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Causal illusions in the classroom: how the distribution of student outcomes can promote false instructional beliefs. Cogn Res Princ Implic 2020; 5:34. [PMID: 32748083 PMCID: PMC7399015 DOI: 10.1186/s41235-020-00237-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2020] [Accepted: 07/06/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Teachers sometimes believe in the efficacy of instructional practices that have little empirical support. These beliefs have proven difficult to efface despite strong challenges to their evidentiary basis. Teachers typically develop causal beliefs about the efficacy of instructional practices by inferring their effect on students’ academic performance. Here, we evaluate whether causal inferences about instructional practices are susceptible to an outcome density effect using a contingency learning task. In a series of six experiments, participants were ostensibly presented with students’ assessment outcomes, some of whom had supposedly received teaching via a novel technique and some of whom supposedly received ordinary instruction. The distributions of the assessment outcomes was manipulated to either have frequent positive outcomes (high outcome density condition) or infrequent positive outcomes (low outcome density condition). For both continuous and categorical assessment outcomes, participants in the high outcome density condition rated the novel instructional technique as effective, despite the fact that it either had no effect or had a negative effect on outcomes, while the participants in the low outcome density condition did not. These results suggest that when base rates of performance are high, participants may be particularly susceptible to drawing inaccurate inferences about the efficacy of instructional practices.
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Vadillo MA, Matute H. Predictions and causal estimations are not supported by the same associative structure. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 60:433-47. [PMID: 17366310 DOI: 10.1080/17470210601002520] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Studies performed by different researchers have shown that judgements about cue–outcome relationships are systematically influenced by the type of question used to request those judgements. It is now recognized that judgements about the strength of the causal link between a cue and an outcome are mostly determined by the cue–outcome contingency, whereas predictions of the outcome are more influenced by the probability of the outcome given the cue. Although these results make clear that those different types of judgement are mediated by some knowledge of the normative differences between causal estimations and outcome predictions, they do not speak to the underlying processes of these effects. The experiment presented here reveals an interaction between the type of question and the order of trials that challenges standard models of causal and predictive learning that are framed exclusively in associative terms or exclusively in higher order reasoning terms. However, this evidence could be easily explained by assuming the combined intervention of both types of process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel A Vadillo
- Departamento de Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
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Hagmayer Y, Waldmann MR. Inferences about unobserved causes in human contingency learning. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 60:330-55. [PMID: 17366304 DOI: 10.1080/17470210601002470] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Estimates of the causal efficacy of an event need to take into account the possible presence and influence of other unobserved causes that might have contributed to the occurrence of the effect. Current theoretical approaches deal differently with this problem. Associative theories assume that at least one unobserved cause is always present. In contrast, causal Bayes net theories (including Power PC theory) hypothesize that unobserved causes may be present or absent. These theories generally assume independence of different causes of the same event, which greatly simplifies modelling learning and inference. In two experiments participants were requested to learn about the causal relation between a single cause and an effect by observing their co-occurrence (Experiment 1) or by actively intervening in the cause (Experiment 2). Participants’ assumptions about the presence of an unobserved cause were assessed either after each learning trial or at the end of the learning phase. The results show an interesting dissociation. Whereas there was a tendency to assume interdependence of the causes in the online judgements during learning, the final judgements tended to be more in the direction of an independence assumption. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- York Hagmayer
- Department of Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany.
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Abstract
A major topic within human learning, the field of contingency judgement, began to emerge about 25 years ago following publication of an article on depressive realism by Alloy and Abramson (1979). Subsequently, associationism has been the dominant theoretical framework for understanding contingency learning but this has been challenged in recent years by an alternative cognitive or inferential approach. This article outlines the key conceptual differences between these approaches and summarizes some of the main methods that have been employed to distinguish between them.
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Affiliation(s)
- David R Shanks
- Department of Psychology, University College London. London. UK.
