A social neuroscience approach to self and social categorisation: A new look at an old issue

Neural correlates of performance monitoring vary as a function of competition between automatic and controlled processes: An ERP study

Dual process theories of attitude formation propose that an evolutionary old associative system automatically generates subjective judgments by processing mere spatiotemporal contiguity between paired objects, subjects, or events. These judgments can potentially contradict our well-reasoned evaluations and highjack decisional or behavioral outcomes. Contrary to this perspective, other models stress the exclusive work of a single propositional system that consciously process co-occurrences between environmental cues and produce propositions, i.e., mental statements that capture the specific manner through which stimuli are linked. We constructed an experiment on the premise that it would be possible, if the associative system does produce attitudes in a parallel non-conscious fashion, to condition two mutually exclusive attitudes (one implicit, the other explicit) toward a same stimulus. Through explicit ratings, inhibition performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring, we assessed whether there was a discrepancy between stimuli that were conditioned with (1) the two systems working in harmony (i.e., producing congruent attitudes), or (2) the two systems working in competition (i.e., producing incongruent attitudes). Compared with congruent stimuli, incongruent stimuli consistently elicited more neutral liking scores, higher response times and error rates, as well as a diminished amplitudes in two well-studied neural correlates of automatic error detection (i.e., error-related negativity) and conscious appraisal of error commission (i.e., error-related positivity). Our findings are discussed in the light of evolutionary psychology, dual-process theories of attitude formation and theoretical frameworks on the functional significance of error-related neural markers.

An application of the dual identity model and active categorization to increase intercultural closeness

The enhancement of social inclusion is a key to maintaining cohesion in society and to foster the benefits of cultural diversity. Using insights from the Dual Identity Model (DIM) with a special focus on active categorization, we develop an intervention to increase social inclusion. Our intervention encourages the participants to (re-)categorize on a superordinate level (i.e., a human identity) while being exposed to their own culture. Across a set of experiments, we test the efficacy of our intervention against control conditions on the effect of social inclusion, measured by perceived social distance. Results show an increase in cultural closeness and provide preliminary support for the use of a DIM-based intervention to increase intercultural inclusion

Agency and Identity in the Collective Self

Contemporary research on human sociality is heavily influenced by the social identity approach, positioning social categorization as the primary mechanism governing social life. Building on the distinction between agency and identity in the individual self ("I" vs. "Me"), we emphasize the analogous importance of distinguishing collective agency from collective identity ("We" vs. "Us"). While collective identity is anchored in the unique characteristics of group members, collective agency involves the adoption of a shared subjectivity that is directed toward some object of our attention, desire, emotion, belief, or action. These distinct components of the collective self are differentiated in terms of their mental representations, neurocognitive underpinnings, conditions of emergence, mechanisms of social convergence, and functional consequences. Overall, we show that collective agency provides a useful complement to the social categorization approach, with unique implications for multiple domains of human social life, including collective action, responsibility, dignity, violence, dominance, ritual, and morality.

Examining the effect of online advertisement cues on human responses using eye-tracking, EEG, and MRI

This study sought to emphasize how disciplines such as neuroscience and marketing can be applied in advertising and consumer behavior. The application of neuroscience methods in analyzing and understanding human behavior related to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) and brain activity has recently garnered attention. This study examines brain processes while participants attempted to elicit preferences for a product, and demonstrates factors that influence consumer behavior using eye-tracking, electroencephalography (EEG), and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) from a neuroscience approach. We planned two conditions of online advertising, namely, peripheral cues without argument and central cues with argument strength. Thirty respondents participated in the experiment, consisting of eye-tracking, EEG, and MRI instruments to explore brain activity in central cue conditions. We investigated whether diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) analysis could detect regional brain changes. Using eye-tracking, we found that the responses were mainly in the mean fixation duration, number of fixations, mean saccade duration, and number of saccade durations for the central cue condition. Moreover, the findings show that the fusiform gyrus and frontal cortex are significantly associated with building a relationship by inferring central cues in the EEG assay. The MRI images show that the fusiform gyrus and frontal cortex are significantly active in the central cue condition. DTI analysis indicates that the corpus callosum has changed in the central cue condition. We used eye-tracking, EEG, MRI, and DTI to understand that these connections may apprehend responses when viewing advertisements, especially in the fusiform gyrus, frontal cortex, and corpus callosum.

