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Yeung EKL, Cheung H. Intensionality is more cognitively demanding than false belief in adults: evidence from a non-inferential sentence-reading task. Sci Rep 2024; 14:561. [PMID: 38177291 PMCID: PMC10766945 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-51181-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2023] [Accepted: 01/01/2024] [Indexed: 01/06/2024] Open
Abstract
Children are said to understand false belief if they can appreciate an agent's wrong description of an object as a result of misinformation, and intensionality if they can appreciate and switch between alternative descriptions from different epistemic viewpoints. Most previous studies have investigated the developmental trajectories of these capacities in the age range from 3 to 10 years aiming to discern their conceptual nature. The present research examines whether intensionality incurs lower performance accuracies and longer response times than false belief in adults, using a task in which participants read sentences that explicitly state an agent's beliefs. Experiment 1 showed that participants were less accurate in rejecting verbal probes that contradicted an agent's alternative than false thoughts about objects. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this finding using thoughts about object identities but not properties. These results suggest that compared to false belief, intensionality is cognitively demanding for adults to process because of the availability of more than one identity candidate under the agent's perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Him Cheung
- Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.
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2
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Fabricius WV, Gonzales CR, Pesch A, Weimer AA. Perceptual Access Reasoning: What are the alternatives? COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2023.101306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
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3
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Huemer M, Schröder LM, Leikard SJ, Gruber S, Mangstl A, Perner J. The knowledge ("true belief") error in 4- to 6-year-old children: When are agents aware of what they have in view? Cognition 2023; 230:105255. [PMID: 36088669 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105255] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2021] [Revised: 08/09/2022] [Accepted: 08/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
The standard view on explicit theory of mind development holds that children around the age of 4 years start to ascribe beliefs to themselves and others, typically tested with false belief (FB) tasks. The present study (N = 95, 53 female, 41 male, Austrian, 41 to 80 months) systematically investigated the puzzling phenomenon that FB achievers (FB+) fail knowledge (often subsumed under "true belief") tasks: Despite the story protagonist witnessing the displacement of an object these children predict that the protagonist will look for it in its original location. We replicate this result in Experiment 1. Interestingly, some of our children indicated uncertainty about the protagonist's awareness of the relevant event. Thus, in Experiment 2 a new active watching condition was designed to help children understand that the protagonist attended to the critical event. This practically eradicated the knowledge error. Experiment 3 successfully replicated these results. Implications for existing explanations, perceptual access reasoning (PAR, Fabricius, Boyer, Weimer, & Carroll, 2010) and pragmatic difficulties (Oktay-Gür & Rakoczy, 2017) are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Huemer
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria.
| | - Lara M Schröder
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Sarah J Leikard
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Sara Gruber
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Anna Mangstl
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
| | - Josef Perner
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
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4
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Schidelko LP, Proft M, Rakoczy H. How do children overcome their pragmatic performance problems in the true belief task? The role of advanced pragmatics and higher-order theory of mind. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0266959. [PMID: 35476636 PMCID: PMC9045612 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0266959] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2021] [Accepted: 03/31/2022] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
The true belief (TB) control condition of the classical location-change task asks children to ascribe a veridical belief to an agent to predict her action (analog to the false belief (FB) condition to test Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities). Studies that administered TB tasks to a broad age range of children yielded surprising findings of a U-shaped performance curve in this seemingly trivial task. Children before age four perform competently in the TB condition. Children who begin to solve the FB condition at age four, however, fail the TB condition and only from around age 10, children succeed again. New evidence suggests that the decline in performance around age four reflects pragmatic confusions caused by the triviality of the task rather than real competence deficits in ToM. Based on these results, it can be hypothesized that the recovery of performance at the end of the U-shaped curve reflects underlying developments in children's growing pragmatic awareness. The aim of the current set of studies, therefore, was to test whether the developmental change at the end of the U-shaped performance curve can be explained by changes in children's pragmatic understanding and by more general underlying developmental changes in recursive ToM or recursive thinking in general. Results from Study 1 (N = 81, 6-10 years) suggest that children's recursive ToM, but not their advanced pragmatic understanding or general recursive thinking abilities predict their TB performance. However, this relationship could not be replicated in Study 2 (N = 87, 6-10 years) and Study 3 (N = 64, 6-10 years) in which neither recursive ToM nor advanced pragmatic understanding or recursive thinking explained children's performance in the TB task. The studies therefore remain inconclusive regarding explanations for the end of the U-shaped performance curve. Future research needs to investigate potential pragmatic and general cognitive foundations of this developmental change more thoroughly.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Marina Proft
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
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5
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Expanding the understanding of majority-bias in children's social learning. Sci Rep 2022; 12:6723. [PMID: 35468912 PMCID: PMC9038790 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-10576-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2021] [Accepted: 04/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Prior experiments with children across seven different societies have indicated U-shaped age patterns in the likelihood of copying majority demonstrations. It is unclear which learning strategies underlie the observed responses that create these patterns. Here we broaden the understanding of children’s learning strategies by: (1) exploring social learning patterns among 6–13-year-olds (n = 270) from ethnolinguistically varied communities in Vanuatu; (2) comparing these data with those reported from other societies (n = 629), and (3) re-analysing our and previous data based on a theoretically plausible set of underlying strategies using Bayesian methods. We find higher rates of social learning in children from Vanuatu, a country with high linguistic and cultural diversity. Furthermore, our results provide statistical evidence for modest U-shaped age patterns for a more clearly delineated majority learning strategy across the current and previously investigated societies, suggesting that the developmental mechanisms structuring majority bias are cross-culturally highly recurrent and hence a fundamental feature of early human social learning.
