From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at

No effect of autistic traits on social attention: evidence based on single-cue and conflicting-cues scenarios

Individuals often use others' gaze and head directions to direct their attention. To investigate the influence of autistic traits on social attention, we conducted two experiments comparing groups with high and low autistic traits in single-cue (Experiment 1) and conflicting-cue (Experiment 2) scenarios. Our findings indicate that individuals responded more rapidly to the direction of a single social cue or the consensus of multiple cues. However, we did not observe significant differences in social attention between individuals with high and low autistic traits. Notably, as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) increased, individuals with low autistic traits exhibited greater improvements in reaction speed compared to those with high autistic traits. This suggests that individuals with low autistic traits excel at leveraging temporal information to optimize their behavioral readiness over time, hinting at potential variations in cognitive flexibility related to autistic traits.

Spontaneous perspective-taking and its relation to schizotypy

INTRODUCTION

Patients with schizophrenia differ from healthy controls in the extent that they spontaneously take another's perspective. For such effects, it is difficult to separate the influence of schizophrenia from multiple potential confounders. Here, for the first time, associations between spontaneous perspective-taking and schizotypy were investigated in a nonclinical population.

METHODS

Adult participants completed both a Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ-BRU) and a novel online adaptation of a visual perspective-taking task that required participants to make judgements both from their own perspective and that of a human avatar.

RESULTS

Response times were elevated when the avatar's perspective was inconsistent with that of the participant, providing evidence of spontaneous perspective-taking. This demonstrates that the visual perspective-taking task can be successfully implemented in an online format. However, schizotypy did not predict these spontaneous perspective-taking effects.

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike explicit mentalising, this form of implicit mentalising is not affected by nonclinical manifestations of schizotypy traits. This implies that impairment of general neurocognitive function contributes to altered spontaneous perspective-taking in schizophrenia. A novel account based on the cognitive control processes involved in perspective selection and the role of attention in perspective calculation reconciles apparently contradictory findings of earlier studies comparing patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls.

Body Form Modulates the Prediction of Human and Artificial Behaviour from Gaze Observation

The future of human–robot collaboration relies on people’s ability to understand and predict robots' actions. The machine-like appearance of robots, as well as contextual information, may influence people’s ability to anticipate the behaviour of robots. We conducted six separate experiments to investigate how spatial cues and task instructions modulate people’s ability to understand what a robot is doing. Participants observed goal-directed and non-goal directed gaze shifts made by human and robot agents, as well as directional cues displayed by a triangle. We report that biasing an observer's attention, by showing just one object an agent can interact with, can improve people’s ability to understand what humanoid robots will do. Crucially, this cue had no impact on people’s ability to predict the upcoming behaviour of the triangle. Moreover, task instructions that focus on the visual and motor consequences of the observed gaze were found to influence mentalising abilities. We suggest that the human-like shape of an agent and its physical capabilities facilitate the prediction of an upcoming action. The reported findings expand current models of gaze perception and may have important implications for human–human and human–robot collaboration.

Human but not robotic gaze facilitates action prediction

Do people ascribe intentions to humanoid robots as they would to humans or non-human-like animated objects? In six experiments, we compared people’s ability to extract non-mentalistic (i.e., where an agent is looking) and mentalistic (i.e., what an agent is looking at; what an agent is going to do) information from gaze and directional cues performed by humans, human-like robots, and a non-human-like object. People were faster to infer the mental content of human agents compared to robotic agents. Furthermore, although the absence of differences in control conditions rules out the use of non-mentalizing strategies, the human-like appearance of non-human agents may engage mentalizing processes to solve the task. Overall, results suggest that human-like robotic actions may be processed differently from humans’ and objects’ behavior. These findings inform our understanding of the relevance of an object’s physical features in triggering mentalizing abilities and its relevance for human–robot interaction.

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People differently ascribe mental content to human-like and non-human-like agents

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A human-like shape may automatically engage mentalizing processes

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Human actions are interpreted faster than non-human actions

Visual perspective-taking in complex natural scenes

Studies of visual perspective-taking have shown that adults can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other peoples’ viewpoints, but they experience difficulties when the two perspectives are inconsistent. We tested whether these egocentric (i.e., interference from one’s own perspective) and altercentric biases (i.e., interference from another person’s perspective) persist in ecologically valid complex environments. Participants (N = 150) completed a dot-probe visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in natural scenes containing real people, first only according to their own perspective and then judging both their own and another person’s perspective. Results showed that the other person’s perspective did not disrupt self perspective-taking judgements when the other perspective was not explicitly prompted. In contrast, egocentric and altercentric biases were found when participants were prompted to switch between self and other perspectives. These findings suggest that altercentric visual perspective-taking can be activated spontaneously in complex real-world contexts, but is subject to both top-down and bottom-up influences, including explicit prompts or salient visual stimuli.

