Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning

Fast & slow decisions under risk: Intuition rather than deliberation drives advantageous choices

Would you take a gamble with a 10% chance to gain $100 and a 90% chance to lose $10? Even though this gamble has a positive expected value, most people would avoid taking it given the high chance of losing money. Popular "fast-and-slow" dual process theories of risky decision making assume that to take expected value into account and avoid a loss aversion bias, people need to deliberate. In this paper we directly test whether reasoners can also consider expected value benefit intuitively, in the absence of deliberation. To do so, we presented participants with bets and lotteries in which they could choose between a risky expected-value-based choice and a safe loss averse option. We used a two-response paradigm where participants made two choices in every trial: an initial intuitive choice under time-pressure and cognitive load and a final choice without constraints where they could freely deliberate. Results showed that in most trials participants were loss averse, both in the intuitive and deliberate stages. However, when people opted for the expected-value-based choice after deliberating, they had predominantly already arrived at this choice intuitively. Additionally, loss averse participants often showed an intuitive sensitivity to expected value (as reflected in decreased confidence). Overall, these results suggest that deliberation is not the primary route for expected-value-based responding in risky decision making. Risky decisions may be better conceptualized as an interplay between different types of "fast" intuitions rather than between two different types of "fast" and "slow" thinking per se.

Adieu Bias: Debiasing Intuitions Among French Speakers

Recent debiasing studies have shown that a short, plain-English explanation of the correct solution strategy can improve reasoning performance. However, these studies have predominantly focused on English-speaking populations, who were tested with problem contents designed for an English-speaking test environment. Here we explore whether the key findings of previous debiasing studies can be extended to native French speakers living in continental Europe (France). We ran a training session with a battery of three reasoning tasks (i.e., base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and bat-and-ball) on 147 native French speakers. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Results showed a clear training effect, as early as the initial (intuitive) stage. Immediately after training, most participants solved the problems correctly, without the need for a deliberation process. The findings confirm that the intuitive debiasing training effect extends to native French speakers.

Dual-Process Theory of Thought and Inhibitory Control: An ALE Meta-Analysis

The dual-process theory of thought rests on the co-existence of two different thinking modalities: a quick, automatic, and associative process opposed to a slow, thoughtful, and deliberative process. The increasing interest in determining the neural foundation of the dual-process distinction has yielded mixed results, also given the difficulty of applying the fMRI standard approach to tasks usually employed in the cognitive literature. We report an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis to investigate the neural foundation of the dual-process theory of thought. Eligible studies allowed for the identification of cerebral areas associated with dual-process theory-based tasks without differentiating between fast and slow thinking. The ALE algorithm converged on the medial frontal cortex, superior frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and left inferior frontal gyrus. These structures partially overlap with the cerebral areas recurrently reported in the literature about the neural basis of the dual-process distinction, where the PARCS theory-based interpretation emphasizes the role of the right inferior gyrus. The results confirm the potential (but still almost unexplored) common ground between the dual-process literature and the cognitive control literature.

The role of anticipated emotions in self-control: linking self-control and the anticipatory ability to engage emotions associated with upcoming events

Self-control is typically attributed to "cold" cognitive control mechanisms that top-down influence "hot" affective impulses or emotions. In this study we tested an alternative view, assuming that self-control also rests on the ability to anticipate emotions directed toward future consequences. Using a behavioral within-subject design including an emotion regulation task measuring the ability to voluntarily engage anticipated emotions towards an upcoming event and a self-control task in which subjects were confronted with a variety of everyday conflict situations, we examined the relationship between self-control and anticipated emotions. We found that those individuals (n = 33 healthy individuals from the general population) who were better able to engage anticipated emotions to an upcoming event showed stronger levels of self-control in situations where it was necessary to resist short-term temptations or to endure short-term aversions to achieve long-term goals. This finding suggests that anticipated emotions may play a functional role in self-control-relevant deliberations with respect to possible future consequences and are not only inhibited top-down as implied by "dual system" views on self-control.

