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Talboy A, Schneider S. Reference Dependence in Bayesian Reasoning: Value Selection Bias, Congruence Effects, and Response Prompt Sensitivity. Front Psychol 2022; 13:729285. [PMID: 35369253 PMCID: PMC8970303 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.729285] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2021] [Accepted: 02/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This work examines the influence of reference dependence, including value selection bias and congruence effects, on diagnostic reasoning. Across two studies, we explored how dependence on the initial problem structure influences the ability to solve simplified precursors to the more traditional Bayesian reasoning problems. Analyses evaluated accuracy and types of response errors as a function of congruence between the problem presentation and question of interest, amount of information, need for computation, and individual differences in numerical abilities. Across all problem variations, there was consistent and strong evidence of a value selection bias in that incorrect responses almost always conformed to values that were provided in the problem rather than other errors including those related to computation. The most consistent and unexpected error across all conditions in the first experiment was that people were often more likely to utilize the superordinate value (N) as part of their solution rather than the anticipated reference class values. This resulted in a weakened effect of congruence, with relatively low accuracy even in congruent conditions, and a dominant response error of the superordinate value. Experiment 2 confirmed that the introduction of a new sample drew attention away from the provided reference class, increasing reliance on the overall sample size. This superordinate preference error, along with the benefit of repeating the PPV reference class within the question, demonstrated the importance of reference dependence based on the salience of information within the response prompt. Throughout, higher numerical skills were generally associated with higher accuracy, whether calculations were required or not.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alaina Talboy
- Microsoft, Redmond, WA, United States
- Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States
| | - Sandra Schneider
- Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States
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2
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Tubau E. Why can it be so hard to solve Bayesian problems? Moving from number comprehension to relational reasoning demands. THINKING & REASONING 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2015439] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Elisabet Tubau
- Department of Cognition, Development and Educational Psychology, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- Institute of Neurosciences, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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3
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Which cognitive individual differences predict good Bayesian reasoning? Concurrent comparisons of underlying abilities. Mem Cognit 2021; 49:235-248. [PMID: 32815106 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-020-01087-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
We know a lot about how to present Bayesian reasoning tasks in order to aid performance, but less about underlying individual differences that can account for interindividual variability on the same tasks. Such information would be useful for both theoretical and practical reasons. Two theoretical positions, ecological rationality and nested set views, generate multiple hypotheses about which individual difference traits should be most relevant as underlying Bayesian reasoning performance. However, because many of these traits are somewhat overlapping, testing variables in isolation can yield misleading results. The present research assesses Bayesian reasoning abilities in conjunction with multiple individual different measures. Across three experiments, Bayesian reasoning was best predicted by measures of numerical literacy and visuospatial ability, as opposed to several different measures of cognitive thinking dispositions/styles, ability to conceptually model set-theoretic relationships, or cognitive processing ability (working memory span). These results support an ecological rationality view of Bayesian reasoning, rather than nested sets views. There also was some predictive ability for the Cognitive Reflection Task, which was only partially due to the numeracy aspects of that instrument, and further work is needed to clarify if this is a distinct factor. We are now beginning to understand not only how to build Bayesian reasoning tasks, but also how to build good Bayesian reasoners.
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Bruckmaier G, Krauss S, Binder K, Hilbert S, Brunner M. Tversky and Kahneman's Cognitive Illusions: Who Can Solve Them, and Why? Front Psychol 2021; 12:584689. [PMID: 33912097 PMCID: PMC8075297 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.584689] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2020] [Accepted: 01/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
In the present paper we empirically investigate the psychometric properties of some of the most famous statistical and logical cognitive illusions from the "heuristics and biases" research program by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who nearly 50 years ago introduced fascinating brain teasers such as the famous Linda problem, the Wason card selection task, and so-called Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g., the mammography task). In the meantime, a great number of articles has been published that empirically examine single cognitive illusions, theoretically explaining people's faulty thinking, or proposing and experimentally implementing measures to foster insight and to make these problems accessible to the human mind. Yet these problems have thus far usually been empirically analyzed on an individual-item level only (e.g., by experimentally comparing participants' performance on various versions of one of these problems). In this paper, by contrast, we examine these illusions as a group and look at the ability to solve them as a psychological construct. Based on an sample of N = 2,643 Luxembourgian school students of age 16-18 we investigate the internal psychometric structure of these illusions (i.e., Are they substantially correlated? Do they form a reflexive or a formative construct?), their connection to related constructs (e.g., Are they distinguishable from intelligence or mathematical competence in a confirmatory factor analysis?), and the question of which of a person's abilities can predict the correct solution of these brain teasers (by means of a regression analysis).
