Reasoning, biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (1960)

Reasoning More Efficiently with Primary Knowledge Despite Extraneous Cognitive Load

Geary's evolutionary approach in educational psychology differentiates between primary (low cognitive costs and motivational advantage) and secondary knowledge (high cognitive costs and no motivational benefit). Although these features have been well demonstrated in previous work, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. To investigate it, in a reasoning task, the present study varies (i) the content of the problems (primary knowledge vs. secondary; e.g., food vs. grammar rules), (ii) the intrinsic cognitive load (conflict or non-conflict syllogism, the former requiring more cognitive resources to be properly processed than the latter) and (iii) the extraneous cognitive load (via a Dot Memory Task with three modalities: low, medium and high cognitive load). Analyses assessed the influence of these variables on performance, problem solving speed and perceived cognitive load. Results confirmed the positive impact of primary knowledge on efficiency, particularly when intrinsic cognitive load was high. Surprisingly, the extraneous cognitive load did not influence the performance in secondary knowledge content but that in primary knowledge content: the higher the additional load was, the better the performance was, only for primary knowledge and especially for syllogisms with high intrinsic load. Findings support evolutionary theory as secondary knowledge would overload cognitive resources, preventing participants from allocating sufficient resources to solve problems. Primary knowledge would allow participants to process the additional load and to increase their performance despite this. This study also raises the hypothesis that a minimum cognitive load is necessary for participants to be invested in the task.

Identifying behavioral determinants and stage of readiness for performing knee massage among individuals with knee osteoarthritis: An observational study

OBJECTIVE

Patients who experience knee osteoarthritis or chronic knee pain can alleviate their symptoms by performing self-knee massage. Understanding the readiness and types of determinants needed to facilitate self-knee massage is needed to design effective, theory-informed interventions. The primary objective of this study was to apply the transtheoretical model of behavior change to identify how factors, which include the type of knee condition and pain level, predict an individual's readiness to adopt self-knee massage. The secondary objective employed the capability, opportunity and motivation-behavior (COM-B) model to identify relevant determinants that are predictive of an individual's readiness to undertake self-knee massage.

METHODS

An observational study design was used to recruit individuals with knee osteoarthritis (n = 270) and chronic knee pain (n = 130). Participants completed an online survey that assessed the transtheoretical model of behavior change stages, COM-B determinants (capability, opportunity and motivation), along with self-administered massage behavior. Multivariate analysis of covariance and structural equation modeling were used to test the primary and secondary objective, respectively.

RESULTS

Participants who had knee osteoarthritis scored higher on the action stage compared to those with chronic pain (P = 0.003), and those who experienced greater level of pain scored higher in the contemplation (P < 0.001) and action phases (P < 0.001) of performing knee massage compared to those with milder pain. The COM-B structural equation model revealed self-administered knee massage to be predicted by capability (β = 0.31, P = 0.004) and motivation (β = 0.29, P < 0.001), but not opportunity (β = -0.10, P = 0.39). Pain level predicted motivation (β = 0.27, P < 0.001), but not capability (β = 0.09, P = 0.07) or opportunity (β = 0.01, P = 0.83). Tests for mediating effects found that determinants of COM-B (motivation and capability) mediate between pain level and self-administered massage behavior (β = 0.10, P = 0.002).

CONCLUSION

Clinicians and researchers can expect that patients diagnosed with knee osteoarthritis or who have chronic knee pain are ready (action stage) or are considering the behavior (contemplation stage) of self-knee massage. Individuals who report having knee osteoarthritis or chronic knee pain should be coached to develop the skills to perform self-knee massage and helped to develop the motivation to carry out the therapy. Please cite this article as: Nemati D, Munk N, Kaushal N. Identifying behavioral determinants and stage of readiness for performing knee massage among individuals with knee osteoarthritis: an observational study. J Integr Med. 2024; 22(1): 54-63.