Implicit and explicit processing on base rate neglect problems

Base rate reasoning as assessed on Base rate neglect (BRN) Tasks has been studied extensively, with a sizable body of findings indicating that both logical (base rate) and belief-based (case description) processing contribute to responses on the task. Various task conditions have been found to influence which type of processing controls responding. The present study compares two instructional sets, one which requires responding in terms of the base rate information and one which requires responding in accordance with the case description. This manipulation allows for a distinction between explicit processing (set-consistent) and implicit processing (set-inconsistent and potentially interfering). We also manipulated the extremity of the base rates employed in the task and the extremity of the stereotypes contained in the case description. We argue that extremity effects should be present in implicit, but not explicit, processing, suggesting that these effects are the result of limitations in the control of set-inconsistent processing. The results generally supported the predictions. In addition, a proclivity for analytical thinking, as measured by actively open-minded thinking (AOT), was associated with less interference of belief-based processing on logical responding, but greater interference of logical processing on belief-based responding.

Dual-Process Theory and Two Types of Metacognitive Monitoring and Control Processes

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes are important parts of our cognitive system. In this article, they are considered in the light of the dual-process theory and interpreted as occurring at the level of Type 1 and Type 2 information processing. Associative connection is the main factor that allows us to divide these processes into two types. Accordingly, metacognitive monitoring of the first type occurs when feelings of rightness/error automatically appear along with a certain judgment. The second type occurs when a controlled inference is made about whether a judgment is true or false. Metacognitive control of the first type occurs when the decision to reject, revise or accept the received judgment is associated with the feelings of rightness/error and automatically appears when one of these feelings appears. The second type takes place when a person rejects (or they are unclear) the results of the first type of metacognitive control and deliberately decides what to do with the received judgment - reject, revise or accept.

The Willpower Paradox: Possible and Impossible Conceptions of Self-Control

Self-control denotes the ability to override current desires to render behavior consistent with long-term goals. A key assumption is that self-control is required when short-term desires are transiently stronger (more preferred) than long-term goals and people would yield to temptation without exerting self-control. We argue that this widely shared conception of self-control raises a fundamental yet rarely discussed conceptual paradox: How is it possible that a person most strongly desires to perform a behavior (e.g., eat chocolate) and at the same time desires to recruit self-control to prevent themselves from doing it? A detailed analysis reveals that three common assumptions about self-control cannot be true simultaneously. To avoid the paradox, any coherent theory of self-control must abandon either the assumption (a) that recruitment of self-control is an intentional process, or (b) that humans are unitary agents, or (c) that self-control consists in overriding the currently strongest desire. We propose a taxonomy of different kinds of self-control processes that helps organize current theories according to which of these assumptions they abandon. We conclude by outlining unresolved questions and future research perspectives raised by different conceptions of self-control and discuss implications for the question of whether self-control can be considered rational.

Differences in Art Appreciation in Autism: A Measure of Reduced Intuitive Processing

Art appreciation reflects an initial emotional and intuitive response to artwork evaluation, although this intuitive evaluation can be attenuated by subsequent deliberation. The Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have a greater propensity to deliberate and reduced intuition compared to matched controls. Evaluations of high- and low-quality artworks were undertaken by 107 individuals with a diagnosis of ASD and 145 controls. Controls consistently evaluated high-quality artworks to be much better quality than the low-quality artworks, reflecting intuitive processing. The ASD sample showed a reduced difference in evaluations between high- versus low-quality artwork, which reflects reduced intuitive processing and greater deliberative processing and is consistent with predictions by the Dual Process Theory of Autism.

How can we apply decision-making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

Our understanding of decision-making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision-making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision-making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi-destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision-making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio-ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human-induced rapid environmental change.

Mindfulness-based stress reduction is linked with an improved Cognitive Reflection Test score

Initially, dual-process theories suggested that the existence of two different cognitive systems explained why many participants do not find the correct answer in many reasoning tasks. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one such task. It contains three questions with incorrect answers (typically associated with intuition and thus system 1 which processes information automatically) and correct answers (typically associated with deliberate thinking and thus system 2 which involves the conscious processing of information). More recent theories suggest system 1 is responsible for both incorrect and correct responses, with system 2 being used to resolve the conflict between these different intuitions. Since mindfulness training improves self-regulation and cognitive flexibility, we believe it could improve CRT scores by reducing the relative weight of initial intuitions by strengthening alternative intuitions, thus increasing the probability of triggering deliberate reasoning. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 36 participants, all registered in the same Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) training. Of those 36 participants, 18 answered the CRT before the training and 18 answered it after 8 weeks of training. Results show that participants who followed MBSR training had better CRT scores than those without training. This is coherent with our hypothesis that mindfulness training could reduce the relative weight of initial intuitions and facilitate deliberate thinking.