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Abstract
Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people's estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel A Vadillo
- 1 Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King's College London, UK.,2 Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, UK
| | - Fernando Blanco
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Ion Yarritu
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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Matute H, Blanco F, Yarritu I, Díaz-Lago M, Vadillo MA, Barberia I. Illusions of causality: how they bias our everyday thinking and how they could be reduced. Front Psychol 2015; 6:888. [PMID: 26191014 PMCID: PMC4488611 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00888] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2015] [Accepted: 06/15/2015] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Illusions of causality occur when people develop the belief that there is a causal connection between two events that are actually unrelated. Such illusions have been proposed to underlie pseudoscience and superstitious thinking, sometimes leading to disastrous consequences in relation to critical life areas, such as health, finances, and wellbeing. Like optical illusions, they can occur for anyone under well-known conditions. Scientific thinking is the best possible safeguard against them, but it does not come intuitively and needs to be taught. Teaching how to think scientifically should benefit from better understanding of the illusion of causality. In this article, we review experiments that our group has conducted on the illusion of causality during the last 20 years. We discuss how research on the illusion of causality can contribute to the teaching of scientific thinking and how scientific thinking can reduce illusion.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Fernando Blanco
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Ion Yarritu
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Marcos Díaz-Lago
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Miguel A. Vadillo
- Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King’s College London, London, UK
| | - Itxaso Barberia
- Departamento de Psicología Básica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- EventLab, Departamento de Personalidad, Evaluación y Tratamiento Psicológico, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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Boddez Y, Haesen K, Baeyens F, Beckers T. Selectivity in associative learning: a cognitive stage framework for blocking and cue competition phenomena. Front Psychol 2014; 5:1305. [PMID: 25429280 PMCID: PMC4228836 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01305] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/01/2014] [Accepted: 10/27/2014] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
BLOCKING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PHENOMENON IN THE HISTORY OF ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING THEORY: for over 40 years, blocking has inspired a whole generation of learning models. Blocking is part of a family of effects that are typically termed "cue competition" effects. Common amongst all cue competition effects is that a cue-outcome relation is poorly learned or poorly expressed because the cue is trained in the presence of an alternative predictor or cause of the outcome. We provide an overview of the cognitive processes involved in cue competition effects in humans and propose a stage framework that brings these processes together. The framework contends that the behavioral display of cue competition is cognitively construed following three stages that include (1) an encoding stage, (2) a retention stage, and (3) a performance stage. We argue that the stage framework supports a comprehensive understanding of cue competition effects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yannick Boddez
- Centre for the Psychology of Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven - University of Leuven, Leuven Belgium
| | - Kim Haesen
- Centre for the Psychology of Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven - University of Leuven, Leuven Belgium
| | - Frank Baeyens
- Centre for the Psychology of Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven - University of Leuven, Leuven Belgium
| | - Tom Beckers
- Centre for the Psychology of Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven - University of Leuven, Leuven Belgium ; University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Netherlands
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Matute H, Steegen S, Vadillo MA. Outcome probability modulates anticipatory behavior to signals that are equally reliable. ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR 2014; 22:207-216. [PMID: 25419093 PMCID: PMC4230536 DOI: 10.1177/1059712314527005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
A stimulus is a reliable signal of an outcome when the probability that the outcome occurs in its presence is different from in its absence. Reliable signals of important outcomes are responsible for triggering critical anticipatory or preparatory behavior, which is any form of behavior that prepares the organism to receive a biologically significant event. Previous research has shown that humans and other animals prepare more for outcomes that occur in the presence of highly reliable (i.e., highly contingent) signals, that is, those for which that difference is larger. However, it seems reasonable to expect that, all other things being equal, the probability with which the outcome follows the signal should also affect preparatory behavior. In the present experiment with humans, we used two signals. They were differentially followed by the outcome, but they were equally (and relatively weakly) reliable. The dependent variable was preparatory behavior in a Martians video game. Participants prepared more for the outcome (a Martians' invasion) when the outcome was most probable. These results indicate that the probability of the outcome can bias preparatory behavior to occur with different intensities despite identical outcome signaling.
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Mitchell CJ, Griffiths O, More P, Lovibond PF. Contingency Bias in Probability Judgement May Arise from Ambiguity regarding Additional Causes. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2013; 66:1675-86. [DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2012.752854] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
In laboratory contingency learning tasks, people usually give accurate estimates of the degree of contingency between a cue and an outcome. However, if they are asked to estimate the probability of the outcome in the presence of the cue, they tend to be biased by the probability of the outcome in the absence of the cue. This bias is often attributed to an automatic contingency detection mechanism, which is said to act via an excitatory associative link to activate the outcome representation at the time of testing. We conducted 3 experiments to test alternative accounts of contingency bias. Participants were exposed to the same outcome probability in the presence of the cue, but different outcome probabilities in the absence of the cue. Phrasing the test question in terms of frequency rather than probability and clarifying the test instructions reduced but did not eliminate contingency bias. However, removal of ambiguity regarding the presence of additional causes during the test phase did eliminate contingency bias. We conclude that contingency bias may be due to ambiguity in the test question, and therefore it does not require postulation of a separate associative link-based mechanism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chris J. Mitchell
- School of Psychology, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Oren Griffiths
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Pranjal More
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Peter F. Lovibond
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
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Abstract
Many theories of contingency learning assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that predicting whether an outcome will occur should be easier than making a causal judgment. Previous research suggests that outcome predictions would depart from normative standards less often than causal judgments, which is consistent with the idea that the latter are based on more numerous and complex processes. However, only indirect evidence exists for this view. The experiment presented here specifically addresses this issue by allowing for a fair comparison of causal judgments and outcome predictions, both collected at the same stage with identical rating scales. Cue density, a parameter known to affect judgments, is manipulated in a contingency learning paradigm. The results show that, if anything, the cue-density bias is stronger in outcome predictions than in causal judgments. These results contradict key assumptions of many influential theories of contingency learning.
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Abstract
Since the very earliest experimental investigations of learning, tension has existed between association-based and cognitive theories. Associationism accounts for the phenomena of both conditioning and "higher" forms of learning via concepts such as excitation, inhibition, and reinforcement, whereas cognitive theories assume that learning depends on hypothesis testing, cognitive models, and propositional reasoning. Cognitive theories have received considerable impetus in regard to both human and animal learning from recent research suggesting that the key illustration of cue selection in learning, blocking, often arises from inferential reasoning. At the same time, a dichotomous view that separates noncognitive, unconscious (implicit) learning from cognitive, conscious (explicit) learning has gained favor. This review selectively describes key findings from this research, evaluates evidence for and against associative and cognitive explanatory constructs, and critically examines both the dichotomous view of learning as well as the claim that learning can occur unconsciously.
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Affiliation(s)
- David R Shanks
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London WC1H 0AP United Kingdom.
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Abstract
AbstractThe past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research.
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