Closeness impeded self-perspective inhibition whereas facilitated explicit perspective calculation

This study examined whether and how closeness affected the calculation and selection processes underlying perspective taking. Using the visual dot perspective taking task, we introduced a close friend and a stranger from the participants' university as the perspective-taking targets. Friend and stranger trials were mixed in a block in Experiment 1 but separated in different blocks in Experiment 2. Results revealed a significant effect of closeness on egocentric but not altercentric interference. The analyses on other-consistent and other-inconsistent trials suggested that closeness impeded responding from the avatar's perspective when self and other perspectives differed but facilitated responding from the avatar's perspective when self and other perspectives were consistent. However, the analyses on self-consistent and self-inconsistent trials revealed that the processing cost induced by implicit perspective calculation and other-inhibition was comparable between friends and strangers. These suggested that closeness selectively impeded self-perspective inhibition whereas facilitated explicit perspective calculation.

Association between dispositional empathy and self-other distinction in Irish and Belgian medical students: a cross-sectional analysis

OBJECTIVE

Physicians' cognitive empathy is associated with improved diagnosis and better patient outcomes. The relationship between self-reported and performance-based measures of cognitive empathic processes is unclear.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional analysis of the association between medical students' empathy scale scores and their empathic performance in a visuospatial perspective-taking (VPT) task.

PARTICIPANTS

Undergraduate medical students across two European medical schools (n=194).

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES

Two self-report empathy and one performance-based perspective-taking outcome: Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy (JSPE); Empathy Quotient (EQ); Samson's level-1 VPT task.

RESULTS

Higher scores on the 'standing in patient's shoes' subscale of the JSPE were associated with a lower congruency effect (as well as lower egocentric and altercentric biases) in the VPT (B=-0.007, 95% CI=-0.013 to 0.002, p<0.05), which reflects an association with better capacity to manage conflicting self-other perspectives, also known as self-other distinction. Lower egocentric bias was also associated with higher scores on the 'social skills' EQ subscale (B=-10.17, 95% CI=-17.98 to 2.36, p<0.05). Additionally, selection of a 'technique-oriented' clinical specialty preference was associated with a higher self-perspective advantage in the VPT, reflecting greater attentional priority given to the self-perspective.

CONCLUSIONS

We show that self-assessment scores are associated with selected performance-based indices of perspective taking, providing a more fine-grained analysis of the cognitive domain of empathy assessed in medical student empathy scales. This analysis allows us to generate new critical hypotheses about the reasons why only certain self-report empathy measures (or their subscales) are associated with physicians' observed empathic ability.

Excluded but not alone. Does social exclusion prevent the occurrence of a Joint Simon Effect (JSE)?

The Joint Simon Effect (JSE) is known to reflect the natural and spontaneous tendency to integrate actions from another individual into our own action system during joint action. This tendency to co-represent others' actions positively correlates with the dispositional tendency to take others' perspective. However, a quick episode of social exclusion has been shown to erase the tendency to co-represent others' actions. From a theoretical viewpoint, excluded individuals should still show signs of co-representation as ostracism tends to increase attention paid to others and Perspective Taking. In this context, this study challenges the idea that social exclusion eliminates all forms of co-representation (or JSE) by using an in-person version of the Task. We also intend to replicate findings on a positive link between Perspective Taking and the size of the JSE. To this end, participants played either an inclusive or exclusive version of the Cyberball game, then performed a joint go-nogo Simon Task. Perspective Taking was measured by using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. By contrast to previous results, our results revealed that excluded individuals co-represented others' actions as much as included ones. However, a positive correlation between Perspective Taking and the JSE was limited to included participants. We discuss these findings in terms of methodological differences and in the light of the social exclusion literature.

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In this study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalising” processes. Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalising processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g., arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze–following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalising interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct.

