Flexible and inflexible task sets: asymmetric interference when switching between emotional expression, sex, and age classification of perceived faces

Reward-based modulation of task-switching performance: a diffusion model analysis

Investigating the interface between motivation and cognitive control, we conducted two task switching experiments (N = 96 each) with reward manipulation where participants switched between three different tasks. We measured N-2 task repetition costs, which denote the performance decrement in N-2 task repetition sequences (ABA) relative to N-2 task switch sequences (CBA), and which are presumed to be a marker of inhibitory control in task switching. Participants in the reward group received performance-contingent reward in the second phase of each experiment, and in the second experiment they were additionally penalized for errors. Reward thresholds were determined individually based on participants' performance during the first phase of each experiment. Participants in the control group did not receive any reward. The reward manipulation led to faster performance in the reward group relative to the control group. Diffusion modeling revealed that the reward manipulation induced an increase in drift rate parameter, consistent with dopamine-based enhancement of attentional focus under reward. Contrary to our expectations, no robust evidence for a reward-based modulation of N-2 repetition costs was found across the two experiments. N-2 task repetition costs were small in both experiments, and possibly, a larger amount of inhibitory control is needed in order to obtain empirical evidence for a reward-related modulation thereof. However, additional analyses suggested that reward may not interact with inhibitory control on the task level at all.

Neural correlates of affective task switching and asymmetric affective task switching costs

The control of emotions is of potentially great clinical relevance. Accordingly, there has been increasing interest in understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying the ability to switch efficiently between the processing of affective and non-affective information. Reports of asymmetrically increased switch costs when switching toward the more salient emotion task indicate specific demands in the flexible control of emotion. The neural mechanisms underlying affective task switching, however, are so far not fully understood. Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) (N = 57), we observed that affective task switching was accompanied by increased activity in domain-general fronto-parietal control systems. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity in the posterior medial frontal and anterolateral prefrontal cortex was directly related to affective switch costs, indicating that these regions play a particular role in individual differences in (affective) task-switching ability. Asymmetric switch costs were associated with increased activity in the right inferior frontal and dorsal anterior medial prefrontal cortex, two brain regions critical for response inhibition. This suggests that asymmetric switch costs might-to a great extent-reflect higher demands on inhibitory control of the dominant emotion task. These results contribute to a refined understanding of brain systems for the flexible control of emotions and thereby identify valuable target systems for future clinical research.

Individual differences in resilience to stress are associated with affective flexibility

Cognitive flexibility is frequently linked to resilience because of its important contribution to stress regulation. In this context, particularly affective flexibility, defined as the ability to flexibly attend and disengage from affective information, may play a significant role. In the present study, the relationship of cognitive and affective flexibility and resilience was examined in 100 healthy participants. Resilience was measured with three self-report questionnaires, two defining resilience as a personality trait and one focusing on resilience as an outcome in the sense of stress coping abilities. Cognitive and affective flexibility were assessed in two experimental task switching paradigms with non-affective and affective materials and tasks, respectively. The cognitive flexibility paradigm additionally included measures of cognitive stability and spontaneous switching in ambiguous situations. In the affective flexibility paradigm, we explicitly considered the affective valence of the stimuli. Response time switch costs in the affective flexibility paradigm were significantly correlated to all three measures of resilience. The correlation was not specific for particular valences of the stimuli before or during switching. For cognitive (non-affective) flexibility, a significant correlation of response time switch costs was found with only one resilience measure. A regression analysis including both affective and cognitive switch costs as predictors of resilience indicated that only affective, but not cognitive switch costs, explained unique variance components. Furthermore, the experimental measures of cognitive stability and the rate of spontaneous switching in ambiguous situations did not correlate with resilience scores. These findings suggest that specifically the efficiency of flexibly switching between affective and non-affective information is related to resilience.

The role of discriminability in face perception: Interference processing of expression, gender, and gaze

Eye gaze plays a fundamental role in social interaction and facial recognition. However, interference processing between gaze and other facial variants (e.g., expression) and invariant information (e.g., gender) remains controversial and unclear, especially the role of facial information discriminability in interference. A Garner paradigm was used to conduct two experiments. This paradigm allows simultaneous investigation of the mutual influence of two kinds of facial information in one experiment. In Experiment 1, we manipulated facial expression discriminability and investigated its role in interference processing of gaze and facial expression. The results show that individuals were unable to ignore expression when classifying gaze with both high and low discriminability but could ignore gaze when classifying expression with high discriminability only. In Experiment 2, we manipulated gender discriminability and investigated its function in interference processing of gaze and gender. Participants were unable to ignore gender when classifying gaze with both high and low discriminability but could ignore gaze when classifying gender with low discriminability only. The results indicate that gaze categorization is affected by facial expression and gender regardless of facial information discriminability, whereas interference of gaze on facial expression and gender depends on the degree of discriminability. The present study provides evidence that the processing of gaze and other variant and invariant information is interdependent.