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6
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Schidelko LP, Huemer M, Schröder LM, Lueb AS, Perner J, Rakoczy H. Why Do Children Who Solve False Belief Tasks Begin to Find True Belief Control Tasks Difficult? A Test of Pragmatic Performance Factors in Theory of Mind Tasks. Front Psychol 2022; 12:797246. [PMID: 35095682 PMCID: PMC8796962 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.797246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2021] [Accepted: 12/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The litmus test for the development of a metarepresentational Theory of Mind is the false belief (FB) task in which children have to represent how another agent misrepresents the world. Children typically start mastering this task around age four. Recently, however, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. Pragmatic accounts assume that the TB task is pragmatically confusing because it poses a trivial academic test question about a rational agent's perspective; and we do not normally engage in such discourse about subjective mental perspectives unless there is at least the possibility of error or deviance. The lack of such an obvious possibility in the TB task implicates that there might be some hidden perspective difference and thus makes the task confusing. In the present study, we test the pragmatic account by administering to 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 88) TB and FB tasks and structurally analogous true and false sign (TS/FS) tasks. The belief and sign tasks are matched in terms of representational and metarepresentational complexity; the crucial difference is that TS tasks do not implicate an alternative non-mental perspective and should thus be less pragmatically confusing than TB tasks. The results show parallel and correlated development in FB and FS tasks, replicate the puzzling performance pattern in TB tasks, but show no trace of this in TS tasks. Taken together, these results speak in favor of the pragmatic performance account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lydia P. Schidelko
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Michael Huemer
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
- Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
| | - Lara M. Schröder
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
- Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
| | - Anna S. Lueb
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Josef Perner
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
- Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
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Schidelko LP, Schünemann B, Rakoczy H, Proft M. Online Testing Yields the Same Results as Lab Testing: A Validation Study With the False Belief Task. Front Psychol 2021; 12:703238. [PMID: 34721151 PMCID: PMC8548716 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.703238] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2021] [Accepted: 09/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Recently, online testing has become an increasingly important instrument in developmental research, in particular since the COVID-19 pandemic made in-lab testing impossible. However, online testing comes with two substantial challenges. First, it is unclear how valid results of online studies really are. Second, implementing online studies can be costly and/or require profound coding skills. This article addresses the validity of an online testing approach that is low-cost and easy to implement: The experimenter shares test materials such as videos or presentations via video chat and interactively moderates the test session. To validate this approach, we compared children’s performance on a well-established task, the change-of-location false belief task, in an in-lab and online test setting. In two studies, 3- and 4-year-old received online implementations of the false belief version (Study 1) and the false and true belief version of the task (Study 2). Children’s performance in these online studies was compared to data of matching tasks collected in the context of in-lab studies. Results revealed that the typical developmental pattern of performance in these tasks found in in-lab studies could be replicated with the novel online test procedure. These results suggest that the proposed method, which is both low-cost and easy to implement, provides a valid alternative to classical in-person test settings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Britta Schünemann
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Marina Proft
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
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Fabricius WV, Gonzales CR, Pesch A, Weimer AA, Pugliese J, Carroll K, Bolnick RR, Kupfer AS, Eisenberg N, Spinrad TL. Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind. Monogr Soc Res Child Dev 2021; 86:7-154. [PMID: 34580875 PMCID: PMC9292623 DOI: 10.1111/mono.12432] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/04/2022]
Abstract
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false‐belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false‐belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false‐belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false‐belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true‐belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true‐ and false‐belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true‐belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true‐belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English‐speakers. Children were recruited from university‐sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3‐option false‐belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM‐related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Amy A Weimer
- Human Development and Family Sciences, Texas State University
| | - John Pugliese
