Evaluative Conditioning without Directly Experienced Pairings of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned Stimuli

Sixty Years After Orne's American Psychologist Article: A Conceptual Framework for Subjective Experiences Elicited by Demand Characteristics

Study participants form beliefs based on cues present in a testing situation (demand characteristics). These beliefs can alter study outcomes (demand effects). Neglecting demand effects can threaten the internal and external validity of studies (including their replication). While demand characteristics garnered much attention following Orne's introduction of this notion, consideration of their effects has become sparse in experimental reports. Moreover, the concept remains confusing. Here, we introduce a conceptual framework for subjective experiences elicited by demand characteristics. The model distinguishes between participants' awareness of the hypothesis, their motivation to comply with it, and the strategy they use to meet situational requirements. We stress that demand characteristics can give rise to genuine experiences. To illustrate, we apply the model to Evaluative Conditioning and the Rubber Hand Illusion. In the General Discussion, we discuss risks and opportunities associated with demand characteristics, and we explain that they remain highly relevant to current research.

Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences

Explicit (directly measured) evaluations are widely assumed to be sensitive to logical structure. However, whether implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are uniquely sensitive to co-occurrence information or can also reflect logical structure has been a matter of theoretical debate. To test these competing ideas, participants (N = 3928) completed a learning phase consisting of a series of two-step trials. In step 1, one or more conditional statements (A → B) containing novel targets co-occurring with valenced adjectives (e.g., "if you see a blue square, Ibbonif is sincere") were presented. In step 2, a disambiguating stimulus, e.g., blue square (A) or gray blob (¬A) was revealed. Co-occurrence information, disambiguating stimuli, or both were varied between conditions to enable investigating the unique and joint effects of each. Across studies, the combination of conditional statements and disambiguating stimuli licensed different normatively accurate inferences. In Study 1, participants were prompted to use modus ponens (inferring B from A → B and A). In Studies 2-4, the information did not license accurate inferences, but some participants made inferential errors: affirming the consequent (inferring A from A → B and B; Study 2) or denying the antecedent (inferring ¬B from A → B and ¬A; Studies 3A, 3B, and 4). Bayesian modeling using ordinal constraints on condition means yielded consistent evidence for the sensitivity of both explicit (self-report) and implicit (IAT and AMP) evaluations to the (correctly or erroneously) inferred truth value of propositions. Together, these data suggest that implicit evaluations, similar to their explicit counterparts, can reflect logical structure.

Lateral Attitude Change: Stalking the Elusive Displacement Effect

Recent theorizing (Glaser et al., 2015, Personality and Social Psychology Review) distinguishes two types of lateral attitude change (LAC): generalization, where explicit attitude change toward a focal object transfers to lateral (= related) objects, and displacement, where only lateral (but not focal) attitudes change. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that generalization versus displacement effects depend on acceptance versus rejection of focal attitude change. Participants (total n = 471) read positive and negative ratings of different products that served as focal attitude objects. Subsequent attitude change toward focal products generalized to lateral products as a function of similarity (Experiments 1–3) and of induced preference for consistency (Experiment. 3). However, manipulations designed to induce rejection of focal change by telling participants not to trust the information presented were not successful: Instead of displacement, they produced attenuated generalization (Experiments 1–3). Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

Like what you see: Generalization of social learning determines art appreciation

We examine whether a stimulus generalization framework can provide insight in how experience shapes evaluative responses to artworks. Participants received positive information about one artwork and negative information about another artwork. Afterwards, we tested their evaluative responses not only to these artworks but also to similar artworks, which allowed us to assess generalization. Results showed that the artwork that was paired with positive information and the artwork that was similar to it were evaluated more positively than the other artworks. These findings confirm that theories that aim to explain art appreciation could benefit from taking learning and its generalization into account.