Effects of Minimal Grouping On Implicit Prejudice, Infrahumanization, and Neural Processing Despite Orthogonal Social Categorizations

Racial prejudice is a pervasive and pernicious form of intergroup bias. However, a mounting number of studies show that re-categorization-even into minimal groups-can overcome the typical consequences of racial and other group classifications. We tested the effects of minimal grouping on implicit prejudice and infrahumanization using a paradigm in which race was orthogonal to group membership. This allowed us to examine whether knowledge of group membership overrides obvious category differences. We found that participants infrahumanized and showed implicit bias toward the minimal out-group, despite the crosscutting presence of race, and in fact did not show any of the usual implicit racial bias. In addition, Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) showed an early race effect followed by distinct reactions on the basis of group as processing continued. This is evidence that arbitrary social classifications can engender in-group preference even in the presence of orthogonal, visually salient categorizations.

Understanding Work Practices of Autonomous Agile Teams: A Social-psychological Review

The purpose of this paper is to suggest additional aspects of social psychology that could help when making sense of autonomous agile teams. To make use of well-tested theories in social psychology and instead see how they replicated and differ in the autonomous agile team context would avoid reinventing the wheel. This was done, as an initial step, through looking at some very common agile practices and relate them to existing findings in social-psychological research. The two theories found that I argue could be more applied to the software engineering context are social identity theory and group socialization theory. The results show that literature provides social-psychological reasons for the popularity of some agile practices, but that scientific studies are needed to gather empirical evidence on these under-researched topics. Understanding deeper psychological theories could provide a better understanding of the psychological processes when building autonomous agile team, which could then lead to better predictability and intervention in relation to human factors.

The social identity approach: Appraising the Tajfellian legacy

Since its original formulation, Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT) has broadened considerably from its original focus on intergroup relations and is now applied to a wide range of phenomena. Indeed, the 'social identity approach' has become one of the most widely used perspectives in contemporary social psychology. In this article, I examine the popularity of Tajfel's writings on social identity and intergroup relations, especially over the last thirty years when they started to become more generally used. I offer a critical appraisal of the original SIT, both as a theory of intergroup relations and as a theory of identity, concluding that its real value lies in its success in offering an over-arching perspective on the importance of groups in social life and its ability to stimulate new areas of research. I then widen the discussion to consider how the social identity perspective has been used in a number of other fields of enquiry.

Viewing Adaptive Social Choice Through the Lens of Associative Learning

Because humans live in a dynamic and evolving social world, modeling the factors that guide social behavior has remained a challenge for psychology. In contrast, much progress has been made on understanding some of the more basic elements of human behavior, such as associative learning and memory, which has been successfully modeled in other species. Here we argue that applying an associative learning approach to social behavior can offer valuable insights into the human moral experience. We propose that the basic principles of associative learning-conserved across a range of species-can, in many situations, help to explain seemingly complex human behaviors, including altruistic, cooperative, and selfish acts. We describe examples from the social decision-making literature using Pavlovian learning phenomena (e.g., extinction, cue competition, stimulus generalization) to detail how a history of positive or negative social outcomes influences cognitive and affective mechanisms that shape moral choice. Examining how we might understand social behaviors and their likely reliance on domain-general mechanisms can help to generate testable hypotheses to further understand how social value is learned, represented, and expressed behaviorally.

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief

Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties - known as partisanship - can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.

fMRI Repetition Suppression During Generalized Social Categorization

Correctly identifying friends and foes is integral to successful group living. Here, we use repetition suppression to examine the neural circuitry underlying generalized group categorization-the process of categorizing in-group and out-group members across multiple social categories. Participants assigned to an arbitrary team (i.e., Eagles or Rattlers) underwent fMRI while categorizing political and arbitrary in-group and out-group members. We found that frontoparietal control network exhibited repetition suppression in response to "identical in-group" (Democrat-Democrat or Eagles-Eagles) and "different in-group" (Eagles-Democrat or Democrat-Eagles) trials relative to "out-group/in-group trials" (Republican-Democrat or Rattler-Eagles). Specifically, the repetition suppression contrast map included bilateral superior parietal lobule, bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and bilateral middle temporal gyrus. Participants who reported an increased tendency to join and value their social groups exhibited decreased repetition suppression in bilateral DLPFC. Comparison of our whole-brain repetition suppression map with an independently identified map of frontoparietal control network revealed 34.3% overlap. Social categorization requires recognizing both a target's group membership but also the target's orientation toward one's self. Fittingly, we find that generalized social categorization engages a network that acts as a functional bridge between dorsal attentional (exogenously-oriented) and default mode (internally-oriented) networks.