- California Department of Public Health, Department of Psychology, California State University, Sacramento
| | | | | | | | | | - Tracy L Spinrad
- T. Denny Sanford School of Social and Family Dynamics, Arizona State University
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9
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Alternative perspectives: Relations between belief reasoning and ambiguous figure perception in bilingual children. INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1002/icd.2258] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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10
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Pesch A, Semenov AD, Carlson SM. The Path to Fully Representational Theory of Mind: Conceptual, Executive, and Pragmatic Challenges. Front Psychol 2020; 11:581117. [PMID: 33250820 PMCID: PMC7672026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.581117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2020] [Accepted: 10/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Although an explicit Theory of Mind (ToM) has been found to develop around 4 years of age in Western societies, recent work showing that 4- and 5-year-olds fail modified versions of False Belief tasks as well as seemingly easier True Belief tasks calls into question the robustness of preschoolers’ belief understanding. Some have argued these findings illustrate children’s conceptual limitations in their understanding of belief that are masked by standard False Belief tasks. However, others claim these examples of children’s failure can be explained by pragmatics of the testing situation, rather than conceptual limitations. Given the documented relation between ToM and executive function, an unexamined possibility is that children’s failure can be explained by certain executive demands. In the current study, we examined the relation between typically developing 4- (n = 43) and 5-year-olds’ (n = 42) performance on traditional and modified False Belief tasks, True Belief tasks, and one component of executive functioning - working memory. We found that children performed worse on modified False Belief tasks and True Belief tasks compared to standard 2-option False Belief tasks, and that working memory was related to modified 3-option contents False Belief performance. These results suggest that a fully representational ToM, one that is stable in the context of increased conceptual, executive, and pragmatic demands, may develop later than traditional accounts have assumed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Annelise Pesch
- Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, United States
| | - Andrei D Semenov
- Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, United States
| | - Stephanie M Carlson
- Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, United States
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Wenzel L, Dörrenberg S, Proft M, Liszkowski U, Rakoczy H. Actions do not speak louder than words in an interactive false belief task. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2020; 7:191998. [PMID: 33204438 PMCID: PMC7657934 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.191998] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/08/2019] [Accepted: 09/16/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Traditionally, it had been assumed that meta-representational Theory of Mind (ToM) emerges around the age of 4 when children come to master standard false belief (FB) tasks. More recent research with various implicit measures, though, has documented much earlier competence and thus challenged the traditional picture. In interactive FB tasks, for instance, infants have been shown to track an interlocutor's false or true belief when interpreting her ambiguous communicative acts (Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907-912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). However, several replication attempts so far have produced mixed findings (e.g. Dörrenberg et al. 2018 Cogn. Dev. 46, 12-30. (doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001); Grosse Wiesmann et al. 2017 Dev. Sci. 20, e12445. (doi:10.1111/desc.12445); Király et al. 2018 Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 115, 11 477-11 482. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1803505115)). Therefore, we conducted a systematic replication study, across two laboratories, of an influential interactive FB task (the so-called 'Sefo' tasks by Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907-912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). First, we implemented close direct replications with the original age group (17-month-olds) and compared their performance to those of 3-year-olds. Second, we designed conceptual replications with modifications and improvements regarding pragmatic ambiguities for 2-year-olds. Third, we validated the task with explicit verbal test versions in older children and adults. Results revealed the following: the original results could not be replicated, and there was no evidence for FB understanding measured by the Sefo task in any age group except for adults. Comparisons to explicit FB tasks suggest that the Sefo task may not be a sensitive measure of FB understanding in children and even underestimate their ToM abilities. The findings add to the growing replication crisis in implicit ToM research and highlight the challenge of developing sensitive, reliable and valid measures of early implicit social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lisa Wenzel
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Sebastian Dörrenberg
- Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 18, 28359 Bremen, Germany
- Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Marina Proft
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Ulf Liszkowski
- Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
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