Case study of the terrorist bombing in Tel Aviv market – putting all the eggs in one basket might save lives

Abdominal blast injuries: different patterns, severity, management, and prognosis according to the main mechanism of injury

PURPOSE

To review the frequency, different patterns, anatomic severity, management, and prognosis of abdominal injuries in survivors of explosions, according to the main mechanism of injury.

METHODS

A MEDLINE search was conducted from January 1982 to August 2013, including the following MeSH terms: blast injuries, abdominal injuries. EMBASE was also searched, with the same entries. Abdominal blast injuries (ABIs) have been defined as injuries resulting not only from the effects of the overpressure on abdominal organs, but also from the multimechanistic effects and projectile fragments resulting from the blast. Special emphasis was placed on the detailed assessment of ABIs in patients admitted to GMUGH (Gregorio Marañón University General Hospital) after the Madrid 2004 terrorist bombings, and in patients admitted to HYMC (Hillel Yaffe Medical Centre) in Hadera (Israel) following several bombing episodes. The anatomic severity of injuries was assessed by the abdominal component of the AIS, and the overall anatomic severity of casualties was assessed by means of the NISS.

RESULTS

Abdominal injuries are not common in survivors of terrorist explosions, although they are a frequent finding in those immediately killed. Primary and tertiary blast injuries have predominated in survivors from explosions in enclosed spaces reported outside of Israel. In contrast, secondary blast injuries causing fragmentation wounds were predominant in suicide bombings in open and/or semi-confined spaces, mainly in Israel, and also in military conflicts. Multiple perforations of the ileum seem to be the most common primary blast injury to the bowel, but delayed bowel perforations are rare. Secondary blast injuries carry the highest anatomic severity and mortality rate. Most of the deaths assessed occurred early, with hemorrhagic shock from penetrating fragments as the main contributing factor. The negative laparotomy rate has been very variable, with higher rates reported, in general, from civilian hospitals attending a large number of casualties.

CONCLUSIONS

The pattern, severity, management, and prognosis of ABI vary considerably, in accordance with the main mechanism of injury.

Primary Triage, Evacuation Priorities, and Rapid Primary Distribution between Adjacent Hospitals—Lessons Learned from a Suicide Bomber Attack in Downtown Tel-Aviv

Introduction:

Terrorist attacks have occurred in Tel-Aviv that have caused mass-casualties.The objective of this study was to draw lessons from the medical response to an event that occurred on 19 January 2006, near the central bus station, Tel-Aviv, Israel. The lessons pertain to the management of primary triage, evacuation priorities, and rapid primary distribution between adjacent hospitals and the operational mode of the participating hospitals during the event.

Methods:

Data were collected in formal debriefings both during and after the event. Data were analyzed to learn about medical response components, interactions, and main outcomes. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic AnalysiS Through—Components, Interactions and Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

Results:

A total of 38 wounded were evacuated from the scene, including one severely injured, two moderately injured, and 35 mildly injured. The severe casualty was the first to be evacuated 14 minutes after the explosion. All of the casualties were evacuated from the scene within 29 minutes. Patients were distributed between three adjacent hospitals including one non-Level-1 Trauma Center that received mild casualties. Twenty were evacuated to the nearby, Level-1 Sourasky Medical Center, including the only severely injured patient. Nine mildly injured patients were evacuated to the Sheba Medical Center and nine to Wolfson Hospital, a non-Level-1 Trauma Center hospital. All the receiving hospitals were operated according to the mass-casualty incident doctrine.

Conclusions:

When a mass-casualty incident occurs in the vicinity of more than one hospital, primary triage, evacuation priority decision-making, and rapid distribution of casualties between all of the adjacent hospitals enables efficient and effective containment of the event.

Distribution of Casualties in a Mass-Casualty Incident with Three Local Hospitals in the Periphery of a Densely Populated Area: Lessons Learned from the Medical Management of a Terrorist Attack

Introduction:

A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources.When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city.

Methods:

Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

Results:

Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick.The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated.

