Social groups have a representation of their own: Clues from neuropsychology

Impaired processing of conspecifics in Parkinson's disease

Experimental evidence indicates that the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) processes emotional/affective features crucial to elaborate knowledge about social groups and that knowledge of social concepts is stored in the anterior temporal lobe (ATL).We investigated whether knowledge about social groups is impaired in Parkinson's disease (PD), in which dysfunctional connectivity between IFG and ATL has been demonstrated.PD patients (N = 20) and healthy controls (HC, N = 16) were given a lexical decision task in a semantic priming paradigm: the prime-targets included 144 words and 144 pseudowords, each preceded by three types of prime ("animals," "things," "persons"). Out of these 288 prime-targets, forty-eight were congruent (same category) and 96 incongruent (different category). Out of 48 congruent prime-targets, 24 denoted social items and 24 nonsocial items. Thus, four types of trials were obtained: congruent social; congruent nonsocial; incongruent social; incongruent nonsocial.Congruent target-words were recognized better than incongruent target-words by all groups. The semantic priming effect was preserved in PD; however, accuracy was significantly lower in PD than in HC in social items. No difference emerged between the two groups in nonsocial items.Impaired processing of words denoting social groups in PD may be due to impairment in accessing the affective/emotional features that characterize conceptual knowledge of social groups, for the functional disconnection between the IFG and the ATL.

The contribution of the left inferior frontal gyrus in affective processing of social groups

We investigated the contribution of the pars opercularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFGop) in representing knowledge about social groups. We asked healthy individuals to categorize words preceded by semantically congruent or incongruent primes while stimulating the LIFGop. Previous studies showing an involvement of the LIFGop both in processing social stimuli and negative valence words led us to predict that its stimulation would affect responses to negative social category words. Compared to the Vertex as control site, the stimulation of the LIFGop increased the speed of categorization of negative social groups, and disrupted the semantic priming effect for negative words overall. Within the framework of recent theories of semantic memory, we argue that the present results provide initial evidence of the representation of social groups being characterized by affective properties, whose processing is supported by the LIFGop.

Neural representations of Groups and Stereotypes using fMRI repetition suppression

Categorizing people in groups and associating them with stereotypical behavior is an integral part of human social understanding and interaction. This study investigates where knowledge on social groups and their stereotypes is represented in the brain. We presented participants with two sentences describing a group member (e.g. the police officer) performing a behavior believed to be stereotypical of the group (e.g. makes an arrest, i.e. authoritative), and asked them to rate the degree to which the behavior was typical of the group. Our critical manipulation was the repetition of this information across the two sentences: Either both the group and the stereotype implied by the behavior was repeated, only the group was repeated, only the stereotype implied by the behavior, or neither. Results showed robust suppression of hemodynamic activation from the first to second sentence in the medial prefrontal cortex in response to the repetition of the stereotype implied in the behavior, but only when groups were different. This finding suggests that the neural representation of stereotypes is located in this area, and this is in line with similar repetition suppression research showing trait representation in this area. A suppression effect for the repetition of groups was observed in the posterior cingulate cortex, regardless of whether stereotypes were repeated or not. This finding suggests that the neural representation of groups is located in this area. Because this location is unexpected, we discuss several suggestions for future research to confirm this finding.

Imagined Intergroup Physical Contact Improves Attitudes Toward Immigrants

In this set of research, we investigated the effects of intergroup physical contact on intergroup attitudes by relying on indirect contact strategies, namely the imagined contact paradigm. We implemented the imagined contact paradigm by leading participants to shape the mental imagery upon pictorial information. Specifically, in Study 1 participants saw a picture of a white hand touching a black hand [i.e., intergroup physical contact condition (InterPC)] or a picture of an outdoor scene (i.e., control condition), and were asked to imagine being either the toucher or in the outdoor scene, respectively. Results demonstrated that InterPC compared to control condition reduced intergroup bias. In Study 2 we compared the InterPC condition to a condition in which participants saw a white hand touching another white hand [i.e., intragroup physical contact (IntraPC)], and imagined to be the toucher. Again, we found that participants in the InterPC condition showed reduced intergroup bias compared to the IntraPC. Study 3 replicated results of Studies 1 and 2 by using an implicit measure of prejudice. Also, Study 3 further showed that asking participants to merely look at the picture of a white hand touching a black hand, without imagining being the toucher was not effective in reducing implicit prejudice. Results were discussed with respect to the literature on physical contact and prejudice reduction processes.

Neural Representations of Belief Concepts: A Representational Similarity Approach to Social Semantics

The present experiment identified neural regions that represent a class of concepts that are independent of perceptual or sensory attributes. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants viewed names of social groups (e.g. Atheists, Evangelicals, and Economists) and performed a one-back similarity judgment according to 1 of 2 dimensions of belief attributes: political orientation (Liberal to Conservative) or spiritualism (Spiritualist to Materialist). By generalizing across a wide variety of social groups that possess these beliefs, these attribute concepts did not coincide with any specific sensory quality, allowing us to target conceptual, rather than perceptual, representations. Multi-voxel pattern searchlight analysis was used to identify regions in which activation patterns distinguished the 2 ends of both dimensions: Conservative from Liberal social groups when participants focused on the political orientation dimension, and spiritual from Materialist groups when participants focused on the spiritualism dimension. A cluster in right precuneus exhibited such a pattern, indicating that it carries information about belief-attribute concepts and forms part of semantic memory—perhaps a component particularly concerned with psychological traits. This region did not overlap with the theory of mind network, which engaged nearby, but distinct, parts of precuneus. These findings have implications for the neural organization of conceptual knowledge, especially the understanding of social groups.

We are what we eat: How food is represented in our mind/brain

Despite the essential role of food in our lives, we have little understanding of the way our knowledge about food is organized in the brain. At birth, human infants exhibit very few food preferences, and do not yet know much about what is edible and what is not. A multisensory learning development will eventually turn young infants into omnivore adults, for whom deciding what to eat becomes an effortful task. Recognizing food constitutes an essential step in this decisional process. In this paper we examine how concepts about food are represented in the human brain. More specifically, we first analyze how brain-damaged patients recognize natural and manufactured food, and then examine these patterns in the light of the sensory-functional hypothesis and the domain-specific hypothesis. Secondly, we discuss how concepts of food are represented depending on whether we embrace the embodied view or the disembodied view. We conclude that research on food recognition and on the organization of knowledge about food must also take into account some aspects specific to food category, the relevance of which has not been sufficiently recognized and investigated to date.

The neural network associated with lexical-semantic knowledge about social groups

A person can be appraised as an individual or as a member of a social group. In the present study we tested whether the knowledge about social groups is represented independently of the living and non-living things. Patients with frontal and temporal lobe tumors involving either the left or the right hemisphere performed three tasks--picture naming, word-to-picture matching and picture sorting--tapping the lexical semantic knowledge of living things, non-living things and social groups. Both behavioral and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) analyses suggested that social groups might be represented differently from other categories. VLSM analysis carried out on naming errors revealed that left-lateralized lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus, amygdala, insula and basal ganglia were associated with the lexical-semantic processing of social groups. These findings indicate that the social group representation may rely on areas associated with affective processing.