discussion among Richard J. McNally, Dorthe Berntsen, Chris R. Brewin and David C. Rubin

Following the publication of his article on whether memories of trauma in sexual assault victims are fragmented (McNally, 2022), McNally moderated a discussion between Chris R. Brewin and David C. Rubin/Dorthe Berntsen whose perspectives on memory fragmentation were cited by McNally. The discussion clarified their contrasting viewpoints on this controversy.