Perceived warmth and competence of others shape voluntary deceptive behaviour in a morally relevant setting

The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition - 'warmth' and 'competence' - impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.

Swiss identity smells like chocolate: Social identity shapes olfactory judgments

There is extensive evidence that social identities can shape people’s attitudes and behavior, but what about sensory judgments? We examined the possibility that social identity concerns may also shape the judgment of non-social properties—namely, olfactory judgment. In two experiments, we presented Swiss and non-Swiss participants with the odor of chocolate, for which Switzerland is world-famous, and a control odor (popcorn). Swiss participants primed with Swiss identity reported the odor of chocolate (but not popcorn) as more intense than non-Swiss participants (Experiments 1 and 2) and than Swiss participants primed with individual identity or not primed (Experiment 2). The self-reported intensity of chocolate smell tended to increase as identity accessibility increased—but only among Swiss participants (Experiment 1). These results suggest that identity priming can counter-act classic sensory habituation effects, allowing identity-relevant smells to maintain their intensity after repeated presentations. This suggests that social identity dynamically influences sensory judgment. We discuss the potential implications for models of social identity and chemosensory perception.

A closer look at the discrimination outcomes in the IAT literature

To what extent the IAT (Implicit Association Test, Greenwald et al., 1998) predicts racial and ethnic discrimination is a heavily debated issue. The latest meta-analysis by Oswald et al. (2013) suggests a very weak association. In the present meta-analysis, we switched the focus from the predictor to the criterion, by taking a closer look at the discrimination outcomes. We discovered that many of these outcomes were not actually operationalizations of discrimination, but rather of other related, but distinct, concepts, such as brain activity and voting preferences. When we meta-analyzed the main effects of discrimination among the remaining discrimination outcomes, the overall effect was close to zero and highly inconsistent across studies. Taken together, it is doubtful whether the amalgamation of these outcomes is relevant criteria for assessing the IAT's predictive validity of discrimination. Accordingly, there is also little evidence that the IAT can meaningfully predict discrimination, and we thus strongly caution against any practical applications of the IAT that rest on this assumption. However, provided that the application is thoroughly informed by the current state of the literature, we believe the IAT can still be a useful tool for researchers, educators, managers, and students who are interested in attitudes, prejudices, stereotypes, and discrimination.

The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative Review

We review emerging research on the psychological and biological factors that underlie social group formation, cooperation, and conflict in humans. Our aim is to integrate the intergroup neuroscience literature with classic theories of group processes and intergroup relations in an effort to move beyond merely describing the effects of specific social out-groups on the brain and behavior. Instead, we emphasize the underlying psychological processes that govern intergroup interactions more generally: forming and updating our representations of "us" and "them" via social identification and functional relations between groups. This approach highlights the dynamic nature of social identity and the context-dependent nature of intergroup relations. We argue that this theoretical integration can help reconcile seemingly discrepant findings in the literature, provide organizational principles for understanding the core elements of intergroup dynamics, and highlight several exciting directions for future research at the interface of intergroup relations and neuroscience.

Social identity modifies face perception: an ERP study of social categorization

Two studies examined whether social identity processes, i.e. group identification and social identity threat, amplify the degree to which people attend to social category information in early perception [assessed with event-related brain potentials (ERPs)]. Participants were presented with faces of Muslims and non-Muslims in an evaluative priming task while ERPs were measured and implicit evaluative bias was assessed. Study 1 revealed that non-Muslims showed stronger differentiation between ingroup and outgroup faces in both early (N200) and later processing stages (implicit evaluations) when they identified more strongly with their ethnic group. Moreover, identification effects on implicit bias were mediated by intergroup differentiation in the N200. In Study 2, social identity threat (vs control) was manipulated among Muslims. Results revealed that high social identity threat resulted in stronger differentiation of Muslims from non-Muslims in early (N200) and late (implicit evaluations) processing stages, with N200 effects again predicting implicit bias. Combined, these studies reveal how seemingly bottom-up early social categorization processes are affected by individual and contextual variables that affect the meaning of social identity. Implications of these results for the social identity perspective as well as social cognitive theories of person perception are discussed.

Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses

Despite its early origins and adaptive functions, empathy is not inevitable; people routinely fail to empathize with others, especially members of different social or cultural groups. In five experiments, we systematically explore how social identity, functional relations between groups, competitive threat, and perceived entitativity contribute to intergroup empathy bias: the tendency not only to empathize less with out-group relative to in-group members, but also feel pleasure in response to their pain (and pain in response to their pleasure). When teams are set in direct competition, affective responses to competition-irrelevant events are characterized not only by less empathy toward out-group relative to in-group members, but also by increased counter-empathic responses: Schadenfreude and Glückschmerz (Experiment 1). Comparing responses to in-group and out-group targets against responses to unaffiliated targets in this competitive context suggests that intergroup empathy bias may be better characterized by out-group antipathy rather than extraordinary in-group empathy (Experiment 2). We find also that intergroup empathy bias is robust to changes in relative group standing-feedback indicating that the out-group has fallen behind (Experiment 3a) or is no longer a competitive threat (Experiment 3b) does not reduce the bias. However, reducing perceived in-group and out-group entitativity can significantly attenuate intergroup empathy bias (Experiment 4). This research establishes the boundary conditions of intergroup empathy bias and provides initial support for a more integrative framework of group-based empathy.

Drinking Too Much and Feeling Bad About It? How Group Identification Moderates Experiences of Guilt and Shame Following Norm Transgression

The role of reference group norms in self-regulation was examined from the perspective of transgressions. Results from four studies suggest that following the transgression of a reference group’s norms, individuals who strongly identify with their group report more intense feelings of guilt, an emotion reflecting an inference that “bad” behaviors are perceived as the cause of the transgression. Conversely, weakly identified individuals reported more intense feelings of shame, an emotion reflecting an inference that “bad” characteristics of the person are perceived as the cause of the transgression. The studies also explored the differential relevance of the reference groups when assessing transgressive behaviors, the counterfactual thoughts individuals have about possible causes for the transgressions, and the motivational outcomes of guilt and shame using behavioral data. Results of the studies offer insights into self-regulation, maintenance of group norms, and offer implications for alcohol consumption interventions, such as social marketing campaigns.

Common brain regions with distinct patterns of neural responses during mentalizing about groups and individuals

An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., "scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature"). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition--medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the "mind" of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.

Dynamic representations of race: processing goals shape race decoding in the fusiform gyri

People perceive and evaluate others on the basis of social categories, such as race, gender and age. Initial processing of targets in terms of visually salient social categories is often characterized as inevitable. In the current study, we investigated the influence of processing goals on the representation of race in the visual processing stream. Participants were assigned to one of two mixed-race teams and categorized faces according to their group membership or skin color. To assess neural representations of race, we employed multivariate pattern analysis to examined neural activity related to the presentation of Black and White faces. As predicted, patterns of neural activity within the early visual cortex and fusiform gyri (FG) could decode the race of face stimuli above chance and were moderated by processing goals. Race decoding in early visual cortex was above chance in both categorization tasks and below chance in a prefrontal control region. More importantly, race decoding was greater in the FG during the group membership vs skin color categorization task. The results suggest that, ironically, explicit racial categorization can diminish the representation of race in the FG. These findings suggest that representations of race are dynamic, reflecting current processing goals.

The importance of moral construal: moral versus non-moral construal elicits faster, more extreme, universal evaluations of the same actions

Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating whether actions were morally good or bad) or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad) of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly associated with universal prescriptions-the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an action-than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic) evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-making.

The role of the medial prefrontal cortex in social categorization

Group membership is an important aspect of our everyday behavior. Recently, we showed that existing relevant in-group labels increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) compared with out-group labels, suggesting a role of the MPFC in social categorization. However, the question still remains whether this increase in MPFC activation for in-group representation is solely related with previous experience with the in-group. To test this, we randomly assigned participants to a red or blue team and in a subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment they categorized red and blue team words as belonging to either the in-group or the out-group. Results showed that even under these minimal conditions increased activation was found in the MPFC when participants indicated that they belonged to a group, as compared with when they did not. This effect was found to be associated with the level of group identification. These results confirm the role of MPFC in social categorization.