The Relationship between Cognition and Brain Size or Neuron Number

The comparative approach is a powerful way to explore the relationship between brain structure and cognitive function. Thus far, the field has been dominated by the assumption that a bigger brain somehow means better cognition. Correlations between differences in brain size or neuron number between species and differences in specific cognitive abilities exist, but these correlations are very noisy. Extreme differences exist between clades in the relationship between either brain size or neuron number and specific cognitive abilities. This means that correlations become weaker, not stronger, as the taxonomic diversity of sampled groups increases. Cognition is the outcome of neural networks. Here we propose that considering plausible neural network models will advance our understanding of the complex relationships between neuron number and different aspects of cognition. Computational modelling of networks suggests that adding pathways, or layers, or changing patterns of connectivity in a network can all have different specific consequences for cognition. Consequently, models of computational architecture can help us hypothesise how and why differences in neuron number might be related to differences in cognition. As methods in connectomics continue to improve and more structural information on animal brains becomes available, we are learning more about natural network structures in brains, and we can develop more biologically plausible models of cognitive architecture. Natural animal diversity then becomes a powerful resource to both test the assumptions of these models and explore hypotheses for how neural network structure and network size might delimit cognitive function.

Not feeling right about uncertainty monitoring

De Neys proposed a "switch" model to address what he argued to be lacuna in dual-process theory, in which he theorized about the processes that initiate and terminate analytic thinking. We will argue that the author neglected to acknowledge the abundant literature on metacognitive functions, specifically, the meta-reasoning framework developed by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), that addresses just those questions.

Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing

The 34 commentaries on the target article span a broad range of interesting issues. I have organized my reply around five major themes that seemed to emerge: Remarks about the generalizability of the empirical findings, links with other models, necessary extensions, the utility of dual-process models, and more specific points. This allows me to clarify possible misconceptions and identify avenues for further advancement.

A good architecture for fast and slow thinking, but exclusivity is exclusively in the past

No doubt older work in the dual-process tradition overemphasized the importance and frequency of the override function, and the working model in this target article provides a useful corrective. The attempt to motivate the model using the so-called exclusivity assumption is unnecessary, because no recent dual-process model in the reasoning literature has rested strongly on this assumption.

Thinking, fast and slow on the autism spectrum

What is already known about the topicDaniel Kahneman wrote a highly influential book titled 'thinking, fast and slow'. He proposes that people usually think in a rapid, automatic, intuitive style. When people realise their intuitive thinking may be wrong, a slower, effortful, deliberative style of thinking takes over. It has recently been proposed that thinking in autistic individuals can be characterised as usually thinking in the deliberative style (rather than the intuitive style that non-autistic people usually think in).What this paper addsAs intuitive thinking is fast and deliberative thinking is slow, this research manipulated the time available to complete a series of reasoning questions. These questions have been developed to have intuitive answers (which are incorrect) and deliberative answers (which are correct). For the first time, a fast time manipulation (you must answer quickly) and slow (you must think about your answer before responding) was undertaken with autistic individuals. Autistic participants did produce more deliberative answers than the non-autistic participants. However, both groups produced comparably more intuitive answers and less deliberative answers in the fast condition. This shows that while autistic people tend not to use their intuition, autistic people can be encouraged to use their intuition.Implications for practice, research or policyUsing rapid intuition can be useful in fast-changing contexts, such as some social situations. Future research can explore how to support autistic individuals to use their intuition when the need arises. In addition, the propensity for deliberation resulting in unbiased, correct responses reflects a strengths-based account of autism. This requires more mental effort and is less susceptible to bias and errors. This is called 'Dual Process Theory'.