On the reliability of behavioral measures of cognitive control: retest reliability of task-inhibition effect, task-preparation effect, Stroop-like interference, and conflict adaptation effect

This study examined the reliability (retest and split-half) of four common behavioral measures of cognitive control. In Experiment 1 (N = 96), we examined N – 2 task repetition costs as a marker of task-level inhibition, and the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) effect as a marker of time-based task preparation. In Experiment 2 (N = 48), we examined a Stroop-like face-name interference effect as a measure of distractor interference control, and the sequential congruency effect (“conflict adaptation effect”) as a measure of conflict-triggered adaptation of cognitive control. In both experiments, the measures were assessed in two sessions on the same day, separated by a 10 min-long unrelated filler task. We observed substantial experimental effects with medium to large effect sizes. At the same time, split-half reliabilities were moderate, and retest reliabilities were poor, for most measures, except for the CSI effect. Retest reliability of the Stroop-like effect was improved when considering only trials preceded by congruent trials. Together, the data suggest that these cognitive control measures are well suited for assessing group-level effects of cognitive control. Yet, except for the CSI effect, these measures do not seem suitable for reliably assessing interindividual differences in the strength of cognitive control, and therefore are not suited for correlational approaches. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between robustness at the group level and reliability at the level of interindividual differences.

Cognitive Multitasking: Inhibition in Task Switching Depends on Stimulus Complexity

We report a series of three experiments investigating inhibition in task switching, using N-2 repetition costs as an empirical marker. The experiments were structurally identical, employing a standard experimental paradigm where participants switch between three different categorization tasks. The experiments differed with respect to the stimulus material. According to prominent theories of cognitive control, N-2 repetition costs should be observed in all three experiments. To our surprise, this is not what we observed: N-2 repetition costs did not occur in Experiment 1, where we used static pictures from a driving simulator environment showing an oncoming car, embedded in a car-driving scene. In contrast, we observed robust N-2 repetition costs in Experiment 2, where we used static pictures of faces, and in Experiment 3, where the identical car stimuli from Experiment 1 were used, but without the surrounding visual scene. These results suggest that N-2 repetition costs depend on the complexity of the stimulus material. We discuss two aspects of complexity: 1) When the relevant stimulus feature is embedded in a complex visual scene, task-irrelevant features in that scene might trigger additional task sets, and thus induce additional task switches, attenuating N-2 repetition costs among the instructed task sets. 2) The presence of distractors might lead to additional covert or overt shifts of spatial attention, which in turn might reduce the size of N-2 repetition costs. On a more general level, the results illustrate the difficulty of transferring laboratory tasks to settings that bear more similarity to everyday life situations.

Delayed reconfiguration of a non-emotional task set through reactivation of an emotional task set in task switching: an ageing study

In our everyday life, we frequently switch between different tasks, a faculty that changes with age. However, it is still not understood how emotion impacts on age-related changes in task switching. Using faces with emotional and neutral expressions, Experiment 1 investigated younger (n = 29; 18-38 years old) and older adults' (n = 32; 61-80 years old) ability to switch between an emotional and a non-emotional task (i.e. responding to the face's expression vs. age). In Experiment 2, younger and older adults also viewed emotional and neutral faces, but switched between two non-emotional tasks (i.e. responding to the face's age vs. gender). Data from Experiment 1 demonstrated that switching from an emotional to a non-emotional task was slower when the expression of the new face was emotional rather than neutral. This impairment was observed in both age groups. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that neither younger nor older adults were affected by block-wise irrelevant emotion when switching between two non-emotional tasks. Overall, the findings suggest that task-irrelevant emotion can impair task switching through reactivation of the competing emotional task set. They also suggest that this effect and the ability to shield task-switching performance from block-wise irrelevant emotion are preserved in ageing.

