Factors that affect action possibility judgements: recent experience with the action and the current body state

On the perception of movement vigour

It is common to get the impression that someone moves rather slowly or quickly in everyday life. In motor control, the natural pace of movement is captured by the concept of vigour, which is often quantified from the speed or duration of goal-directed actions. A common phenomenon, here referred to as the vigour law, is that preferred speed and duration idiosyncratically increase with the magnitude of the motion. According to the direct-matching hypothesis, this vigour law could thus underlie the judgement of someone else's movement vigour. We conducted a series of three experiments (N = 80) to test whether the vigour law also exists in perception and whether it is linked to that of action. In addition to measuring participants' vigour, we also asked them to judge the quickness of stimuli representing horizontal arm reaching movements varying through amplitudes, speeds, and durations. Results showed that speed and duration of movements perceived as neither fast nor slow (i.e., natural pace) increased with amplitude, thereby indicating that the vigour law holds when an observer judges the natural pace of others' movements. Results also revealed that this judgement was population-based (related to the average vigour of all participants) rather than individual-based (participant's own vigour).

The Impact of Limited Previous Motor Experience on Action Possibility Judgments in People with Spinal Muscle Atrophy

Previous studies have shown that people with limited motor capabilities may rely on previous motor experience when making action possibility judgments for others. In the present study, we examined if having limited previous motor experience, as a consequence of spinal muscle atrophy (SMA), alters action possibility judgments. Participants with SMA and neurologically healthy (NH) sex- and age-matched controls performed a perceptual-motor judgment task using the Fitts's law paradigm. Participants observed apparent motion videos of reciprocal aiming movements with varying levels of difficulty. For each movement, participants predicted the shortest movement time (MT) at which a neurologically healthy young adult could accurately perform the task. Participants with SMA predicted significantly longer MTs compared to controls; however, the predicted MTs of both SMA and NH participants exhibited a Fitts's law relationship (i.e., the predicted MTs significantly increased as movement difficulty increased). Overall, these results provide evidence that participants with SMA who have limited, or no motor experience may make more conservative action possibility judgments for others. Critically, our finding that the pattern of action possibility judgments was not different between SMA and NH groups suggests that limited previous motor experience may not completely impair action possibility judgments.

Examining the equivalence between imagery and execution - Do imagined and executed movements code relative environmental features?

Imagined actions engage some of the same neural substrates and related sensorimotor codes as executed actions. The equivalency between imagined and executed actions has been frequently demonstrated by the mental and physical chronometry of movements; namely, the imagination and execution of aiming movements in a Fitts paradigm. The present study aimed to examine the nature or extent of this equivalence, and more specifically, whether imagined movements encompass the relative environmental features as do executed movements. In two separate studies, participants completed a series of imagined or executed reciprocal aiming movements between standard control targets (no annuli), perceptually small targets (large annuli) and perceptually large targets (small annuli) (Ebbinghaus illusions). The findings of both studies replicated the standard positive relation between movement time and index of difficulty for imagined and executed movements. Furthermore, movement times were longer for targets with surrounding annuli compared to the movement times without the annuli suggesting a general interference effect. Hence, the surrounding annuli caused a longer time, independent of the illusory target size, most likely to avoid a potential collision and more precisely locate the endpoint. Most importantly, this feature could not be discriminated as a function of the task (imagined vs. executed). These findings lend support to the view of a common domain for imagined and executed actions, while elaborating on the precision of their equivalence.

"Two Minds Don't Blink Alike": The Attentional Blink Does Not Occur in a Joint Context

Typically, when two individuals perform a task together, each partner monitors the other partners' responses and goals to ensure that the task is completed efficiently. This monitoring is thought to involve a co-representation of the joint goals and task, as well as a simulation of the partners' performance. Evidence for such "co-representation" of goals and task, and "simulation" of responses has come from numerous visual attention studies in which two participants complete different components of the same task. In the present research, an adaptation of the attentional blink task was used to determine if co-representation could exert an influence over the associated attentional mechanisms. Participants completed a rapid serial visual presentation task in which they first identified a target letter (T1) and then detected the presence of the letter X (T2) presented one to seven letters after T1. In the individual condition, the participant identified T1 and then detected T2. In the joint condition, one participant identified T1 and the other participant detected T2. Across two experiments, an attentional blink (decreased accuracy in detecting T2 when presented three letters after T1) was observed in the individual condition, but not in joint conditions. A joint attentional blink may not emerge because the co-representation mechanisms that enable joint action exert a stronger influence at information processing stages that do not overlap with those that lead to the attentional blink.

Recombinant Enaction: Manipulatives Generate New Procedures in the Imagination, by Extending and Recombining Action Spaces

Manipulation of physical models such as tangrams and tiles is a popular approach to teaching early mathematics concepts. This pedagogical approach is extended by new computational media, where mathematical entities such as equations and vectors can be virtually manipulated. The cognitive and neural mechanisms supporting such manipulation-based learning-particularly how actions generate new internal structures that support problem-solving-are not understood. We develop a model of the way manipulations generate internal traces embedding actions, and how these action-traces recombine during problem-solving. This model is based on a study of two groups of sixth-grade students solving area problems. Before problem-solving, one group manipulated a tangram, the other group answered a descriptive test. Eye-movement trajectories during problem-solving were different between the groups. A second study showed that this difference required the tangram's geometrical structure, just manipulation was not enough. We propose a theoretical model accounting for these results, and discuss its implications.