High Performance on a Pragmatic Task May Not Be the Result of Successful Reasoning: On the Importance of Eliciting Participants' Reasoning Strategies

Formal probabilistic models, such as the Rational Speech Act model, are widely used for formalizing the reasoning involved in various pragmatic phenomena, and when a model achieves good fit to experimental data, that is interpreted as evidence that the model successfully captures some of the underlying processes. Yet how can we be sure that participants' performance on the task is the result of successful reasoning and not of some feature of experimental setup? In this study, we carefully manipulate the properties of the stimuli that have been used in several pragmatics studies and elicit participants' reasoning strategies. We show that certain biases in experimental design inflate participants' performance on the task. We then repeat the experiment with a new version of stimuli which is less susceptible to the identified biases, obtaining a somewhat smaller effect size and more reliable estimates of individual-level performance.

“The Exorcist”: a grounded theory on how individuals avoid unethical requests at work

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to understand how individuals seek to reduce the occurrence of unethical requests at work and the effects of such strategies.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors built a grounded theory through semi-structured interviews with 65 individuals who worked for companies involved in the Brazilian corruption scandal called Operation Car Wash.

Findings

The interviewees reported that they use two central strategies to avoid unethical requests: explicit moral communication (directly stating that they are not willing to adhere to an unethical request) and implicit communication (expressing such a refusal through moral symbols). Both strategies signal the morality of the communicator and lead the possible proponent of an unethical request to perceive a greater probability of being reported and, thus, avoid making such an unethical request. However, while explicit moral communication affects the perceived morality of the individual who would possibly make an unethical request, implicit (symbolic) moral communication does not. As a consequence, the risks of retaliation for making a moral communication are greater in the case of explicit moral communication, entailing that implicit moral communication is more effective and safer for the individual who wants to avoid unethical requests.

Originality/value

This paper broadens the literature on business ethics and moral psychology by shifting its focus from what organizations and leaders can do to prevent unethical behavior to what leaders can actively do to protect themselves from unethical requests.

Addressing the dauntingness of formulation: The value of considering empathy as "grasping"

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

To explore the value of using Karl Jaspers' lived experience concept of 'grasping' in remediating the reported dauntingness of formulation.

CONCLUSIONS

Formulation can be construed as both the process and explication of understanding why a patient is presenting in a particular way. In an automatic process of abduction, 'feeling into' the mind of the other, hypotheses are posted to consciousness with little mental effort as meaningful connections are grasped. Subsequent more deliberative reasoning is synthesised continuously and with surprisingly little mental effort into the best explanation(s). Karl Jaspers' introduction to Psychiatry of the concepts involved, empathy and understanding, and his aim of making their use more scientific established the ongoing, often fierce debate about the ontology of Psychiatry; empirical versus interpretive. Trainees must resolve this for themselves in explicating a formulation, risking exposure of their prejudices. Jaspers' emphasis on the lived experience of empathic understanding that psychiatrists bring to their work found him often using the term 'grasp' rather than 'empathise'. 'Grasping' seems to convey more vividly and meaningfully the role that empathy plays in the initial ascertainment of mood and the subsequent hypothesis discovery, testing and synthesis.

'Feeling' or 'sensing' the future? Testing for anomalous cognitions in clinical versus healthy populations

In the study and treatment of psychosis, emotional intelligence (EI) and thinking styles are important patient characteristics for successful outcomes in clinical intervention. Anticipation of unpredictable stimuli (AUS) may be understood as an anomalous perception and anomalous cognition in which an individual supposedly senses and recognizes future stimuli in an unexpected way, also referred to as “hunches or premonitions.” This examined the roles of EI and thinking styles in AUSs in convenience samples of healthy participants (n = 237) versus patients diagnosed with psychosis (n = 118). We adjusted several quadratic and exponential regression models according to the obtained functions. Group means were also compared to examine differences in EI scores for participants with psychosis compared to healthy participants. In the healthy group, EI predicted AUSs with a weight between 42% and 58%. Thinking styles were not correlated with AUSs. However, EI was not correlated with AUSs in the clinical group. Patients with psychosis tended to score higher on AUSs and lower on EI and thinking styles compared to participants in the healthy group. We discuss EI as a variable that can contextualize some anomalous perceptions which are otherwise difficult to classify or measure within the classic psychosis continuum model.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Choice experiment selection of tourism destinations in a dual process theory framework: The role of decision style and potential to promote deliberation