The influence of misinformation manipulations on evaluative conditioning

We tested the influence of misinformation on evaluative conditioning (EC) by giving false information about the contingencies between CS and US stimuli after a conditioning procedure. This was done by asking participants questions about the USs while inaccurately suggesting that some CSs had been paired with a US that had the opposite valence than the US it had actually been paired with. For CS-US pairs from other conditions, accurate suggestions or no suggestions at all were given to participants. This manipulation significantly moderated EC effects. For pairs that were combined with inaccurate information we found a reversed EC effect, while we found a standard EC effect for both pairs combined with no suggestions and pairs combined with accurate suggestions. Additional analyses showed that the misinformation manipulation also moderated memory for the pairs. These results show that misinformation manipulations cannot only influence explicit memory but also attitudes. Furthermore, and in line with some theories of EC, they support the relevance of explicit memory for EC effects.

A Model of Attribute Conditioning

We present a model of attribute conditioning, the phenomenon that people’s assessment of stimuli’s specific attributes (e.g., a person’s characteristics) changes due to pairings with other stimuli possessing these specific attributes (e.g., another "athletic" person). These changes in attribute assessments go beyond evaluation changes due to these pairings (i.e., evaluative conditioning effects). We provide a short historical overview of the phenomenon and the available data. Then we present a potential mental model of the effect: We assume attribute conditioning to be a form of stimulus-stimulus learning. CS-US pairings establish an enduring referential link between CS and US. We present an associative as well as a distributed memory variant of this referential link. Based on this model, we provide the answers to the specific questions that guide the present special issue. Finally, we discuss the relation of evaluative and attribute conditioning.

Simple First: A Skeleton for an Evaluative Learning Model

Simple firstis our name for a set of hypotheses that we have found useful in our research on evaluative learning. The hypotheses are: (1) It is easier to encode and retrieve information that two concepts are linked than information about how they are linked; (2) It is easier to store and retrieve information than to make an inference based on that information; (3) When people encounter an object and memory activates valence that is mentally linked to that object, they consider the activation valid evidence that the activated valence characterizes the object. We demonstrate how these hypotheses generate useful assumptions about Evaluative Conditioning, and open paths for further research on evaluative learning and evaluation.

What You Feel Is What You See: A Binding Perspective on Evaluative Conditioning

In this paper, we outline the predominant theoretical perspectives on evaluative conditioning (EC)—the changes in liking that are due to the pairing of stimuli—identify their weaknesses, and propose a new framework, the binding perspective on EC, which might help to overcome at least some of these issues. Based on feature integration theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980, https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(80)90005-5) and the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01000103), we assume that EC depends on a selective integration mechanism that binds relevant CS, US, and action features into an event-file, while simultaneously inhibiting features irrelevant for current goals. This perspective examines hitherto unspecified processes relevant to the encoding of CS-US pairs and their consequences for behavior, which we hope will stimulate further theoretical development. We also present some preliminary evidence for binding in EC and discuss the scope and limitations of this perspective.

A Declarative Memory Model of Evaluative Conditioning

I propose a Declarative Memory Model (DMM) of evaluative conditioning (EC). EC effects are changes in the valence of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to previous pairings with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g., De Houwer, 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1138741600006491). According to the DMM, EC effects are found if (1) a memory trace is formed in the learning phase that links the CS to evaluative information from the US, if (2) this trace survives the retention interval, if (3) the trace or part of it is consciously retrieved when the CS is being evaluated, and if (4) the retrieved trace is used in the CS evaluation. For each of these stages, I make separate predictions about EC effects, many of which are based on empirical research on declarative memory. Where available, I report and discuss empirical evidence on EC that speaks to these hypotheses. The available empirical evidence is largely in line with the predictions of the DMM. Several predictions, however, have yet to be tested and some findings are ambiguous. While the DMM specifies conditions under which CS-US pairings should lead to a valence change, it does not deny the possibility that other processes might lead to a change in attitude as well. Advantages of the DMM are its foundation on declarative memory research, its applicability for attitude change effects in general, and its suitability for predictions of EC effects in the real world.