Inferring hidden objects from still and communicative onlookers at 8, 14, and 36 months of age

The current study investigated across five eye-tracking experiments children's developing skill of adopting others' referential perspective (Level 1 perspective taking) and to what extent it involves automatic processes or requires ostensive communicative cues. Three age groups (8-, 14-, and 36-month-olds) were tested on their expectation of an object appearing behind one of two peripheral occluders. A centrally presented person in profile either provided an ostensive communicative pointing cue or sat still, oriented to one of the two occluders. The 14-month-olds anticipated the hidden object when the onlooker had communicatively pointed to the location, as revealed by faster target detection in congruent trials (latency effect) and longer dwell times to the empty side in incongruent trials (violation-of-expectation effect). This was not the case when a still person was only oriented to one side. Adding emotional expressions to the still person (Experiment 2) did not help to produce the effects. However, at 36 months of age (Experiment 3), children showed both effects for the still person. The 8-month-olds did not show the violation-of-expectation effect for communicative pointing (Experiment 4) or for a matched abbreviated reach (Experiment 5b), showing it only for a complete reach behind the occluder (Experiment 5a), although they were faster to detect the congruent object in Experiment 4 and 5a. Findings reveal that automatic perspective taking develops after communicative perspective taking and that communicative perspective taking is a developmental outcome of the first year of life. The developmental pattern suggests a continuous social construction process of perspective-taking skills.

Automatic imitation is reduced in narcissists but only in egocentric perspective-takers

Narcissism is a prevalent personality trait associated with low concern for others and high self-focus. Congruently, reduced automatic imitation in narcissists was reported in one study (23 participants), but it was not replicated in another (57 participants). In this study, 100 participants completed the previously used narcissism and automatic imitation measures but here along with a visual perspective-taking task allowing to dissociate 4 profiles of perspective-takers. While we confirmed a non-replication at whole-sample level, we did find a reliable negative association between narcissism and automatic imitation among egocentric perspective-takers, that is, characterized as highly self-centered when tasked to adopt someone else's point of view. Our findings shed a new light on whether narcissistic individuals are less sensitive to others, highlight the importance of considering performance-based individual differences within the narcissistic personality, and revisit the recent claim that automatic imitation poorly relates to social functioning by presenting a theoretical framework that questions the sensitivity of the automatic imitation task.

Altercentric Cognition: How Others Influence Our Cognitive Processing

Humans are ultrasocial, yet, theories of cognition have often been occupied with the solitary mind. Over the past decade, an increasing volume of work has revealed how individual cognition is influenced by the presence of others. Not only do we rapidly identify others in our environment, but we also align our attention with their attention, which influences what we perceive, represent, and remember, even when our immediate goals do not involve coordination. Here, we refer to the human sensitivity to others and to the targets and content of their attention as 'altercentrism'; and aim to bring seemingly disparate findings together, suggesting that they are all reflections of the altercentric nature of human cognition.

Perspective-taking is spontaneous but not automatic

Data from a range of different experimental paradigms—in particular (but not only) the dot perspective task—have been interpreted as evidence that humans automatically track the perspective of other individuals. Results from other studies, however, have cast doubt on this interpretation, and some researchers have suggested that phenomena that seem like perspective-taking might instead be the products of simpler behavioural rules. The issue remains unsettled in significant part because different schools of thought, with different theoretical perspectives, implement the experimental tasks in subtly different ways, making direct comparisons difficult. Here, we explore the possibility that subtle differences in experimental method explain otherwise irreconcilable findings in the literature. Across five experiments we show that the classic result in the dot perspective task is not automatic (it is not purely stimulus-driven), but nor is it exclusively the product of simple behavioural rules that do not involve mentalising. Instead, participants do compute the perspectives of other individuals rapidly, unconsciously, and involuntarily, but only when attentional systems prompt them to do so (just as, for instance, the visual system puts external objects into focus only as and when required). This finding prompts us to clearly distinguish spontaneity from automaticity. Spontaneous perspective-taking may be a computationally efficient means of navigating the social world.

The closing of the theory of mind: A critique of perspective-taking

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another's viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the "pictorial" theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.

The Impact of a Human Figure in a Scene on Spatial Descriptions in Speech, Gesture, and Gesture Alone

The presence of a human figure in a scene appears to change how people describe it. About 20% of participants take the human figure's viewpoint (Tversky and Hard in Cognition 110:124-129, 2009. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.10.008). Five exploratory studies compare descriptions of a scene with no person to descriptions of a scene with a person. About 20% of participants are predicted to use the person's point of view in the "person" conditions. Study 1 replicates the original pattern. Study 2 shows that the pattern holds when object/scene are changed, and that the figure's gaze towards/away from the object does not change the pattern. Studies 3 and 4 show the pattern holds when the object has different positions and when it is moving. Study 5 shows the pattern holds when the describer is talking to an interlocutor, in both speech and co-speech gesture, and when the person is using gesture alone. The presence of a human figure in a scene appears to be a robust variable in shaping spatial descriptions.

