A dissociation between causal judgement and the ease with which a cause is categorized with its effect

Second-Order Conditioning in Humans

In contrast to the large body of work demonstrating second-order conditioning (SOC) in non-human animals, the evidence for SOC in humans is scant. In this review, I examine the existing literature and suggest theoretical and procedural explanations for why SOC has been so elusive in humans. In particular, I discuss potential interactions with conditioned inhibition, whether SOC is rational, and propose critical parameters needed to obtain the effect. I conclude that SOC is a real but difficult phenomenon to obtain in humans, and suggest directions for future research.

Second-order conditioning in human predictive judgements when there is little time to think

Associative accounts uniquely predict that second-order conditioning might be observed in human predictive judgements. Such an effect was found for cue X in two experiments in which participants were required to predict the outcomes of a series of training trials that included P + and PX−, but only when training was paced by requiring participants to make a prediction within 3 s on each trial. In Experiment 1 training on P + ended before training was given on PX − . In Experiment 2 trials with P+, PX−, T + and other cues were intermixed. In the unpaced group inhibitory learning was revealed by a summation test, TX versus TM, where M was a control stimulus. These results suggest either that pacing interferes with learning successive associations more than with learning simultaneous associations or that lack of time to think interferes with inferential processes required for this type of inhibitory learning.

Associationism and cognition: Human contingency learning at 25

A major topic within human learning, the field of contingency judgement, began to emerge about 25 years ago following publication of an article on depressive realism by Alloy and Abramson (1979). Subsequently, associationism has been the dominant theoretical framework for understanding contingency learning but this has been challenged in recent years by an alternative cognitive or inferential approach. This article outlines the key conceptual differences between these approaches and summarizes some of the main methods that have been employed to distinguish between them.

Second-order conditioning and conditioned inhibition: influences of speed versus accuracy on human causal learning

In human causal learning, excitatory and inhibitory learning effects can sometimes be found in the same paradigm by altering the learning conditions. This study aims to explore whether learning in the feature negative paradigm can be dissociated by emphasising speed over accuracy. In two causal learning experiments, participants were given a feature negative discrimination in which the outcome caused by one cue was prevented by the addition of another. Participants completed training trials either in a self-paced fashion with instructions emphasising accuracy, or under strict time constraints with instructions emphasising speed. Using summation tests in which the preventative cue was paired with another causal cue, participants in the accuracy groups correctly rated the preventative cue as if it reduced the probability of the outcome. However, participants in the speed groups rated the preventative cue as if it increased the probability of the outcome. In Experiment 1, both speed and accuracy groups later judged the same cue to be preventative in a reasoned inference task. Experiment 2 failed to find evidence of similar dissociations in retrospective revaluation (release from overshadowing vs. mediated extinction) or learning about a redundant cue (blocking vs. augmentation). However in the same experiment, the tendency for the accuracy group to show conditioned inhibition and the speed group to show second-order conditioning was consistent even across sub-sets of the speed and accuracy groups with equivalent accuracy in training, suggesting that second-order conditioning is not merely a consequence of poorer acquisition. This dissociation mirrors the trade-off between second-order conditioning and conditioned inhibition observed in animal conditioning when training is extended.

Learning: from association to cognition

Since the very earliest experimental investigations of learning, tension has existed between association-based and cognitive theories. Associationism accounts for the phenomena of both conditioning and "higher" forms of learning via concepts such as excitation, inhibition, and reinforcement, whereas cognitive theories assume that learning depends on hypothesis testing, cognitive models, and propositional reasoning. Cognitive theories have received considerable impetus in regard to both human and animal learning from recent research suggesting that the key illustration of cue selection in learning, blocking, often arises from inferential reasoning. At the same time, a dichotomous view that separates noncognitive, unconscious (implicit) learning from cognitive, conscious (explicit) learning has gained favor. This review selectively describes key findings from this research, evaluates evidence for and against associative and cognitive explanatory constructs, and critically examines both the dichotomous view of learning as well as the claim that learning can occur unconsciously.