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Affiliation(s)
- Georg Bruckmaier
- School of Education, Institute of Secondary Education, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland, Windisch, Switzerland
| | - Stefan Krauss
- Mathematics Education, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Karin Binder
- Mathematics Education, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Sven Hilbert
- Institute for Learning and Teaching Research, Faculty of Psychology, Education and Sports Science, University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Martin Brunner
- Department of Educational Sciences, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
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What facilitates Bayesian reasoning? A crucial test of ecological rationality versus nested sets hypotheses. Psychon Bull Rev 2020; 28:703-709. [PMID: 32885405 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01763-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Different theoretical views about Bayesian reasoning (ecological rationality and nested sets views) both claim support from results showing that natural sampling, whole numbers, and pictorial representations help with reasoning performance, although they differ in explaining how those results occur. Three studies (total N = 653) use minimally different numerical presentation formats-varying the singular or plural tense of the context story topic-and presence or absence of an additional icon array picture, to better understand the mechanisms driving these reasoning performance results. Plural wording, indicating a conceptual aggregation (i.e., frequencies) rather than just numerical whole numbers, consistently boosted performance. Icon arrays, in contrast, were helpful only when alongside single-tense information. These results fit more consistently with an ecological rationality view which has long argued that the mind is adapted to work best with frequentist information.
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Leuders T, Loibl K. Processing Probability Information in Nonnumerical Settings - Teachers' Bayesian and Non-bayesian Strategies During Diagnostic Judgment. Front Psychol 2020; 11:678. [PMID: 32719627 PMCID: PMC7348070 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00678] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2019] [Accepted: 03/19/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
A diagnostic judgment of a teacher can be seen as an inference from manifest observable evidence on a student’s behavior to his or her latent traits. This can be described by a Bayesian model of inference: The teacher starts from a set of assumptions on the student (hypotheses), with subjective probabilities for each hypothesis (priors). Subsequently, he or she uses observed evidence (students’ responses to tasks) and knowledge on conditional probabilities of this evidence (likelihoods) to revise these assumptions. Many systematic deviations from this model (biases, e.g., base-rate neglect, inverse fallacy) are reported in the literature on Bayesian reasoning. In a teacher’s situation, the information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) is usually not explicitly represented numerically (as in most research on Bayesian reasoning) but only by qualitative estimations in the mind of the teacher. In our study, we ask to which extent individuals (approximately) apply a rational Bayesian strategy or resort to other biased strategies of processing information for their diagnostic judgments. We explicitly pose this question with respect to nonnumerical settings. To investigate this question, we developed a scenario that visually displays all relevant information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) in a graphically displayed hypothesis space (called “hypothegon”)–without recurring to numerical representations or mathematical procedures. Forty-two preservice teachers were asked to judge the plausibility of different misconceptions of six students based on their responses to decimal comparison tasks (e.g., 3.39 > 3.4). Applying a Bayesian classification procedure, we identified three updating strategies: a Bayesian update strategy (BUS, processing all probabilities), a combined evidence strategy (CES, ignoring the prior probabilities but including all likelihoods), and a single evidence strategy (SES, only using the likelihood of the most probable hypothesis). In study 1, an instruction on the relevance of using all probabilities (priors and likelihoods) only weakly increased the processing of more information. In study 2, we found strong evidence that a visual explication of the prior–likelihood interaction led to an increase in processing the interaction of all relevant information. These results show that the phenomena found in general research on Bayesian reasoning in numerical settings extend to diagnostic judgments in nonnumerical settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Leuders
- Institute of Mathematics Education, University of Education, Freiburg, Germany
| | - Katharina Loibl
