A test of concurrent validity for linguistic indices of deception

Cues to deception

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions.

LINGUISTIC STYLES IN DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION: DUBITATIVE AMBIGUITY AND ELLIPTIC ELUDING IN PACKAGED LIES

This paper was aimed at addressing the topic of communicative styles of deception. University students were asked to describe a picture with varying truth/lie conditions. In accordance with their perception or being deliberately against it, the participant could: tell the truth (T); lie to an acquiescent recipient (L1); or lie to a suspicious recipient (L2). The goal was to investigate whether or not different linguistic styles could be correlated to the cognitive complexity of the task as regards the truth bias or lie bias of the recipient. Specifically, two sets of linguistic aspects – micro and macro structural – were analyzed. In the former, indices were considered as words (arguments number, repetitions and interruptions, fluency and fluency disorder indices), predicates (number, nominal/predicative construction, and personal/impersonal structure), pronouns and adverbial forms. In the latter, the structural variations of the standard phrase, utterances' complexity, spatial organization of utterances, and speech organization were analyzed. Results showed that participants used speech to shield from reality and chose different strategies; in the L1 condition, participants resorted to ambiguity and prolixity (“cuttlefish effect”); on the contrary, in the L2 condition they used concise assertiveness and elliptic eluding strategies (“chameleon effect”).