Independent Development of Imagination and Perception of Fitts' Law in Late Childhood and Adolescence

Recent neurophysiological and behavioral research suggests perception-action systems are tightly coupled. Accordingly, Fitts' law has been observed when individuals execute, perceive, and imagine actions. Developmental research has found that (a) children demonstrate Fitts' law in imagined actions and (b) imagined movement time (MT) becomes closer to actual MT as age increases. However, action execution, imagination, and perception have yet to be assessed together in children. The authors investigated how imagined and perceived MTs related to actual MTs in children and adolescents. It was found that imagined MTs were longer than execution MTs were. Perception MTs were lower than execution MTs for children and more consistent with execution MTs for adolescents. These results suggest potential mechanistic differences in action imagination and perception.

Effect of task-specific execution on accuracy of imagined aiming movements

Ideomotor theory states that the neural codes that represent action and the perceptual consequences of those actions are tightly bound in a common code. For action imagination, bound action, and perceptual codes are thought to be internally activated at a sub-threshold level through action simulation. In support of this hypothesis, previous research revealed that imagined movement times (MTs) for reciprocal aiming movements were closer to actual execution MTs after the participants gained experience executing the task. The current study examined the task-specific nature of the effects of experience on imagination by determining if improvements in accuracy in the imagination of reciprocal aiming movements occur only with experience of the reciprocal aiming task or with any aiming task. To this end, one group of participants executed a reciprocal pointing task, whereas a second group executed a discrete aiming task with comparable accuracy requirements before and after imagining reciprocal aiming movements. Influence of task specificity on imagination was assessed by evaluating the changes in imagined MTs before and after execution. Consistent with previous findings, there was a reduction in imagined MTs following task execution. Critically, there was a significant time by group interaction revealing a significant pre/post reduction in imagined MTs for the group that executed the reciprocal aiming movements, but not for the group that executed the discrete aiming movements. These data support ideomotor accounts of action imagination because it appears that the imagination of a movement is affected by task-specific experience with that movement.

Action possibility judgments of people with varying motor abilities due to spinal cord injury

Predictions about one's own action capabilities as well as the action capabilities of others are thought to be based on a simulation process involving linked perceptual and motor networks. Given the central role of motor experience in the formation of these networks, one's present motor capabilities are thought to be the basis of their perceptual judgments about actions. However, it remains unknown whether the ability to form these action possibility judgments is affected by performance related changes in the motor system. To determine if judgments of action capabilities are affected by long-term changes in one's own motor capabilities, participants with different degrees of upper-limb function due to their level (cervical vs. below cervical) of spinal cord injury (SCI) were tested on a perceptual-motor judgment task. Participants observed apparent motion videos of reciprocal aiming movements with varying levels of difficulty. For each movement, participants determined the shortest movement time (MT) at which they themselves and a young adult could perform the task while maintaining accuracy. Participants also performed the task. Analyses of MTs revealed that perceptual judgments for participant's own movement capabilities were consistent with their actual performance- people with cervical SCI had longer judged and actual MTs than people with below cervical SCI. However, there were no between-group differences in judged MTs for the young adult. Although it is unclear how the judgments were adjusted (altered simulation vs. threshold modification), the data reveal that people with different motor capabilities due to SCI are not completely biased by their present capabilities and can effectively adjust their judgments to estimate the actions of others.

On the relationship between the execution, perception, and imagination of action

Humans can perform, perceive, and imagine voluntary movement. Numerous investigations of these abilities have employed variants of goal-directed aiming tasks because the Fitts's law equation reliably captures the mathematical relationship between movement time (MT) and accuracy requirements. The emergence of Fitts's speed-accuracy relationship during movement execution, perception, and imagination has led to the suggestion that these processes rely on common neural codes. This common coding account is based on the notion that the neural codes used to generate an action are tightly bound to the codes that represent the perceptual consequences of that action. It is suggested that during action imagination and perception the bound codes are activated offline through an action simulation. The present study provided a comprehensive testing of this common coding hypothesis by examining the characteristics of the Fitts relationship in movement execution, perception, and imagination within the same individuals. Participants were required to imagine and perceive reciprocal aiming movements with varying accuracy requirements before and after actually executing the movements. Consistent with the common coding account, the Fitts relationship was observed in all conditions. Critically, the slopes of the regression lines across tasks were not different suggesting that the core of the speed-accuracy trade-off was consistent across conditions. In addition, it was found that incidental limb position variability scaled to the amplitude of imagined movements. This motor overflow suggests motor system activation during action imagination. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that action execution, perception, and imagination rely on a common coding system.

Factors that affect action possibility judgments: the assumed abilities of other people

Judging what actions are possible and impossible to complete is a skill that is critical for planning and executing movements in both individual and joint actions contexts. The present experiments explored the ability to adapt action possibility judgments to the assumed characteristics of another person. Participants watched alternating pictures of a person's hand moving at different speeds between targets of different indexes of difficulty (according to Fitts' Law) and judged whether or not it was possible for individuals with different characteristics to maintain movement accuracy at the presented speed. Across four studies, the person in the pictures and the background information about the person were manipulated to determine how and under what conditions participants adapted their judgments. Results revealed that participants adjusted their possibility judgments to the assumed motor capabilities of the individual they were judging. However, these adjustments only occurred when participants were instructed to take the other person into consideration suggesting that the adaption process is a voluntary process. Further, it was observed that the slopes of the regression equations relating movement time and index of difficulty did not differ across conditions. All differences between conditions were in the y-intercept of the regression lines. This pattern of findings suggests that participants formed the action possibility judgments by first simulating their own performance, and then adjusted the "possibility" threshold by adding or subtracting a correction factor to determine what is and is not possible for the other person to perform.