- Institute of Education, University of Education, Freiburg, Germany
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7
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Hill WT, Brase GL, Kenney KL. Developing a Better and More User-Friendly Numeracy Scale for Patients. Health Lit Res Pract 2019; 3:e174-e180. [PMID: 31428734 PMCID: PMC6690223 DOI: 10.3928/24748307-20190624-01] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2017] [Accepted: 11/30/2018] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Background A person's ability to work with and understand numerical information (i.e., numeracy) is increasingly important in everyday health and other decision-making contexts. Several survey measures of numeracy have been developed to address this trend, including the widely used General Numeracy Scale (GNS), which is thematically focused on health decision-making and is assumed to measure a unidimensional construct of numeracy. Objective The present research was designed to evaluate this proposed unidimensional structure of general numeracy, for which prior data have given mixed empirical support. Methods Three samples completed the GNS, in different forms, and responses were analyzed in terms of underlying factor structure. Key Results We show that both one-factor and four-factor models of numeracy are plausible based on the GNS (Study 1), and then develop a multiple-choice version of the GNS (i.e., the MC-GNS) that demonstrates some increased clarity in factor structure due to the consistent response format (Study 2). A further study evaluated the convergent and discriminant validity of the MC-GNS (Study 3), finding it to be as good as or better than the prior scale. Conclusions Additionally, the MC-GNS is easier for people to take, likely to be less stressful, and easier for practitioners to score. Collectively, this research identifies a problem with the GNS measure, develops improvements to help address this problem, and in the process creates a way to more easily measure numeracy in practical settings. [HLRP: Health Literacy Research and Practice. 2019;3(3):e174-e180.]. Plain Language Summary Numeracy is important across health contexts. Prevalent numeracy scales assumedly measure a single construct but empirical support for this is lacking. We find both one- and four-factor models are consistent with one scale and develop a revision that clarifies this structure without sacrificing validity. This revised numeracy scale is easier to administer and score, and therefore preferable in practical settings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Gary L. Brase
- Address correspondence to Gary L. Brase, PhD, Department of Psychological Sciences, Kansas State University, 492 Bluemont Hall, 1114 Mid-Campus Drive, Manhattan, KS 66506;
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Abstract
Three studies reexamined the claim that clarifying the causal origin of key statistics can increase normative performance on Bayesian problems involving judgment under uncertainty. Experiments 1 and 2 found that causal explanation did not increase the rate of normative solutions. However, certain types of causal explanation did lead to a reduction in the magnitude of errors in probability estimation. This effect was most pronounced when problem statistics were expressed in percentage formats. Experiment 3 used process-tracing methods to examine the impact of causal explanation of false positives on solution strategies. Changes in probability estimation following causal explanation were the result of a mixture of individual reasoning strategies, including non-Bayesian mechanisms, such as increased attention to explained statistics and approximations of subcomponents of Bayes' rule. The results show that although causal explanation of statistics can affect the way that a problem is mentally represented, this does not necessarily lead to an increased rate of normative responding.
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9
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Nahinsky ID. Parallel Interactive Processing as a Way to Understand Complex Information Processing: The Conjunction Fallacy and Other Examples. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2018; 130:201-222. [PMID: 29461716 DOI: 10.5406/amerjpsyc.130.2.0201] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Parallel interactive processing (PIP) represents an approach in which specific context generates interactive relationships between general attributes. This article summarizes previous research that demonstrates how such relationships influence inference making in categorization. This is followed by evidence that the approach can be extended to other areas of cognition, including probability judgments. PIP was successful in fitting data that revealed the prevalence of the conjunction fallacy as well as other probability estimation data. PIP provided better fits overall than the signed summation model and the configural weighted average model. The quantum probability model provided good fits for the conjunction fallacy data but not for other probability judgments.