Increased cognitive control after task conflict? Investigating the N-3 effect in task switching

Task inhibition is considered to facilitate switching to a new task and is assumed to decay slowly over time. Hence, more persisting inhibition needs to be overcome when returning to a task after one intermediary trial (ABA task sequence) than when returning after two or more intermediary trials (CBA task sequence). Schuch and Grange (J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 41:760-767, 2015) put forward the hypothesis that there is higher task conflict in ABA than CBA sequences, leading to increased cognitive control in the subsequent trial. They provided evidence that performance is better in trials following ABA than following CBA task sequences. Here, this effect of the previous task sequence ("N-3 effect") is further investigated by varying the cue-stimulus interval (CSI), allowing for short (100 ms) or long (900 ms) preparation time for the upcoming task. If increased cognitive control after ABA involves a better preparation for the upcoming task, the N-3 effect should be larger with long than short CSI. The results clearly show that this is not the case. In Experiment 1, the N-3 effect was smaller with long than short CSI; in Experiment 2, the N-3 effect was not affected by CSI. Diffusion model analysis confirmed previous results in the literature (regarding the effect of CSI and of the ABA-CBA difference); however, the N-3 effect was not unequivocally associated with any of the diffusion model parameters. In exploratory analysis, we also tested the alternative hypothesis that the N-3 effect involves more effective task shielding, which would be reflected in reduced congruency effects in trials following ABA, relative to trials following CBA; congruency effects did not differ between these conditions. Taken together, we can rule out two potential explanations of the N-3 effect: Neither is this effect due to enhanced task preparation, nor to more effective task shielding.

Older adults show less interference from task-irrelevant social categories: evidence from the garner paradigm

Though age-related difference in most cognitive performance has been found, there was no previous research examining age difference in multiple social categorizations. Using faces as stimuli and Garner Selective Attention Paradigm, this study explored the different characteristics of implicit and explicit social categorization between young and older adults. The results showed that young perceivers explicitly categorized gender and age of the faces faster and more readily than older perceivers did. When young adults judged specific category (gender category in Experiment 1; age category in Experiment 2), they were interfered from the completing irrelative category; however, irrelative category could not capture older adults' attention. These results first suggest perceivers' age indeed plays an important role in multiple social categorizations.

Trait Cheerfulness Does Not Influence Switching Costs But Modulates Preparation and Repetition Effects in a Task-Switching Paradigm

Many studies have shown the beneficial effect of positive emotions on various cognitive processes, such as creativity and cognitive flexibility. Cheerfulness, understood as an affective predisposition to sense of humor, has been associated with positive emotions. So far, however, no studies have shown the relevance of this dimension in cognitive flexibility processes. The aim of this research was to analyze the relationship between cheerfulness and these processes. To this end, we carried out two studies using a task-switching paradigm. Study 1 aimed at analyzing whether high trait cheerfulness was related to better cognitive flexibility (as measured by reduced task-switching costs), whereas Study 2 aimed at replicating the pattern of data observed in Study 1. The total sample was composed of 139 participants (of which 86 were women) selected according to their high versus low scores in trait cheerfulness. In a random way, participants had to judge whether the face presented to them in each trial was that of a man or a woman (gender recognition task) or whether it expressed anger or happiness (expressed emotion recognition task). We expected participants with high versus low trait cheerfulness to show a lower task-switching cost (i.e., higher cognitive flexibility). Results did not confirm this hypothesis. However, in both studies, participants with high versus low trait cheerfulness showed a higher facilitation effect when the stimuli attributes were repeated and also when a cue was presented anticipating the demand to perform. We discuss the relevance of these results for a better understanding of cheerfulness.

Conflict adaptation in positive and negative mood: Applying a success-failure manipulation

Conflict adaptation is a cognitive mechanism denoting increased cognitive control upon detection of conflict. This mechanism can be measured by the congruency sequence effect, indicating the reduction of congruency effects after incongruent trials (where response conflict occurs) relative to congruent trials (without response conflict). Several studies have reported increased conflict adaptation under negative, as compared to positive, mood. In these studies, sustained mood states were induced by film clips or music combined with imagination techniques; these kinds of mood manipulations are highly obvious, possibly distorting the actual mood states experienced by the participants. Here, we report two experiments where mood states were induced in a less obvious way, and with higher ecological validity. Participants received success or failure feedback on their performance in a bogus intelligence test, and this mood manipulation proved highly effective. We largely replicated previous findings of larger conflict adaptation under negative mood than under positive mood, both with a Flanker interference paradigm (Experiment 1) and a Stroop-like interference paradigm (Experiment 2). Results are discussed with respect to current theories on affective influences on cognitive control.