The Role of Subjective Expectations for Exhaustion and Recovery: The Sample Case of Work and Leisure

We propose a new model of exhaustion and recovery that posits that people evaluate an activity as exhausting or recovering on the basis of the subjective expectation about how exhausting or recovering activities related to a certain life domain are. To exemplify the model, we focus as a first step on the widely shared expectations that work is exhausting and leisure is recovering. We assume that the association of an activity related to a life domain associated with exhaustion (e.g., work) leads people to monitor their experiences and selectively attend to signs of exhaustion; in contrast, while pursuing an activity related to a life domain associated with recovery (e.g., leisure), people preferentially process signs of recovery. We further posit that the preferential processing of signs of exhaustion (vs. recovery) leads to experiencing more exhaustion when pursuing activities expected to be exhausting (e.g., work activities) and more recovery when pursuing activities expected to be recovering (e.g., leisure activities). This motivational process model of exhaustion and recovery provides new testable hypotheses that differ from predictions derived from limited-resource models.

When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy

Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer-Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants' subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer-Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems.

Training People to Think in Opposites Facilitates the Falsification Process in Wason's Rule Discovery Task

With reference to Wason's 2-4-6 rule discovery task, this study investigated the effects of a simple training session that prompted participants to "think in opposites". The results showed a significant improvement in performance under the training condition when compared to the control condition, both in terms of the proportion of participants who discovered the correct rule and how quickly it was discovered. An analysis of whether or not participant submitted test triples formed of descending numbers showed that fewer participants under the control condition considered ascending/descending to represent a critical dimension and, in any case, this occurred later (that is, after more test triples) than in the training condition. These results are discussed in relation to previous literature showing improvements in performance that were prompted by strategies involving "contrast" as a critical factor. The limitations of the study are discussed, as well as the benefits of a training program like this, which is non-content related.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Primary vs. secondary knowledge contents in reasoning: Motivated and efficient vs. overburdened

Primary knowledge is the knowledge for which our cognitive architecture has evolved so that we acquire it quickly and effortlessly. We are intrinsically motivated to process it. Secondary knowledge is the knowledge for which our cognitive architecture has not had enough time to evolve: it requires time, cognitive resources and is hardly motivating. This study proposed to test these evolutionary characteristics using the experimental paradigm of logical reasoning. We conducted five experiments (n = 720) varying (i) the content of syllogisms (primary or secondary knowledge), (ii) the presentation order of the knowledge types, (iii) the added extrinsic cognitive load, and (iv) the type of syllogism. Results showed that primary knowledge increased performance, emotional and cognitive investment and decreased perceived cognitive load. Second, presenting primary knowledge first would encourage participants to be motivated throughout the task, while presenting secondary knowledge first would undermine their motivation. Third, secondary knowledge seemed to lead to a feeling of conflict that consumed cognitive resources. All together, these results suggested that primary knowledge should be taken into account and not left aside because it is something "already learned".

Both Medical and Context Elements Influence the Decision-Making Processes of Pediatricians

We wanted to investigate the relationship of medical and non-medical factors with the clinical decision-making of pediatricians. We hypothesize that the addition of relevant medical information (either alarming or reassuring) will influence the physician's decision-making, but that the addition of non-medical information will also play a role. To investigate this, we designed an online questionnaire containing ten clinical case-based scenarios, of which five focused on medical factors and five on non-medical/context factors, each scored on a five-point Likert scale. In total, 113 pediatricians completed the online questionnaire. Both medical and non-medical/context factors were considered relevant to change the initial decision in most cases. Additional information of an alarming nature induces the physician to become more worried, whereas reassuring information decreases this worry. In some cases, with the medical factors, the gender and the age of the pediatrician does have some effect on the clinical decision-making. We conclude that medical decision-making is affected by multiple intrinsic and extrinsic factors that differ between physicians. Our data indicate that these non-medical factors must be considered when making a medical decision, as it is crucial to be aware that they have a substantial influence on that decision-making.