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10
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Brase GL, Vasserman EY, Hsu W. Do Different Mental Models Influence Cybersecurity Behavior? Evaluations via Statistical Reasoning Performance. Front Psychol 2017; 8:1929. [PMID: 29163304 PMCID: PMC5673648 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01929] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2017] [Accepted: 10/18/2017] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Cybersecurity research often describes people as understanding internet security in terms of metaphorical mental models (e.g., disease risk, physical security risk, or criminal behavior risk). However, little research has directly evaluated if this is an accurate or productive framework. To assess this question, two experiments asked participants to respond to a statistical reasoning task framed in one of four different contexts (cybersecurity, plus the above alternative models). Each context was also presented using either percentages or natural frequencies, and these tasks were followed by a behavioral likelihood rating. As in previous research, consistent use of natural frequencies promoted correct Bayesian reasoning. There was little indication, however, that any of the alternative mental models generated consistently better understanding or reasoning over the actual cybersecurity context. There was some evidence that different models had some effects on patterns of responses, including the behavioral likelihood ratings, but these effects were small, as compared to the effect of the numerical format manipulation. This points to a need to improve the content of actual internet security warnings, rather than working to change the models users have of warnings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gary L. Brase
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States
| | - Eugene Y. Vasserman
- Department of Computer Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States
| | - William Hsu
- Department of Computer Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States
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11
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Abstract
Disagreement on the "probability status" of chances casts doubt on Girotto and Gonzalez's (2001) conclusion that the human mind can make sound Bayesian inferences involving single-event probabilities. The main objection raised has been that chances are de facto natural frequencies disguised as probabilities. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that numbers of chances are perceived as being distinct from natural frequencies and that they have a facilitatory effect on Bayesian inference tasks that is completely independent from their (minor) frequentist readings. Overall, therefore, our results strongly disconfirm the hypothesis that natural frequencies are a privileged cognitive representational format for Bayesian inferences and suggest that a significant portion of laypeople adequately handle genuine single-event probability problems once these are rendered computationally more accessible by using numbers of chances.
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12
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Hoffrage U, Krauss S, Martignon L, Gigerenzer G. Natural frequencies improve Bayesian reasoning in simple and complex inference tasks. Front Psychol 2015; 6:1473. [PMID: 26528197 PMCID: PMC4604268 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2015] [Accepted: 09/14/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Representing statistical information in terms of natural frequencies rather than probabilities improves performance in Bayesian inference tasks. This beneficial effect of natural frequencies has been demonstrated in a variety of applied domains such as medicine, law, and education. Yet all the research and applications so far have been limited to situations where one dichotomous cue is used to infer which of two hypotheses is true. Real-life applications, however, often involve situations where cues (e.g., medical tests) have more than one value, where more than two hypotheses (e.g., diseases) are considered, or where more than one cue is available. In Study 1, we show that natural frequencies, compared to information stated in terms of probabilities, consistently increase the proportion of Bayesian inferences made by medical students in four conditions-three cue values, three hypotheses, two cues, or three cues-by an average of 37 percentage points. In Study 2, we show that teaching natural frequencies for simple tasks with one dichotomous cue and two hypotheses leads to a transfer of learning to complex tasks with three cue values and two cues, with a proportion of 40 and 81% correct inferences, respectively. Thus, natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian reasoning in a much broader class of situations than previously thought.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ulrich Hoffrage
- Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC Lausanne), University of LausanneLausanne, Switzerland
| | - Stefan Krauss
- Mathematics Education, Faculty of Mathematics, University of RegensburgRegensburg, Germany
| | - Laura Martignon
- Institute of Mathematics, Ludwigsburg University of EducationLudwigsburg, Germany
| | - Gerd Gigerenzer
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human DevelopmentBerlin, Germany
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13
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Cohen AL, Staub A. Within-subject consistency and between-subject variability in Bayesian reasoning strategies. Cogn Psychol 2015; 81:26-47. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2015] [Revised: 08/04/2015] [Accepted: 08/09/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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14