Models of consumer choice that assume rational decision processes are too simplistic, as they ignore intuitive processes and combinations of intuition and rationality. In dual process theory, System 1 processes are intuitive, fast, require low cognitive effort, and involve autonomous systems, while System 2 processes are deliberative, slower, reflect greater cognitive effort, and involve controlled attention. The dual process framework facilitates understanding of decision processes that may be diverse and complex. Based on response time as an indicator of System 2 use, we fill gaps in the tourism and choice experiment literatures by i) assessing the dimensionality of a decision style scale and its role in predicting System 2 use and ii) assessing whether researcher interventions, such as instructions, can promote System 2 use. The study is based on survey-based choice experiment responses of 483 domestic and international visitors across two Norwegian nature-based tourism destination contexts. Each visitor completed four choice experiment tasks for a total of 1,932 choice occasions. Results indicated diversity in extent of System 2 use. The decision style scale was multidimensional with both the intuitive and rational subscales predicting response time. We encourage inclusion of decision style scales–and specifically multidimensional scales–in future tourism choice and choice experiment applications. Statistically significant coefficients for instructions and unhurriedness suggest potential for researchers to increase System 2 processing in survey tasks. We encourage future use of this intervention, especially when survey tasks are intended to replicate “real world” decisions that rely heavily on System 2 use.

Debiasing System 1: Training favours logical over stereotypical intuiting

Whereas people’s reasoning is often biased by intuitive stereotypical associations, recent debiasing studies suggest that performance can be boosted by short training interventions that stress the underlying problem logic. The nature of this training effect remains unclear. Does training help participants correct erroneous stereotypical intuitions through deliberation? Or does it help them develop correct intuitions? We addressed this issue in four studies with base-rate neglect and conjunction fallacy problems. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Studies 1A and 2A showed that training boosted performance and did so as early as the intuitive stage. After training, most participants solved the problems correctly from the outset and no longer needed to correct an initial incorrect answer through deliberation. Studies 1B and 2B indicated that this sound intuiting persisted over at least two months. The findings confirm that a short training can debias reasoning at an intuitive “System 1” stage and get reasoners to favour logical over stereotypical intuitions.

Types of clinical reasoning in a summative clerkship oral examination

INTRODUCTION

Dual-process theory characterizes clinical reasoning (CR) as Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (analytical) thinking. This study examined CR on a summative clinical clerkship structured clinical oral examination (SCOE).

METHODS AND SUBJECTS

511 clinical clerks at the University of Toronto underwent SCOEs. Type 1, Type 2, and Global CR performance were compared to other internal medicine clerkship assessments using descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations.

RESULTS

Clinical clerks achieved mean marks >75% on the three clinical reasoning stations, on Type 1 and 2 CR tasks, and the overall SCOE. Performance on the SCOE CR stations correlated with each of the other clerkship assessments: written examination, inpatient, and ambulatory clinic assessments. The correlation of performance between Type 1 and Type 2 clinical reasoning tasks was statistically significant but weak (r_s = 0.28). This suggests that defined measures of Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning were indeed assessing distinct constructs.

CONCLUSION

Clinical clerks used both Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning with success. This study's characterization of Type 1 and Type 2 CR as separate domains, distinct from existing measures on the SCOE as well as the other clerkship assessments, can suggest a further addition to multimodal clerkship assessment.

Set-shifting and inhibition interplay affect the rule-matching bias occurrence during conditional reasoning task

The rule-matching bias is a common error during conditional reasoning tasks, which refers to a tendency to match responses with the lexical context in the conditional rule and leads to incorrect responses. Conditional reasoning is one of the higher-level cognitive abilities affected by many cognitive skills. We aimed to determine whether inhibition and set-shifting skills with rule-matching bias occurrence could be related and, if so, to what quantitative, at a statistically significant level. A total of 30 healthy university students aged 18 to 30 participated in this study. We used the Wason's Selection Task (WST) to measure conditional reasoning and investigated their inhibition and set-shifting skills with the Stroop and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, respectively. Results showed a significant positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Stroop test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.614). There was a positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.423). Participants with higher inhibition and set-shifting abilities showed better performance in the conditional reasoning test and lower rule-matching bias errors.

