The association between inconsistent handedness and psychopathy does not extend to the domain of moral reasoning

Is Psychopathy a Mental Disorder or an Adaptation? Evidence From a Meta-Analysis of the Association Between Psychopathy and Handedness

Psychopathy has historically been conceptualized as a mental disorder, but there is growing evidence that it may instead be an alternative, adaptive life history strategy designed by natural selection. Although the etiology of mental disorders is not fully understood, one likely contributor is perturbations affecting neurodevelopment. Nonright-handedness is a sign of such perturbations, and therefore can be used to test these competing models. If psychopathy is a mental disorder, psychopaths should show elevated rates of nonright-handedness. However, an adaptive strategy perspective expects psychopaths to be neurologically healthy and therefore predicts typical rates of nonright-handedness. We meta-analyzed 16 studies that investigated the association between psychopathy and handedness in various populations. There was no difference in the rates of nonright-handedness between community participants high and low in psychopathy. Furthermore, there was no difference between psychopathic and nonpsychopathic offenders in rates of nonright-handedness, though there was a tendency for offenders scoring higher on the Interpersonal/Affective dimension of psychopathy to have lower rates of nonright-handedness, and for offenders scoring higher on the Behavioral dimension of psychopathy to have higher rates of nonright-handedness. Lastly, there was no difference in rates of nonright-handedness between psychopathic and nonpsychopathic mental health patients. Thus, our results fail to support the mental disorder model and partly support the adaptive strategy model. We discuss limitations of the meta-analysis and implications for theories of the origins of psychopathy.

Why are consistently-handed individuals more authoritarian? The role of need for cognitive closure

Recent studies indicate that individuals with consistent hand preference are more authoritarian than individuals whose preference is relatively inconsistent. We explored the role of epistemic needs in the handedness-authoritarianism relationship. Based on findings that consistent individuals are less cognitively flexible than inconsistent individuals, we hypothesized that consistent-handers would report greater need for definite knowledge. To measure this, we administered the revised Need for Cognitive Closure scale to a sample of undergraduates (N = 235), along with measures of handedness consistency and authoritarian submission. Consistent individuals scored significantly higher on authoritarian submission and need for closure. Need for closure fully mediated the relationship between consistency and submission. Consistent individuals also expressed greater prejudice against authoritarian out-groups such as immigrants and liberals. This effect was partially mediated by authoritarian submission. We theorize that consistent-handers' cognitive inflexibility leads them to covet definite knowledge. These individuals turn to authoritarianism because it promises to stifle dissent and protect existing (conventional) knowledge.