Reduced spontaneous perspective taking in schizophrenia

Judgments about another person's visual perspective are impaired when the self-perspective is inconsistent with the other-perspective. This is a robust finding in healthy samples as well as in schizophrenia (SZ). Studies show evidence for the existence of a reverse effect, where an inconsistent other-perspective impairs the self-perspective. Such spontaneous perspective taking processes are not yet explored in SZ. In the current fMRI experiment, 24 healthy and 24 schizophrenic participants performed a visual perspective taking task in the scanner. Either a social or a non-social stimulus was presented and their visual perspectives were consistent or inconsistent with the self-perspective of the participant. We replicated previous findings showing that healthy participants show increased reaction times when the human avatar's perspective is inconsistent to the self-perspective. Patients with SZ, however, did not show this effect, neither in the social nor in the non-social condition. BOLD responses revealed similar patterns in occipital areas and group differences were identified in the middle occipital gyrus. These findings suggest that patients with SZ are less likely to spontaneously compute the visual perspectives of others.

Gaze and body cues interplay during interactive requests

Although observing other's gaze and body movements provides a crucial source of information to successfully interact with other people, it remains unclear whether observers weigh differently these cues and whether the convergence of gaze and body's directions determines facilitation effects. Here we aim to shed more light on this issue by testing the reliance upon these cues from both a behavioral and a neurophysiological perspective in a social interactive context. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the convergence between the direction of an actor's upper limb movement and gaze direction while he attempts to socially interact with the participants observing the scene. We determined the direction of gaze as well as the duration of participants' ocular fixations during the observation of the scene. In Experiment 2, we measured and correlated the effect of the body/gaze manipulation on corticospinal excitability and on the readiness to interact-a disposition to engage in social situations. Eye-tracking data revealed that participants fixated chiefly the actor's head when his hand and gaze directions were divergent. Possibly a strategy to disambiguate the scene. Whereas participants mainly fixated the actor's hand when he performed an interactive request toward the participants. From a neurophysiological point of view, the more participants felt involved in the interaction, the lower was motor preparation in the muscle potentially needed to fulfill the actor's request. We contend that social contexts are more likely to elicit motor preparation compared to non-social ones, and that muscular inhibition is a necessary mechanism in order to prevent unwanted overt reactions during action observation tasks.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants' behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.

I Don't See It Your Way: The Dot Perspective Task Does Not Gauge Spontaneous Perspective Taking

Data from studies employing the dot-perspective task have been used to support the theory that humans are capable of automatically computing the visual perspective of other individuals. Recent work has challenged this interpretation, claiming instead that the results may arise through the automatic reorienting of attention triggered by observed head and gaze cues. The two experiments reported here offer a stronger test of the perspective taking account by replacing the computer-generated avatars used in previous research with, respectively, photo-realistic stimuli and socially co-present individuals in a "live", face-to-face version of the task. In each study observers were faster to judge the number of dots in a display when either a digitized image depicting a human "gazer" (Experiment 1), or a socially co-present gazer (Experiment 2) could see the same number of dots as the observer, than when the number of dots visible to each was different. However, in both experiments this effect was also obtained in conditions where barriers clearly occluded the gazers' view of the target dots so that the perspectives of participants and gazers were always different. These results offer no support for the idea that participants are engaged in spontaneous perspective taking in the dot perspective task. It is argued that, instead, the results are likely caused by a spontaneous redirection of a viewer's attention by the observed gazes, which is unlikely to involve representations of the gazer's mental state.