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Hafenbrädl S, Hoffrage U. Toward an ecological analysis of Bayesian inferences: how task characteristics influence responses. Front Psychol 2015; 6:939. [PMID: 26300791 PMCID: PMC4523724 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00939] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2015] [Accepted: 06/22/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In research on Bayesian inferences, the specific tasks, with their narratives and characteristics, are typically seen as exchangeable vehicles that merely transport the structure of the problem to research participants. In the present paper, we explore whether, and possibly how, task characteristics that are usually ignored influence participants’ responses in these tasks. We focus on both quantitative dimensions of the tasks, such as their base rates, hit rates, and false-alarm rates, as well as qualitative characteristics, such as whether the task involves a norm violation or not, whether the stakes are high or low, and whether the focus is on the individual case or on the numbers. Using a data set of 19 different tasks presented to 500 different participants who provided a total of 1,773 responses, we analyze these responses in two ways: first, on the level of the numerical estimates themselves, and second, on the level of various response strategies, Bayesian and non-Bayesian, that might have produced the estimates. We identified various contingencies, and most of the task characteristics had an influence on participants’ responses. Typically, this influence has been stronger when the numerical information in the tasks was presented in terms of probabilities or percentages, compared to natural frequencies – and this effect cannot be fully explained by a higher proportion of Bayesian responses when natural frequencies were used. One characteristic that did not seem to influence participants’ response strategy was the numerical value of the Bayesian solution itself. Our exploratory study is a first step toward an ecological analysis of Bayesian inferences, and highlights new avenues for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ulrich Hoffrage
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne Lausanne, Switzerland
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15
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Johnson ED, Tubau E. Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solving. Front Psychol 2015; 6:938. [PMID: 26283976 PMCID: PMC4515557 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2015] [Accepted: 06/22/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans have long been characterized as poor probabilistic reasoners when presented with explicit numerical information. Bayesian word problems provide a well-known example of this, where even highly educated and cognitively skilled individuals fail to adhere to mathematical norms. It is widely agreed that natural frequencies can facilitate Bayesian inferences relative to normalized formats (e.g., probabilities, percentages), both by clarifying logical set-subset relations and by simplifying numerical calculations. Nevertheless, between-study performance on "transparent" Bayesian problems varies widely, and generally remains rather unimpressive. We suggest there has been an over-focus on this representational facilitator (i.e., transparent problem structures) at the expense of the specific logical and numerical processing requirements and the corresponding individual abilities and skills necessary for providing Bayesian-like output given specific verbal and numerical input. We further suggest that understanding this task-individual pair could benefit from considerations from the literature on mathematical cognition, which emphasizes text comprehension and problem solving, along with contributions of online executive working memory, metacognitive regulation, and relevant stored knowledge and skills. We conclude by offering avenues for future research aimed at identifying the stages in problem solving at which correct vs. incorrect reasoners depart, and how individual differences might influence this time point.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eric D. Johnson
- Department of Basic Psychology, University of BarcelonaBarcelona, Spain
- Research Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior (IR3C)Barcelona, Spain
| | - Elisabet Tubau
- Department of Basic Psychology, University of BarcelonaBarcelona, Spain
- Research Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behavior (IR3C)Barcelona, Spain
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16
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Hoffrage U, Hafenbrädl S, Bouquet C. Natural frequencies facilitate diagnostic inferences of managers. Front Psychol 2015; 6:642. [PMID: 26157397 PMCID: PMC4475789 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00642] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2015] [Accepted: 05/01/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In Bayesian inference tasks, information about base rates as well as hit rate and false-alarm rate needs to be integrated according to Bayes' rule after the result of a diagnostic test became known. Numerous studies have found that presenting information in a Bayesian inference task in terms of natural frequencies leads to better performance compared to variants with information presented in terms of probabilities or percentages. Natural frequencies are the tallies in a natural sample in which hit rate and false-alarm rate are not normalized with respect to base rates. The present research replicates the beneficial effect of natural frequencies with four tasks from the domain of management, and with management students as well as experienced executives as participants. The percentage of Bayesian responses was almost twice as high when information was presented in natural frequencies compared to a presentation in terms of percentages. In contrast to most tasks previously studied, the majority of numerical responses were lower than the Bayesian solutions. Having heard of Bayes' rule prior to the study did not affect Bayesian performance. An implication of our work is that textbooks explaining Bayes' rule should teach how to represent information in terms of natural frequencies instead of how to plug probabilities or percentages into a formula.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ulrich Hoffrage
- Department of Organizational Behavior, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Sebastian Hafenbrädl
- Department of Organizational Behavior, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Cyril Bouquet
- International Institute for Management Development, Lausanne, Switzerland
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17