Positive Psychology and Philosophy-as-Usual: An Unhappy Match?

The present article critiques standard attempts to make philosophy appear relevant to the scientific study of well-being, drawing examples in particular from works that argue for fundamental differences between different forms of wellbeing (by Besser-Jones, Kristjánsson, and Kraut, for example), and claims concerning the supposedly inherent normativity of wellbeing research (e.g., Prinzing, Alexandrova, and Nussbaum). Specifically, it is argued that philosophers in at least some relevant cases fail to apply what is often claimed to be among their core competences: conceptual rigor—not only in dealing with the psychological construct of flow, but also in relation to apparently philosophical concepts such as normativity, objectivity, or eudaimonia. Furthermore, the uncritical use of so-called thought experiments in philosophy is shown to be inappropriate for the scientific study of wellbeing. As an alternative to such philosophy-as-usual, proper attention to other philosophical traditions is argued to be promising. In particular, the philosophy of ZhuangZi (a contemporary of Aristotle and one of the most important figures in Chinese intellectual history) appears to concord well with today’s psychological knowledge, and to contain valuable ideas for the future development of positive psychology.

The best of both worlds: Dual systems of reasoning in animals and AI

Much of human cognition involves two different types of reasoning that operate together. Type 1 reasoning systems are intuitive and fast, whereas Type 2 reasoning systems are reflective and slow. Why has our cognition evolved with these features? Both systems are coherent and in most ecological circumstances either alone is capable of coming up with the right answer most of the time. Neural tissue is costly, and thus far evolutionary models have struggled to identify a benefit of operating two systems of reasoning. To explore this issue we take a broad comparative perspective. We discuss how dual processes of cognition have enabled the emergence of selective attention in insects, transforming the learning capacities of these animals. Modern AIs using dual systems of learning are able to learn how their vast world works and how best to interact with it, allowing them to exceed human levels of performance in strategy games. We propose that the core benefits of dual processes of reasoning are to narrow down a problem space in order to focus cognitive resources most effectively.

Why is formulation daunting? A response to Bagster et al.'s 'instructions' for developing skills in formulation

OBJECTIVE

To explore the theme identified by Bagster et al.¹ in their selective psychiatric literature review that formulation can appear daunting.

CONCLUSION

Formulation is understandably daunting, even though it occurs in all human encounters. The plural nature of mental symptoms is such that anxiety-provoking intuitive judgement is required at all points in both the process and explication of formulation, a type of instinctive guessing. There are no rules for this, because the laws of vertical integration of systems are not established. Guidelines are more appropriate than 'instructions'. Much of the wider mental health and clinical reasoning literature addresses intuitive judgement, but the current psychiatric literature tends to focus on pattern recognition as a deliberative cognitive act of Type 2 processes. Arguably this reductionism adds to the dauntingness. Anxiety detected about the intuitive judgement involved can be addressed in supervision, taking into account the psychological mindedness of the trainee.

To deliberate or not? The role of intuition and deliberation when controlling for irrelevant information in selection decisions

In selection decisions, decision makers often struggle to ignore irrelevant information, such as candidates' age, gender and attractiveness, which can lead to suboptimal decisions. One way to correct the effects of these irrelevant attributes is to consider them as suppressor variables, and penalize individuals who unjustifiably benefit from them. Previous research demonstrated that people have difficulties doing so. In five experiments (N = 1325), we examined the mechanism at the core of people's ability to do so. We found that triggering System 2 did not improve participants' ability to correct for this bias. The majority of those who were successful did so even when denied the opportunity to deliberate. We suggest that logic intuition-not deliberation-is the basis for successfully considering irrelevant information as suppressors. Our results are in line with a revised dual-process approach, in which solving reasoning problems can occur directly through System 1 and does not require an override by a System 2's-based process.

Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load

The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.