Investigating task inhibition in children versus adults: A diffusion model analysis

One can take n-2 task repetition costs as a measure of inhibition on the level of task sets. When switching back to a Task A after only one intermediate trial (ABA task sequence), Task A is thought to still be inhibited, leading to performance costs relative to task sequences where switching back to Task A is preceded by at least two intermediary trials (CBA). The current study investigated differences in inhibitory ability between children and adults by comparing n-2 task repetition costs in children (9-11years of age, N=32) and young adults (21-30years of age, N=32). The mean reaction times and error rate differences between ABA and CBA sequences did not differ between the two age groups. However, diffusion model analysis revealed that different cognitive processes contribute to the inhibition effect in the two age groups: The adults, but not the children, showed a smaller drift rate in ABA than in CBA, suggesting that persisting task inhibition is associated with slower response selection in adults. In children, non-decision time was longer in ABA than in CBA, possibly reflecting longer task preparation in ABA than in CBA. In addition, Ex-Gaussian functions were fitted to the distributions of correct reaction times. In adults, the ABA-CBA difference was reflected in the exponential parameter of the distribution; in children, the ABA-CBA difference was found in the Gaussian mu parameter. Hence, Ex-Gaussian analysis, although noisier, was generally in line with diffusion model analysis. Taken together, the data suggest that the task inhibition effect found in mean performance is mediated by different cognitive processes in children versus adults.

Task Inhibition and Response Inhibition in Older vs. Younger Adults: A Diffusion Model Analysis

Differences in inhibitory ability between older (64–79 years, N = 24) and younger adults (18–26 years, N = 24) were investigated using a diffusion model analysis. Participants performed a task-switching paradigm that allows assessing n−2 task repetition costs, reflecting inhibitory control on the level of tasks, as well as n−1 response-repetition costs, reflecting inhibitory control on the level of responses. N−2 task repetition costs were of similar size in both age groups. Diffusion model analysis revealed that for both younger and older adults, drift rate parameters were smaller in the inhibition condition relative to the control condition, consistent with the idea that persisting task inhibition slows down response selection. Moreover, there was preliminary evidence for task inhibition effects in threshold separation and non-decision time in the older, but not the younger adults, suggesting that older adults might apply different strategies when dealing with persisting task inhibition. N−1 response-repetition costs in mean RT were larger in older than younger adults, but in mean error rates tended to be larger in younger than older adults. Diffusion-model analysis revealed longer non-decision times in response repetitions than response switches in both age groups, consistent with the idea that motor processes take longer in response repetitions than response switches due to persisting response inhibition of a previously executed response. The data also revealed age-related differences in overall performance: Older adults responded more slowly and more accurately than young adults, which was reflected by a higher threshold separation parameter in diffusion model analysis. Moreover, older adults showed larger non-decision times and higher variability in non-decision time than young adults, possibly reflecting slower and more variable motor processes. In contrast, overall drift rate did not differ between older and younger adults. Taken together, diffusion model analysis revealed differences in overall performance between the age groups, as well as preliminary evidence for age differences in dealing with task inhibition, but no evidence for an inhibitory deficit in older age.

Mood states influence cognitive control: the case of conflict adaptation

Conflict adaptation can be measured by the "congruency sequence effect", denoting the reduction of congruency effects after incongruent trials (where response conflict occurs) relative to congruent trials (without response conflict). Recently, it has been reported that conflict adaptation is larger in negative mood than in positive mood (van Steenbergen et al., Psychological Science 21:1629-1634, 2010). We conducted two experiments further investigating this important finding. Two different interference paradigms were applied to measure conflict adaptation: Experiment 1 was a Flanker task, Experiment 2 was a Stroop-like task. To get as pure a measure of conflict adaptation as possible, we minimized the influence of trial-to-trial priming effects by excluding all kinds of stimulus repetitions. Mood states were induced by presenting film clips with emotional content prior to the interference task. Three mood states were manipulated between subjects: amused, anxious, and sad. Across both interference paradigms, we consistently found conflict adaptation in negative, but not in positive mood. Taken together with van Steenbergen et al. (Psychological Science 21:1629-1634, 2010) findings, the results suggest that the negative-mood-triggered increase in conflict adaptation is a general phenomenon that occurs independently of the particular mood-induction procedure and interference paradigm involved.

Task-Switching Methodology

In this paper, the authors review studies involving switching between an evaluative task and a nonevaluative task as a means to indirectly assess evaluative processes in the context of research of attitudes, psychopathology, and personality traits. Two task-switching indices, Switching Cost and Task Rule Congruency Effect, which represent two distinct sets of processes, have been used so far and can be assessed simultaneously. The authors suggest that using task-switching methodology as a platform provides significant methodological as well as theoretical advantages, which they attribute to the heightened involvement of the individual’s goal system, characterizing the task-switching paradigm.