Scope ambiguities and conditionals

Argument Quality in Real World Argumentation

The idea of resolving dispute through the exchange of arguments and reasons has been central to society for millennia. We exchange arguments as a way of getting at the truth in contexts as diverse as science, the court room, and our everyday lives. In democracies, political decisions should be negotiated through argument, not deception, or even worse, brute force. If argument is to lead to the truth or to good decisions, then some arguments must be better than others and 'argument strength' must have some meaningful connection with truth. Can argument strength be measured in a way that tracks an objective relationship with truth and not just mere persuasiveness? This article describes recent developments in providing such measures.

The Dialogical Entailment Task

In this paper, a critical discussion is made of the role of entailments in the so-called New Paradigm of psychology of reasoning based on Bayesian models of rationality (Elqayam & Over, 2013). It is argued that assessments of probabilistic coherence cannot stand on their own, but that they need to be integrated with empirical studies of intuitive entailment judgments. This need is motivated not just by the requirements of probability theory itself, but also by a need to enhance the interdisciplinary integration of the psychology of reasoning with formal semantics in linguistics. The constructive goal of the paper is to introduce a new experimental paradigm, called the Dialogical Entailment task, to supplement current trends in the psychology of reasoning towards investigating knowledge-rich, social reasoning under uncertainty (Oaksford & Chater, 2019). As a case study, this experimental paradigm is applied to reasoning with conditionals and negation operators (e.g. CEM and wide and narrow-scope negation). As part of the investigation, participants' entailment judgments are evaluated against their probability evaluations to assess participants' cross-task consistency over two experimental sessions.

“This Isn’t a Promise, It’s a Threat”

Abstract. Participants had their eye movements recorded as they read vignettes containing implied promises and threats. We observed a reading time penalty when participants read the word “threat” when it anaphorically referred to an implied promise. There was no such penalty when the word “promise” was used to refer to an implied threat. On a later measure of processing we again found a reading time penalty when the word “threat” was used to refer to a promise, but also when the word “promise” was used to refer to a threat. These results suggest that anaphoric processing of such expressions is driven initially by sensitivity to the semantic scope differences of “threats” versus “promises.” A threat can be understood as a type of promise, but a promise cannot be understood as a type of threat. However, this effect was short lived; readers were ultimately sensitive to mismatched meaning, regardless of speech act performed.