Conceptual Knowledge, Procedural Knowledge, and Metacognition in Routine and Nonroutine Problem Solving

When, how, and why students use conceptual knowledge during math problem solving is not well understood. We propose that when solving routine problems, students are more likely to recruit conceptual knowledge if their procedural knowledge is weak than if it is strong, and that in this context, metacognitive processes, specifically feelings of doubt, mediate interactions between procedural and conceptual knowledge. To test these hypotheses, in two studies (Ns = 64 and 138), university students solved fraction and decimal arithmetic problems while thinking aloud; verbal protocols and written work were coded for overt uses of conceptual knowledge and displays of doubt. Consistent with the hypotheses, use of conceptual knowledge during calculation was not significantly positively associated with accuracy, but was positively associated with displays of doubt, which were negatively associated with accuracy. In Study 1, participants also explained solutions to rational arithmetic problems; using conceptual knowledge in this context was positively correlated with calculation accuracy, but only among participants who did not use conceptual knowledge during calculation, suggesting that the correlation did not reflect "online" effects of using conceptual knowledge. In Study 2, participants also completed a nonroutine problem-solving task; displays of doubt on this task were positively associated with accuracy, suggesting that metacognitive processes play different roles when solving routine and nonroutine problems. We discuss implications of the results regarding interactions between procedural knowledge, conceptual knowledge, and metacognitive processes in math problem solving.

What’s not to like about evidence-based management: a hyper-rational fad?

Purpose

A topic currently receiving significant academic and practitioner attention is called evidence-based management. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that this approach is sometimes over-sold and may be a fad. Additionally, evidence-based management fails to fully recognize the importance of tacit knowledge, what Kahneman calls system 1. Evidence-based management does provide tools to better use what Kahneman calls system 2, rationality. Decision-makers need to take advantage of both rational and beyond rational processes.

Design/methodology/approach

This is an essay, it is not a report of a study. At this point in time, this paper needs thinking, reflection, pondering, more than a data-based study.

Findings

Advocates promote evidence-based management in part to help avoid fads, yet evidence-based management itself has many of the characteristics of a fad. Evidence-based management is based on an objective rational view of the world and suggests highly rational methods of decision-making. However, a rational fact-based might not give sufficient credit to instinct and feelings. Decision-makers should take into account facts, evidence, when making decisions, but not ignore intuition, hunches and feelings. This study is learning that decisions use a galaxy of approaches, with both cognitive and affective flexibility.

Research limitations/implications

As with any opinion-based paper, this lacks empirical support. Proponents ask us to believe in evidence-based management. Neither we, the authors of this paper, nor the proponents of evidence-based management can empirically support the ideas offered. An additional limitation is that the paper is written in one language, English. Translation into another language might yield different meanings.

Practical implications

There are advantages for scholars and practitioners to look at the best available evidence. There can be disadvantages in overlooking non-quantifiable factors.

Social implications

Those who use evidence-based management should also take into account feelings, ethics, aesthetics, creativity, for the betterment of society. To solve wicked problems one needs more than facts and rational analysis.

Originality/value

The overwhelming majority of those writing about evidence-based management are supporters. This study offers a different view. This paper brings new ideas and new thinking to both the extensive fad literature and the huge evidence-based management literature. Evidence-based management is discussed widely. Google Scholar lists more than two million papers in 2019, 2020 and 2021 on evidence-based management. Readers of this journal should critically evaluate this popular set of ideas.

Behavioral Restriction Determines Left Attentional Bias: Preliminary Evidences From COVID-19 Lockdown

During the COVID-19 lockdown, individuals were forced to remain at home, hence severely limiting the interaction within environmental stimuli, reducing the cognitive load placed on spatial competences. The effects of the behavioral restriction on cognition have been little examined. The present study is aimed at analyzing the effects of lockdown on executive function prominently involved in adapting behavior to new environmental demands. We analyze non-verbal fluency abilities, as indirectly providing a measure of cognitive flexibility to react to spatial changes. Sixteen students (mean age 20.75; SD 1.34), evaluated before the start of the lockdown (T1) in a battery of psychological tasks exploring different cognitive domains, have been reassessed during lockdown (T2). The assessment included the modified Five-Point Test (m-FPT) to analyze non-verbal fluency abilities. At T2, the students were also administered the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). The restriction of behaviors following a lockdown determines increased non-verbal fluency, evidenced by the significant increase of the number of new drawings. We found worsened verbal span, while phonemic verbal fluency remained unchanged. Interestingly, we observed a significant tendency to use the left part of each box in the m-FPT correlated with TAS-20 and with the subscales that assess difficulty in describing and identifying feelings. Although our data were collected from a small sample, they evidence that the restriction of behaviors determines a leftward bias, suggesting a greater activation of the right hemisphere, intrinsically connected with the processing of non-verbal information and with the need to manage an emotional situation.