Conclusion:

The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area.Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital.The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Disasters and Humanitarian Crises: A Joint Future for Responders?

In the last 35 years, the disaster and humanitarian communities have evolved rapidly in two parallel cohorts. The disaster enterprise in the US and Latin America grew up in the 1970s in response to a series of major earthquakes, hurricanes, and forest fires, culminating with the nuclear disaster at Three Mile Island and the formation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979/80. The Disaster Program at the Pan-American Health Organization also took form in the 1980s.

The humanitarian enterprise can be traced to the Biafran War of 1968/69, where a range of international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) converged to respond to support a population that was fleeing a civil war and famine. In the years since, drawn to refugees and internally displaced persons in war circumstances as varied as Angola, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, the humanitarian community has expanded in numbers, reach, and budget.

Advanced rescue techniques: lessons learned from the collapse of a building in Nairobi, Kenya

This paper examines the collapse of a five-storey building in Nairobi, Kenya, on 23 January 2006. It draws on reports from local authorities and on debriefings by Israel's Home Front Command (HFC), including information on injury distribution, rescue techniques, and the mode of operation. Most of the 117 people found under the structure were evacuated on the first day to a public hospital, which was overwhelmed by the incident. HFC forces arrived 23 hours after the disaster. At that stage, two people were still buried under the building and special techniques (tunnelling and scalping) were required to secure their evacuation. The two people quickly recovered after a short stay in hospital. Local technology is the preferred option during such events because time is crucial. International cooperation is required when this technology is not available. All of the hospitals in the disaster area, including private facilities, should participate in treating casualties.

Managing mild casualties in mass-casualty incidents: lessons learned from an aborted terrorist attack

INTRODUCTION

Mildly injured and "worried well" patients can have profound effects on the management of a mass-casualty incident. The objective of this study is to describe the characteristics and lessons learned from an event that occurred on 28 August 2005 near the central bus station in Beer-Sheva, Israel. The unique profile of injuries allows for the examination of the medical and operational aspects of the management of mild casualties.

METHODS

Data were collected during and after the event, using patient records and formal debriefings. They were processed focusing on the characteristics of patient complaints, medical response, and the dynamics of admission.

RESULTS

A total of 64 patients presented to the local emergency department, including two critical casualties. The remaining 62 patients were mildly injured or suffered from stress. Patient presentation to the emergency department was bi-phasic; during the first two hours following the attack (i.e., early phase), the rate of arrival was high (one patient every three minutes), and anxiety was the most frequent chief complaint. During the second phase, the rate of arrival was lower (one patient every 27 minutes), and the typical chief complaint was somatic. Additionally, tinnitus and complaints related to minor trauma also were recorded frequently. Psychiatric consultation was obtained for 58 (91%) of the patients. Social services were involved in the care of 47 of the patients (73%). Otolaryngology and surgery consultations were obtained for 45% and 44%, respectively. The need for some medical specialties (e.g., surgery and orthopedics) mainly was during the first phase, whereas others, mainly psychiatry and otolaryngology, were needed during both phases. Only 13 patients (20%) needed a consultation from internal medicine.

CONCLUSIONS

Following a terrorist attack, a large number of mildly injured victims and those experiencing stress are to be expected, without a direct relation to the effectiveness of the attack. Mildly injured patients tend to appear in two phases. In the first phase, the rate of admission is expected to be higher. Due to the high incidence of anxiety and other stress-related phenomena, many mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation. In the case of a bombing attack, many of the victims must be evaluated by an otolaryngologist.

The significance of a small, level-3 'semi evacuation' hospital in a terrorist attack in a nearby town

Terrorist attacks can occur in remote areas causing mass-casualty incidents MCIs far away from level-1 trauma centres. This study draws lessons from an MCI pertaining to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational mode practiced. Data was collected from formal debriefings during and after the event, and the medical response, interactions and main outcomes analysed using Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis through Components, Interactions and Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology. A total of 112 people were evacuated from the scene-66 to the nearby level 3 Laniado hospital, including the eight critically and severely injured patients. Laniado hospital was instructed to act as an evacuation hospital but the flow of patients ended rapidly and it was decided to admit moderately injured victims. We introduce a novel concept of a 'semi-evacuation hospital'. This mode of operation should be selected for small-scale events in which the evacuation hospital has hospitalization capacity and is not geographically isolated. We suggest that level-3 hospitals in remote areas should be prepared and drilled to work in semi-evacuation mode during MCIs.