Evaluative Conditioning From the Perspective of the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). According to the associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, EC effects can be the result of two functionally distinct learning mechanisms: associative and propositional learning. The current article reviews the core assumptions of the APE model regarding (1) the defining features of associative and propositional learning, (2) the mental representations resulting from the two learning mechanisms, (3) the processes involved in the behavioral expression of these representations, and (4) the automatic versus controlled nature of the processes underlying EC effects. In addition to reviewing the core assumptions of the APE model, the article reviews relevant evidence to illustrate the theory’s main hypotheses, its explanatory and predictive power, as well as empirical challenges for the theory.

Associative Attitude Learning: A Closer Look at Evidence and How It Relates to Attitude Models

Associative attitude learning is typically viewed as a low-level process that automatically registers mere co-occurrences between stimuli, independent of their validity and relational meaning. This view invites to critically examine how attitude formation conforms to four operating conditions (i.e., unawareness, efficiency, goal independence, and uncontrollability) and two operating principles (i.e., unqualified registration of mere co-occurrences between stimuli and formation of direct stimulus–response links), which is the main purpose of the present contribution. The general discussion examines how contemporary attitude models endorse these conditions and principles. Overall, this contribution calls for (a) a nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of associative attitude learning, (b) a fine-grained understanding of how contemporary attitude models endorse conditions and principles reviewed here and find them relevant to their theorization of attitude formation, (c) a clarification of how direct and indirect evaluative measures relate to these conditions and principles, and (d) enhanced efforts in specifying contemporary attitude formation models.

Subjective, physiological, and behavioural responses towards evaluatively conditioned stimuli

Evaluative Conditioning (EC) is commonly defined as the change in liking of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) due to its pairings with an affective unconditioned stimulus (US). In Experiment 1, we investigated effects of repeated stimulus pairings on affective responses, i.e. valence and arousal ratings, pupil size, and duration estimation. After repeatedly pairing the CSs with affective USs, a consistent pattern of affective responses emerged: The CS_negative was rated as being more negative and more arousing, resulted in larger pupils, and was temporally overestimated compared to the CS_neutral. In Experiment 2, the influence of a mere instruction about the contingency between a CS and US on affective responses was examined. After mere instruction about upcoming pairings between the CS and US, subjective ratings also changed, but there was neither evidence for differential pupillary responses nor for differential temporal processing. The results indicate that EC via pairings or instructions can change the affective responses towards formerly neutral stimuli and introduce pupil size as a physiological measure in EC research. However, Experiment 2 suggests that there might be moderating factors based on the type of EC procedure involved.

The Mere Exposure Instruction Effect

Abstract. The mere exposure effect refers to the well-established finding that people evaluate a stimulus more positively after repeated exposure to that stimulus. We investigated whether a change in stimulus evaluation can occur also when participants are not repeatedly exposed to a stimulus, but are merely instructed that one stimulus will occur frequently and another stimulus will occur infrequently. We report seven experiments showing that (1) mere exposure instructions influence implicit stimulus evaluations as measured with an Implicit Association Test (IAT), personalized Implicit Association Test (pIAT), or Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), but not with an Evaluative Priming Task (EPT), (2) mere exposure instructions influence explicit evaluations, and (3) the instruction effect depends on participants’ memory of which stimulus will be presented more frequently. We discuss how these findings inform us about the boundary conditions of mere exposure instruction effects, as well as the mental processes that underlie mere exposure and mere exposure instruction effects.

Propositional Versus Dual-Process Accounts of Evaluative Conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US). Expanding on the debate between dual-process and propositional accounts, two studies investigated the relative effectiveness of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions in reversing EC effects on implicit and explicit evaluations. After conditioned evaluations were acquired via CS-US pairings, participants were either (1) presented with repeated CS-US pairings of the opposite valence or (2) given instructions that the CSs will be paired with USs of the opposite valence. Although both procedures reversed previously conditioned explicit evaluations, only directly experienced CS-US pairings reversed previously conditioned implicit evaluations. The findings question the functional equivalence of counter-conditioning and counter-instructions hypothesized by single-process propositional accounts. Yet, they support dual-process accounts, suggesting that associative and propositional processes jointly contribute to EC effects.