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

Although human thinking is often biased by erroneous intuitions, recent de-bias studies suggest that people's performance can be boosted by short training interventions, where the correct answers to reasoning problems are explained. However, the nature of this training effect remains unclear. Does training help participants correct erroneous intuitions through deliberation? Or does it help them develop correct intuitions? We addressed this issue in three studies, by focusing on the well-known Bat-and-Ball problem. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Studies 1 and 2 showed that not only did training boost performance, it did so as early as the intuitive stage. After training, most participants solved the problems correctly from the outset and no longer needed to correct an initial incorrect answer through deliberation. Study 3 indicated that this sound intuiting sustained over at least two months. The findings confirm that a short training can boost sound reasoning at an intuitive stage. We discuss key theoretical and applied implications.

On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Think slow, then fast: Does repeated deliberation boost correct intuitive responding?

Influential studies on human thinking with the popular two-response paradigm typically ask participants to continuously alternate between intuitive ("fast") and deliberate ("slow") responding. One concern is that repeated deliberation in these studies will artificially boost the intuitive, "fast" reasoning performance. A recent alternative two-block paradigm therefore advised to present all fast trials in one block before the slow trials were presented. Here, we tested directly whether allowing people to repeatedly deliberate will boost their intuitive reasoning performance by manipulating the order of the fast and slow blocks. In each block, participants solved variants of the bat-and-ball problem. Maximum response time in fast blocks was 4 s and 25 s in the slow blocks. One group solved the fast trials before the slow trials, a second group solved the slow trials first, and a third mixed group alternated between slow and fast trials. Results showed that the order factor did not affect accuracy on the fast trials. This indicates that repeated deliberation does not boost people's intuitive reasoning performance.

Using quantitative trait in adults with ADHD to test predictions of dual-process theory

Dual-process theory is a widely utilized modelling tool in the behavioral sciences. It conceptualizes decision-making as an interaction between two types of cognitive processes, some of them fast and intuitive, others slow and reflective. We make a novel contribution to this literature by exploring differences between adults with clinically diagnosed ADHD and healthy controls for a wide range of behaviors. Given the clinical picture and nature of ADHD symptoms, we had a strong a priori reason to expect differences in intuitive vs reflective processing; and thus an unusually strong case for testing the predictions of dual-process theory. We found mixed results, with overall weaker effects than expected, except for risk taking, where individuals with ADHD showed increased domain sensitivity for gains vs losses. Some of our predictions were supported by the data but other patterns are more difficult to reconcile with theory. On balance, our results provide only limited empirical support for using dual-process theory to understand basic social and economic decision-making.

The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking

Cognitive capacity is commonly assumed to predict performance in classic reasoning tasks because people higher in cognitive capacity are believed to be better at deliberately correcting biasing erroneous intuitions. However, recent findings suggest that there can also be a positive correlation between cognitive capacity and correct intuitive thinking. Here we present results from 2 studies that directly contrasted whether cognitive capacity is more predictive of having correct intuitions or successful deliberate correction of an incorrect intuition. We used a two-response paradigm in which people were required to give a fast intuitive response under time pressure and cognitive load and afterwards were given the time to deliberate. We used a direction-of change analysis to check whether correct responses were generated intuitively or whether they resulted from deliberate correction (i.e., an initial incorrect-to-correct final response change). Results showed that although cognitive capacity was associated with the correction tendency (overall r = 0.22) it primarily predicted correct intuitive responding (overall r = 0.44). These findings force us to rethink the nature of sound reasoning and the role of cognitive capacity in reasoning. Rather than being good at deliberately correcting erroneous intuitions, smart reasoners simply seem to have more accurate intuitions.

Rational rationalization and System 2

In this commentary, I highlight the relevance of Cushman's target article for the popular dual-process framework of thinking. I point to the problematic characterization of rationalization in traditional dual-process models and suggest that in line with recent advances, Cushman's rational rationalization account offers a way out of the rationalization paradox.