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Abstract
The present study examined the effectiveness of a tutoring technique that has been used to identify and address participants' misunderstandings in Wason's selection task. In particular, the study investigated whether the technique would lead to improvements in performance when the task was presented in a deadline format (a condition in which time restrictions are imposed). In Experiment 1, the effects of tutoring on performance were compared in free time (conditions in which no time restrictions are imposed) and deadline task formats. In Experiment 2, improvements in performance were studied in deadline task formats, in which the tutoring and test phases were separated by an interval of 1 day. The results suggested that tutoring improved performance on the selection task under deadline and in free time conditions. Additionally, the study showed that participants made errors because they had misinterpreted the task. With tutoring, they were able to modify their initial misunderstandings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Magda Osman
- Department of Psychology, University College London, London, England.
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Lucas E, Ball L. Think-aloud protocols and the selection task: Evidence for relevance effects and rationalisation processes. THINKING & REASONING 2005. [DOI: 10.1080/13546780442000114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Abstract
Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists' proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify thedifferent forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.
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Affiliation(s)
- Magda Osman
- Department of Psychology, University College London, London, England.
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5
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Abstract
Since it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason's (1966,1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people's hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mike Oaksford
- School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales.
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Abstract
The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.
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Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, New Jersey 08544, USA.
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Wagner-Egger P. Costs and benefits in Wason's selection task: The Social Conditional Model 1The author wants to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments about an earlier draft of this paper. SWISS JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2001. [DOI: 10.1024//1421-0185.60.3.117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
This paper proposes a synthesis of two contrasting theories formulated to explain the content effect in Wason's selection task (1966) , namely the Pragmatic Reasoning Schema Theory ( Cheng & Holyoak, 1985 , 1989 ) and the Social Contract Theory ( Cosmides, 1989 ; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992 ). Although the authors have attempted to refute their competitors' theory, we can postulate that pragmatic schemas and utilities (costs and benefits) are in fact additional factors that influence performance in the thematic selection task. Using tasks from both models, the four studies presented here indicate that utilities influence responses within the structure of a pragmatic schema. Studies 1-3 suggest that the more costly the consequences of cheating, and the more probable cheating is, the better the cheater-detection. Study 4 indicates an effect of the actual benefit in a social situation. A more complex model distinguishing different kinds of utilities is proposed to account for these results: the Social Conditional Model (SCM).
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Girotto V, Kemmelmeier M, Sperber D, van der Henst JB. Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task. Cognition 2001; 81:B69-76. [PMID: 11376645 DOI: 10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00124-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Most individuals fail the selection task, selecting P and Q cases, when they have to test descriptive rules of the form "If P, then Q". But they solve it, selecting P and not-Q cases, when they have to test deontic rules of the form "If P, then must Q". According to relevance theory, linguistic comprehension processes determine intuitions of relevance that, in turn, determine case selections in both descriptive and deontic problems. We tested the relevance theory predictions in a within-participants experiment. The results showed that the same rule, regardless of whether it is tested descriptively or deontically, can be made to yield more P and Q selections or more P and not-Q selections. We conclude that the selection task does not provide a tool to test general claims about human reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- V Girotto
- LPC, CNRS-University of Provence, Aix-en-Provence, France.
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Feeney A, Handley SJ. The suppression of q card selections: evidence for deductive inference in Wason's selection task. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. A, HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2000; 53:1224-42. [PMID: 11131821 DOI: 10.1080/713755944] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
The results of three experiments investigating the role of deductive inference in Wason's selection task are reported. In Experiment 1, participants received either a standard one-rule problem or a task containing a second rule, which specified an alternative antecedent. Both groups of participants were asked to select those cards that they considered were necessary to test whether the rule common to both problems was true or false. The results showed a significant suppression of q card selections in the two-rule condition. In addition there was weak evidence for both decreased p selection and increased not-q selection. In Experiment 2 we again manipulated number of rules and found suppression of q card selections only. Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared one- and two-rule conditions with a two-rule condition where the second rule specified two alternative antecedents in the form of a disjunction. The q card selections were suppressed in both of the two-rule conditions but there was no effect of whether the second rule contained one or two alternative antecedents. We argue that our results support the claim that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the indicative selection task.
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Affiliation(s)
- A Feeney
- Department of Psychology, University of Durham, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, U.K.
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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of how interpretative processes constrain inferential performance on conditional reasoning tasks. Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that performance on common reasoning tasks is mediated by different interpretive variables. Necessity and sufficiency relations predicted performance on the conditional arguments task, whereas on the Wason task, performance was predicted by whether the conditional statement instantiated a deontic or a factual relation. Performance on the truth-table task was predicted by both sets of variables. Experiment 2 explored the mapping relation between interpretation, representation, and inference. It was observed that conditional responses to the Wason and arguments tasks were based on different representations of the conditional relationship. These data rule out a simple model of the interplay between interpretation and reasoning in which the interpretation of a statement is driven solely by its content, and instead, indicate that the interpretation of conditional relations is task-specific.
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Affiliation(s)
- V A Thompson
- University of Saskatchewan, 9 Campus Drive, SK, S7N 5A5, Saskatoon, Canada.
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Staller A, Sloman SA, Ben-Zeev T. Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task. Mem Cognit 2000; 28:396-405. [PMID: 10881557 DOI: 10.3758/bf03198555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
- A Staller
- Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA.
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Abstract
According to the mental model theory, models represent what is true, but not what is false. One unexpected consequence is that certain inferences should have compelling, but invalid, conclusions. Three experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in reasoning about possibilities. When problems had the heading "Only one of the premises is true," the participants considered the truth of each premise in turn, but neglected the fact that when one premise is true, the others are false. When two-premise problems had the heading "One of the premises is true and one is false," the participants still neglected the falsity of one of the premises. As predicted, however, the illusions were reduced when reasoners were told to check their conclusions against the constraint that only one of the premises was true. We discuss alternative explanations for illusory inferences and their implications for current theories of reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Y Goldvarg
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, NJ 08544, USA.
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Abstract
The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally make explicit only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence: it predicts the occurrence of inferences that are compelling but invalid. They should arise from reasoners failing to take into account what is false. Three experiments corroborated the systematic occurrence of these illusory inferences, and eliminated a number of alternative explanations for them. Their results illuminate the controversy among various current theories of reasoning.
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Abstract
This chapter describes the main accounts of deductive competence, which explain what is computed in carrying out deductions. It argues that people have a modicum of competence, which is useful in daily life and a prerequisite for acquiring logical expertise. It outlines the three main sorts of theory of deductive performance, which explain how people make deductions: They rely on factual knowledge, formal rules, or mental models. It reviews recent experimental studies of deductive reasoning in order to help readers to assess these theories of performance.
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Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA.
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Oaksford M. Discussion Task Demands and Revising Probabilities in the Selection Task: A Comment on Green, Over, and Pyne. THINKING & REASONING 1998. [DOI: 10.1080/135467898394201] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
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Hardman DK. Discussion De-focusing on the Wason Selection Task: Mental Models or Mental Inference Rules? A Commentary on Green and Larking (1995). THINKING & REASONING 1998. [DOI: 10.1080/135467898394256] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/16/2022]
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Green DW. Refocusing on the Data: A Reply to Hardman. THINKING & REASONING 1998. [DOI: 10.1080/135467898394265] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/16/2022]
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