Taxonomising delusions: content or aetiology?

The cognitive-phenomenological assessment of delusions and hallucinations at the early intervention in psychosis service stage: The results of a quality improvement project

AIM

Clinical assessments are vital for gaining an understanding of a patients' presenting problem. A priority for Early Intervention in Psychosis Service staff is understanding and supporting their patients' experiences of hallucinations and/or delusions. We aimed to identify what cognitive-phenomenology dimensions of hallucinations and delusions EIPS staff were assessing with their patients.

METHODS

We developed a brief checklist of cognitive-phenomenological dimensions of hallucinations and delusions called the Lived Experience Symptom Survey (LESS) based on relevant literature. As part of a Quality Improvement Project, we reviewed the health records of a sub-sample of EIPS patients using the LESS identifying whether each dimension was present or absent.

RESULTS

We found that all patients had been asked about the content of their hallucinations and/or delusions, and the majority had been asked about the valence of this content. Despite patients having experienced psychosis for almost 2 years on average, less than half of patients were asked about the potential or actual harm associated with these symptoms. All other cognitive-phenomenological dimensions were assessed inconsistently.

CONCLUSIONS

The assessment of hallucination and delusions in our EIPS was inconsistent and incomprehensive. These findings require replication in other EIPS' but may point to a need for guidelines and training around how to conduct a thorough assessment of hallucinations and delusions for current and future EIPS staff. Improved assessment of these symptoms will aid the development of risk assessments and treatment plans.

Body representations and cognitive ontology: Drawing the boundaries of the body image

The distinction between body image and body schema has been incredibly influential in cognitive neuroscience. Recently, researchers have begun to speculate about the relationship between these representations (Gadsby, 2017, 2018; Pitron & de Vignemont, 2017; Pitron et al., 2018). Within this emerging literature, Pitron et al. (2018) proposed that the long-term body image and long-term body schema co-construct one another, through a process of reciprocal interaction. In proposing this model, they make two assumptions: that the long-term body image incorporates the spatial characteristics of tools, and that it is distorted in the case of Alice in wonderland syndrome. Here, I challenge these assumptions, with a closer examination of what the term "long-term body image" refers to. In doing so, I draw out some important taxonomic principles for research into body representation.

How are the spatial characteristics of the body represented? A reply to Pitron & de Vignemont

In their article, Pitron and de Vignemont (2017) provide an insightful and well overdue discussion of the relationship between long-term body representation models and Alice in Wonderland syndrome. Here, I supplement their discussion with a number of observations. First, I present a cautionary note regarding the interpretation of experiential changes in body size as reflective of changes in the content of body representations. Second, I show how their evidence contradicts an alternative model of body representation arising from research into anorexia nervosa-the "LTB" hypothesis. Finally, I highlight a significant issue with their proposed co-construction model.