Utilising online eye-tracking to discern the impacts of cultural backgrounds on fake and real news decision-making

Introduction

Online eye-tracking has been used in this study to assess the impacts of different cultural backgrounds on information discernment. An online platform called RealEye allowed participants to engage in the eye-tracking study from their personal computer webcams, allowing for higher ecological validity and a closer replication of social media interaction.

Methods

The study consisted of two parts with a total of five visuals of social media posts mimicking news posts on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook. Participants were asked to view examples of real and fake news taken from a news fact-checking website, Snopes, and their eye movements were recorded during the process. Participants were recruited through Prolific and SONA; the total sample size for study 1.1 was 29 participants, and the total for study 1.2 was 25 participants, after removing poor eye-tracking data. A total of five visual images comprising true and false news were shown to the participant, study 1.1 had three examples and study 1.2 had two examples. There were two main cultural backgrounds in focus: participants born in China or the United Kingdom.

Results

Results suggested that participants follow a similar visual pattern of attention to Areas of Interest (AOIs) on the posts, which leads us to believe that due to the global standardisation of popular social media platforms, a bias might have occurred during information discernment.

Discussion

It is suggested that regardless of country background, users may have similar eye-tracking results while viewing a social media post because social media platform formats are standardised globally. Further research would recommend looking at language and linguistic traits when seeking differences between country backgrounds during online information discernment.

On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Training Load and Its Role in Injury Prevention, Part I: Back to the Future

The purpose of this 2-part commentary series is† to explain why we believe our ability to control injury risk by manipulating training load (TL) in its current state is an illusion and why the foundations of this illusion are weak and unreliable. In part 1, we introduce the training process framework and contextualize the role of TL monitoring in the injury-prevention paradigm. In part 2, we describe the conceptual and methodologic pitfalls of previous authors who associated TL and injury in ways that limited their suitability for the derivation of practical recommendations. The first important step in the training process is developing the training program: the practitioner develops a strategy based on available evidence, professional knowledge, and experience. For decades, exercise strategies have been based on the fundamental training principles of overload and progression. Training-load monitoring allows the practitioner to determine whether athletes have completed training as planned and how they have coped with the physical stress. Training load and its associated metrics cannot provide a quantitative indication of whether particular load progressions will increase or decrease the injury risk, given the nature of previous studies (descriptive and at best predictive) and their methodologic weaknesses. The overreliance on TL has moved the attention away from the multifactorial nature of injury and the roles of other important contextual factors. We argue that no evidence supports the quantitative use of TL data to manipulate future training with the purpose of preventing injury. Therefore, determining "how much is too much" and how to properly manipulate and progress TL are currently subjective decisions based on generic training principles and our experience of adjusting training according to an individual athlete's response. Our message to practitioners is to stop seeking overly simplistic solutions to complex problems and instead embrace the risks and uncertainty inherent in the training process and injury prevention.

Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

Would disfluency by any other name still be disfluent? Examining the disfluency effect with cursive handwriting

When exposed to words presented under perceptually disfluent conditions (e.g., words written in Haettenschweiler font), participants have difficulty initially recognizing the words. Those same words, though, may be better remembered later than words presented in standard type font. This counterintuitive finding is referred to as the disfluency effect. Evidence for this disfluency effect, however, has been mixed, suggesting possible moderating factors. Using a recognition memory task, level of disfluency was examined as a moderating factor across three experiments using a novel cursive manipulation that varied on degree of legibility (easy-to-read cursive vs. hard-to-read cursive). In addition, list type and retention interval between study and test were manipulated. Across all three experiments, cursive words engendered better memory than type-print words. This memory effect persisted across varied list designs (blocked vs. mixed) and a longer (24-hour) retention interval. A small-scale meta-analysis across the three experiments suggested that the cursive disfluency effect is moderated by level of disfluency: easy-to-read cursive words tended to be better remembered than hard-to-read cursive words. Taken together, these results challenge extant accounts of the disfluency effect. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.