Generalization Effects in Evaluative Conditioning: Evidence for Attitude Transfer Effects from Single Exemplars to Social Categories

The present research investigated whether evaluatively conditioned attitudes toward members of a social category (CSs) generalize to other stimuli belonging to the same category as the CSs (generalization at the stimulus level) and to the category itself (generalization at the category level). In four experiments, USs were paired with schematic or naturalistic CSs belonging to certain fictitious groups. Afterward, attitudes toward the CSs, toward non-presented exemplars of the CS category, and toward the CS category were assessed. Results revealed evidence for generalization effects in EC on both the stimulus and the category level. Transfer effects were greater when participants’ awareness of the CS–US contingency (CA) was high. Moreover, we found differences in generalization between the stimulus and category level, indicating that different processes might contribute to the effects. Theoretical and practical implications such as using EC as a tool for changing attitudes toward social groups will be discussed.

The Moderating Impact of Distal Regularities on the Effect of Stimulus Pairings

Throughout much of the past century psychologists have focused their attention on a seemingly simple question: How do people come to like or dislike stimuli in the environment? Evaluative Conditioning (EC) - a change in liking due to the pairing of stimuli - has been offered as one avenue through which novel preferences may be formed and existing ones altered. In the current article, we offer a new look at EC from the perspective of Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS) and, more specifically, Relational Frame Theory (RFT). We briefly review the EC literature, introduce Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS), Relational Frame Theory (RFT), and then describe a behavioral phenomenon known as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR). Afterwards, we examine the relationship between EC and AARR. This novel perspective offers ways to organize existing as well as predict new EC effects, contributes to debates on "genuine" EC, human versus nonhuman EC, and further facilitates the development and refinement of cognitive theories of EC.

Single- and Dual-Process Models of Biased Contingency Detection

Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people's estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.

The impact of arbitrarily applicable relational responding on evaluative learning about hypothetical money and shock outcomes

Evaluative learning comprises changes in preferences after co-occurrences between conditioned stimuli (CSs) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) of affective value. Co-occurrences may involve relational responding. Two experiments examined the impact of arbitrary relational responding on evaluative preferences for hypothetical money and shock outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants were trained to make arbitrary relational responses by placing CSs of the same size but different colours into boxes and were then instructed that these CSs represented different intensities of hypothetical USs (money or shock). Liking ratings of the CSs were altered in accordance with the underlying bigger/smaller than relations. A reversal of preference was also observed: the CS associated with the smallest hypothetical shock was rated more positively than the CS associated with the smallest amount of hypothetical money. In Experiment 2, procedures from Relational Frame Theory (RFT) established a relational network of more than/less than relations consisting of five CSs (A-B-C-D-E). Overall, evaluative preferences were altered, but not reversed, depending on (a) how stimuli had been related to one another during the learning phase and (b) whether those stimuli referred to money or shocks. The contribution of RFT to evaluative learning research is discussed.

Instruction-Based Approach-Avoidance Effects

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus-action contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). Instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were observed for relatively neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites), but not for clearly valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites). We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli can provide sufficient bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli and discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were not found for valenced well-known stimuli.

Lateral Attitude Change

The authors propose a framework distinguishing two types of lateral attitude change (LAC): (a) generalization effects, where attitude change toward a focal object transfers to related objects, and (b) displacement effects, where only related attitudes change but the focal attitude does not change. They bring together examples of LAC from various domains of research, outline the conditions and underlying processes of each type of LAC, and develop a theoretical framework that enables researchers to study LAC more systematically in the future. Compared with established theories of attitude change, the LAC framework focuses on lateral instead of focal attitude change and encompasses both generalization and displacement. Novel predictions and designs for studying LAC are presented.