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Brase GL, Hill WT. Good fences make for good neighbors but bad science: a review of what improves Bayesian reasoning and why. Front Psychol 2015; 6:340. [PMID: 25873904 PMCID: PMC4379735 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00340] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2015] [Accepted: 03/10/2015] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Bayesian reasoning, defined here as the updating of a posterior probability following new information, has historically been problematic for humans. Classic psychology experiments have tested human Bayesian reasoning through the use of word problems and have evaluated each participant’s performance against the normatively correct answer provided by Bayes’ theorem. The standard finding is of generally poor performance. Over the past two decades, though, progress has been made on how to improve Bayesian reasoning. Most notably, research has demonstrated that the use of frequencies in a natural sampling framework—as opposed to single-event probabilities—can improve participants’ Bayesian estimates. Furthermore, pictorial aids and certain individual difference factors also can play significant roles in Bayesian reasoning success. The mechanics of how to build tasks which show these improvements is not under much debate. The explanations for why naturally sampled frequencies and pictures help Bayesian reasoning remain hotly contested, however, with many researchers falling into ingrained “camps” organized around two dominant theoretical perspectives. The present paper evaluates the merits of these theoretical perspectives, including the weight of empirical evidence, theoretical coherence, and predictive power. By these criteria, the ecological rationality approach is clearly better than the heuristics and biases view. Progress in the study of Bayesian reasoning will depend on continued research that honestly, vigorously, and consistently engages across these different theoretical accounts rather than staying “siloed” within one particular perspective. The process of science requires an understanding of competing points of view, with the ultimate goal being integration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gary L Brase
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Kansas State University Manhattan, KS, USA
| | - W Trey Hill
- Department of Psychology, Fort Hays State University Hays, KS, USA
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18
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McNair SJ. Beyond the status-quo: research on Bayesian reasoning must develop in both theory and method. Front Psychol 2015; 6:97. [PMID: 25705200 PMCID: PMC4319396 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00097] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2014] [Accepted: 01/18/2015] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Simon J. McNair
- Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, University of LeedsLeeds, UK
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19
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Navarrete G, Correia R, Froimovitch D. Communicating risk in prenatal screening: the consequences of Bayesian misapprehension. Front Psychol 2014; 5:1272. [PMID: 25414688 PMCID: PMC4222132 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01272] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2014] [Accepted: 10/20/2014] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Gorka Navarrete
- Laboratory of Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Universidad Diego Portales, UDP-INECO Foundation Core on Neuroscience Santiago, Chile
| | - Rut Correia
- Faculty of Education, Universidad Diego Portales Santiago, Chile
| | - Dan Froimovitch
- Department of Physiology, University of Toronto Toronto, ON, Canada
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20
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The effects of mental steps and compatibility on Bayesian reasoning. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2014. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500005775] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractFour laboratory studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that correct Bayesian reasoning can be predicted by two factors of task complexity — the number of mental steps required to reach the normative solution, and the compatibility between the framing of data presented and the framing of the question posed. The findings show that participants performed better on frequency format questions only when one mental step was required to solve the task and when the data were in a compatible frequency format. By contrast, participants performed more poorly on more complicated tasks which required more mental steps (in a compatible frequency or probability format) or when the data and question formats were incompatible (Studies 1 and 2). Incompatibility between data and question formats was also associated with higher reaction times (Study 2b). Furthermore, on problems that incorporated incompatibility between the data sample size and the target (question) sample size, participants performed better on the probability question than the frequency question, regardless of data format (Study 3). The latter findings highlight the ecological advantage of translating data into probability terms, which are normalized in a range between 0 and 1, and thus can be transferred from one situation to another.
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Brase GL. The power of representation and interpretation: Doubling statistical reasoning performance with icons and frequentist interpretations of ambiguous numbers. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2013.861840] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Johnson ED, Tubau E. Words, numbers, & numeracy: Diminishing individual differences in Bayesian reasoning. LEARNING AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2013. [DOI: 10.1016/j.lindif.2013.09.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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Garcia-Retamero R, Hoffrage U. Visual representation of statistical information improves diagnostic inferences in doctors and their patients. Soc Sci Med 2013; 83:27-33. [DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 106] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/19/2012] [Revised: 01/08/2013] [Accepted: 01/28/2013] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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