Significance of a Level-2, "selective, secondary evacuation" hospital during a peripheral town terrorist attack

INTRODUCTION

Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) can occur outside of major metropolitan areas. In such circumstances, the nearest hospital seldom is a Level-1 Trauma Center. Moreover, emergency medical services (EMS) capabilities in such areas tend to be limited, which may compromise prehospital care and evacuation speed. The objective of this study was to extract lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist event that occurred in the marketplace of a small Israeli town on 26 October 2005. The lessons pertain to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational practices by the only hospital in the town, which is designated as a Level-2 Trauma Center.

METHODS

Data were collected during the event by Home Front Command Medical Department personnel. After the event, formal and informal debriefings were conducted with EMS personnel, the hospitals involved, and the Ministry of Health. The medical response components, interactions (mainly primary triage and secondary distribution), and the principal outcomes were analyzed. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.

RESULTS

The suicide bomber and four victims died at the scene, and two severely injured patients later died in the hospital. A total of 58 wounded persons were evacuated, including eight severely injured, two moderately injured, and 48 mildly injured. Forty-nine of the wounded arrived to the nearby Hillel Yafe Hospital, including all eight of the severely injured victims, the two moderately injured, and 39 of the mildly injured. Most of the mildly injured victims were evacuated in private cars by bystanders. Five other area hospitals were alerted, three of which primarily received the mildly injured victims. Two distant, Level-1 Trauma Centers also were alerted; each received one severely injured patient from Hillel Yafe Hospital during the secondary distribution process. Emergency medical services personnel were able to treat and evacuate all severely and moderately injured patients within 17 minutes of the explosion. A total of 12 of the 21 ambulances arriving on-scene within the first 20 minutes were staffed by EMS volunteers or off-duty workers.

CONCLUSION

When a MCI occurs in a small town that is in the vicinity of a Level-2 Trauma Center, and located a > 40 minute drive from Level-1 Trauma Centers, the Level-2 Trauma Center is a critical component in medical management of the event. All severely and moderately injured patients initially should be evacuated to the Level-2 Trauma Center, and given advanced, hospital-based resuscitation. The patients needing care beyond the capabilities of this facility should be distributed secondarily to Level-1 Trauma Centers. To alleviate the burden placed on the local hospital, some of the mildly injured victims can be evacuated primarily to more distant hospitals. The ability to control the flow of mildly injured patients is limited by the large percentage of them arriving by private cars. The availability of EMS in small towns can be augmented significantly by enrolling off-duty EMS workers and volunteers to the rescue effort. Level-2 hospitals in small towns should be prepared and drilled to operate in a "selective evacuation" mode during MCIs.

A four-step approach for establishment of a national medical response to mega-terrorism

A simplified, four-step approach was used to establish a medical management and response plan to mega-terrorism in Israel. The basic steps of this approach are: (1) analysis of a scenario based on past incidents; (2) description of relevant capabilities of the medical system; (3) analysis of gaps between the scenario and the expected response; and (4) development of an operational framework. Analyses of both the scenario and medical abilities led to the recommendation of an evidence-based contingency plan for mega-terrorism. An important lesson learned from the analyses is that a shortage in medical first responders would require the administration of advanced life support (ALS) by paramedics at the scene, along with simultaneous, rapid evacuation of urgent casualties to nearby hospitals by medics practicing basic life support (BLS). Ambulances and helicopters should triage casualties from inner to outer circle hospitals secondarily, preferentially Level-1 trauma centers. In conclusion, this four-step approach based on scenario analysis, mapping of medical capabilities, detection of bottlenecks, and establishment of a unique operational framework, can help other medical systems develop a response plan to mega-terrorist attacks.