Implicit Mentalising during Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking Indicated by Dissociation with Attention Orienting

Experiments demonstrating level-1 visual perspective-taking have been interpreted as providing important evidence for 'implicit mentalising'-the ability to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner. However, this interpretation has been contested by a rival 'submentalising' account that proposes that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for attentional orienting. Here, we aim to discriminate between these competing accounts by examining whether a gaze aversion manipulation expected to enhance attention orienting would have similar effects on both perspective-taking and attention orienting tasks. Gaze aversion was operationalised by manipulating head position relative to torso of the avatar figures employed in two experiments (gaze-averted vs. gaze-maintained). Experiment 1 used a Posner cueing task to establish that gaze aversion enhanced attention orienting cued by these avatars. Using the avatar task, Experiment 2 revealed level-1 visual perspective-taking effects of equivalent magnitude for gaze-averted and gaze-maintained conditions. These results indicate that gaze aversion moderated attention orienting but not perspective-taking. This dissociation in performance favours implicit mentalising by casting doubt on the submentalising account. It further constrains theorising by implying that attention orienting is not integral to the system permitting the relatively automatic tracking of mental states.

'Spontaneous' visual perspective-taking mediated by attention orienting that is voluntary and not reflexive

Experiments revealing 'spontaneous' visual perspective-taking are conventionally interpreted as demonstrating that adults have the capacity to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner ('implicit mentalising'). A rival account suggests that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for reflexive attentional orienting. Here, we report two experiments designed to distinguish between these competing accounts. In Experiment 1, we assessed whether reflexive attention orienting was sufficient to yield findings interpreted as spontaneous perspective-taking in the 'avatar task' when the protocol was adapted so that participants were unaware that they were taking part in a perspective-taking experiment. Results revealed no evidence for perspective-taking. In Experiment 2, we employed a Posner paradigm to investigate the attentional orienting properties of the avatar stimuli. This revealed cue-validity effects only for longer stimulus onset asynchronies, which indicates a voluntary rather than reflexive shift in spatial attention. Taken together, these findings suggest that attentional orienting does indeed contribute to performance in the Samson et al. avatar task. However, attention orienting appears to be voluntary rather than reflexive, indicating that the perspective-taking phenomenon measured may be less spontaneous than first reported.

Spontaneous Perspective Taking in Humans?

A number of social cognition studies posit that humans spontaneously compute the viewpoint of other individuals. This is based on experiments showing that responses are shorter when a human agent, located in a visual display, can see the stimuli relevant to the observer's task. Similarly, responses are slower when the agent cannot see the task-relevant stimuli. We tested the spontaneous perspective taking theory by incorporating it within two classic visual cognition paradigms (i.e., the flanker effect and the Simon effect), as well as reassessing its role in the gaze cueing effect. Results showed that these phenomena (e.g., the Simon effect) are not modulated according to whether a gazing agent can see the critical stimuli or not. We also examined the claim that previous results attributed to spontaneous perspective taking are due to the gazing agent's ability to shift attention laterally. Results found no evidence of this. Overall, these data challenge both the spontaneous perspective taking theory, as well as the attentional shift hypothesis.

Intergroup visual perspective-taking: Shared group membership impairs self-perspective inhibition but may facilitate perspective calculation

Reasoning about what other people see, know, and want is essential for navigating social life. Yet, even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults make perspective-taking errors. Here, we examined how the group membership of perspective-taking targets (ingroup vs. outgroup) affects processes underlying visual perspective-taking. In three experiments using two bases of group identity (university affiliation and minimal groups), interference from one's own differing perspective (i.e., egocentric intrusion) was stronger when responding from an ingroup versus an outgroup member's perspective. Spontaneous perspective calculation, as indexed by interference from another's visual perspective when reporting one's own (i.e., altercentric intrusion), did not differ across target group membership in any of our experiments. Process-dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate automatic processes underlying altercentric-intrusion effects, further revealed negligible effects of target group membership on perspective calculation. Meta-analytically, however, there was suggestive evidence that shared group membership facilitates responding from others' perspectives when self and other perspectives are aligned.

New Insights into the Inter-Individual Variability in Perspective Taking

This study aimed to test whether individual differences in perspective taking could be explained with two underpinning cognitive dimensions: The ability to handle the conflict between our egocentric perspective and another person’s perspective and the relative attentional focus during processing on the egocentric perspective versus another person’s perspective. We conducted cluster analyses on 346 participants who completed a visual perspective-taking task assessing performance on these two cognitive dimensions. Individual differences were best reduced by forming four clusters, or profiles, of perspective-takers. This partition reflected a high heterogeneity along both dimensions. In addition, deconstructing the perspective-taking performance into two distinct cognitive dimensions better predicted participants’ self-reported everyday life perspective-taking tendencies. Altogether, considering attentional focus and conflict handling as two potential sources of variability allows forming a two-dimensional space that enriches our understanding of the individual differences in perspective taking.

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.