A social identity approach to person memory: group membership, collective identification, and social role shape attention and memory

Evidence indicates that superior memory for own-group versus other-group faces (termed own-group bias) occurs because of social categorization: People are more likely to encode own-group members as individuals. The authors show that aspects of the perceiver's social identity shape social attention and memory over and above mere categorization. In three experiments, participants were assigned to a mixed-race minimal group and showed own-group bias toward this minimal group, regardless of race. Own-group bias was mediated by attention toward own-group faces during encoding (Experiment 1). Furthermore, participants who were highly identified with their minimal group had the largest own-group bias (Experiment 2). However, social affordances attenuated own-group bias-Memory for other-group faces was heightened among participants who were assigned to a role (i.e., spy) that required attention toward other-group members (Experiment 3). This research suggests that social identity may provide novel insights into person memory.

Is race erased? Decoding race from patterns of neural activity when skin color is not diagnostic of group boundaries

Several theories suggest that people do not represent race when it does not signify group boundaries. However, race is often associated with visually salient differences in skin tone and facial features. In this study, we investigated whether race could be decoded from distributed patterns of neural activity in the fusiform gyri and early visual cortex when visual features that often covary with race were orthogonal to group membership. To this end, we used multivariate pattern analysis to examine an fMRI dataset that was collected while participants assigned to mixed-race groups categorized own-race and other-race faces as belonging to their newly assigned group. Whereas conventional univariate analyses provided no evidence of race-based responses in the fusiform gyri or early visual cortex, multivariate pattern analysis suggested that race was represented within these regions. Moreover, race was represented in the fusiform gyri to a greater extent than early visual cortex, suggesting that the fusiform gyri results do not merely reflect low-level perceptual information (e.g. color, contrast) from early visual cortex. These findings indicate that patterns of activation within specific regions of the visual cortex may represent race even when overall activation in these regions is not driven by racial information.

See Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer

Three studies demonstrated that collective identity and identity threat shape representations of the physical world. In Study 1, New York Yankees fans estimated Fenway Park, the stadium of a threatening out-group (but not Camden Yards, the stadium of a neutral out-group) to be closer than did non-Yankees fans. In Study 2, the authors manipulated identity threat among people affiliated (or not) with New York University (NYU). When Columbia University was portrayed as threatening to NYU, NYU affiliates estimated Columbia as closer than did non-affiliates, compared with when Columbia was nonthreatening. In Study 3, Americans who perceived more symbolic threats from Mexican immigration estimated Mexico City as closer. Collective identification with the in-group moderated effects of threat on distance estimations. These studies suggest that social categorization, collective identification, and identity threat work in concert to shape the representations of the physical world.

Modulation of the fusiform face area following minimal exposure to motivationally relevant faces: evidence of in-group enhancement (not out-group disregard)

Studies have shown that fusiform face area (FFA) activity increases with visual expertise. We present an fMRI study showing that faces from a social category made relevant by an experimental manipulation (members of an experimentally created in-group) preferentially recruited the FFA even when they were matched in exposure to face stimuli from a less significant social category (members of an experimentally created out-group). Faces were randomly assigned to groups and fully counterbalanced so that no perceptual cues allowed participants to visually distinguish category membership. The results revealed a pattern of in-group enhancement (not out-group disregard), such that the FFA was selectively engaged following the presentation of in-group compared with out-group or unaffiliated control faces even when the intergroup distinction was arbitrary, and exposure to in-group and out-group faces was equivalent and brief. In addition, individual differences in FFA activity for in-group versus out-group faces were correlated with recognition memory differences for in-group and out-group faces. The effects of group membership on the FFA were not affected by task instruction to respond to in-group or out-group members and were functionally dissociated from early visual processing in the primary visual cortex. This study provides evidence that the FFA is sensitive to top-down influences and may be involved in subordinate level (vs. superordinate level) encoding of stimuli in the absence of long-term exposure or explicit task instructions.