Developing standard operating procedures for gene drive research in disease vector mosquitoes

Conceptual risk assessment of mosquito population modification gene-drive systems to control malaria transmission: preliminary hazards list workshops

The field-testing and eventual adoption of genetically-engineered mosquitoes (GEMs) to control vector-borne pathogen transmission will require them meeting safety criteria specified by regulatory authorities in regions where the technology is being considered for use and other locales that might be impacted. Preliminary risk considerations by researchers and developers may be useful for planning the baseline data collection and field research used to address the anticipated safety concerns. Part of this process is to identify potential hazards (defined as the inherent ability of an entity to cause harm) and their harms, and then chart the pathways to harm and evaluate their probability as part of a risk assessment. The University of California Malaria Initiative (UCMI) participated in a series of workshops held to identify potential hazards specific to mosquito population modification strains carrying gene-drive systems coupled to anti-parasite effector genes and their use in a hypothetical island field trial. The hazards identified were placed within the broader context of previous efforts discussed in the scientific literature. Five risk areas were considered i) pathogens, infections and diseases, and the impacts of GEMs on human and animal health, ii) invasiveness and persistence of GEMs, and interactions of GEMs with target organisms, iii) interactions of GEMs with non-target organisms including horizontal gene transfer, iv) impacts of techniques used for the management of GEMs and v) evolutionary and stability considerations. A preliminary hazards list (PHL) was developed and is made available here. This PHL is useful for internal project risk evaluation and is available to regulators at prospective field sites. UCMI project scientists affirm that the subsequent processes associated with the comprehensive risk assessment for the application of this technology should be driven by the stakeholders at the proposed field site and areas that could be affected by this intervention strategy.

Preparing an Insectary in Burkina Faso to Support Research in Genetic Technologies for Malaria Control

The Institut de Recherche en Sciences de la Santé (IRSS) of Burkina Faso, West Africa, was the first African institution to import transgenic mosquitoes for research purposes. A shift from the culture of mosquito research to regulated biotechnology research and considerable management capacity is needed to set up and run the first insectary for transgenic insects in a country that applied and adapted the existing biosafety framework, first developed for genetically modified (GM) crops, to this new area of research. The additional demands arise from the separate regulatory framework for biotechnology, referencing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the novelty of the research strain, making public understanding and acceptance early in the research pathway important. The IRSS team carried out extensive preparations following recommendations for containment of GM arthropods and invested efforts in local community engagement and training with scientific colleagues throughout the region. Record keeping beyond routine practice was established to maintain evidence related to regulatory requirements and risk assumptions. The National Biosafety Agency of Burkina Faso, Agence Nationale de Biosécurité (ANB), granted the permits for import of the self-limiting transgenic mosquito strain, which took place in November 2016, and for conducting studies in the IRSS facility in Bobo-Dioulasso. Compliance with permit terms and conditions of the permits and study protocols continued until the conclusion of studies, when the transgenic colonies were terminated. All this required close coordination between management and the insectary teams, as well as others. This article outlines the experiences of the IRSS to support others undertaking such studies. The IRSS is contributing to the ongoing development of genetic technologies for malaria control, as a partner of Target Malaria. The ultimate objective of the innovation is to reduce malaria transmission by using GM mosquitoes of the same species released to reduce the disease-vectoring native populations of Anopheles gambiae s.l.

Demystifying the Risk Assessment Process for Laboratory-Based Experiments Utilizing Invasive Genetic Elements: It Is More Than Gene Drive

Advances in recombinant DNA approaches have resulted in the development of transgene architectures that severely bias their own inheritance, a process commonly referred to as "gene drive." The rapid pace of development, combined with the complexity of many gene drive approaches, threatens to overwhelm those responsible for ensuring its safe use in the laboratory, as even identifying that a specific transgene is capable of gene drive may not be intuitive. Although currently gene drive experiments have been limited to just a few species (mosquitoes, flies, mice, and yeast), the range of organisms used in gene drive research is expected to increase substantially in the coming years. Here the defining features of different gene drive approaches are discussed. Although this will start with a focus on identifying when gene drive could or could not occur, the emphasis will also be on establishing risk profiles based on anticipated level of invasiveness and persistence of transgenes in the surrounding environment. Attention is also called to the fact that transgenes can be considered invasive without being considered gene drive (and vice versa). This further supports the notion that adequate risk assessment requires information regarding the specific circumstances a given transgene or set of transgenes is capable of invading a corresponding population. Finally, challenges in the review and evaluation of work involving gene drive organisms are discussed.

Governing Gene Drive Technologies: A Qualitative Interview Study

BACKGROUND

Gene drive technologies (GDTs) bias the inheritance of a genetic element within a population of non-human organisms, promoting its progressive spread across this population. If successful, GDTs may be used to counter intractable problems such as vector-borne diseases. A key issue in the debate on GDTs relates to what governance is appropriate for these technologies. While governance mechanisms for GDTs are to a significant extent proposed and shaped by professional experts, the perspectives of these experts have not been explored in depth.

METHODS

A total of 33 GDT experts from different professional disciplines were interviewed to identify, better understand, and juxtapose their perspectives on GDT governance. The pseudonymized transcripts were analyzed thematically.

RESULTS

Three main themes were identified: (1) engagement of communities, stakeholders, and publics; (2) power dynamics, and (3) decision-making. There was broad consensus amongst respondents that it is important to engage communities, stakeholders, and publics. Nonetheless, respondents had diverging views on the reasons for doing so and the timing and design of engagement. Respondents also outlined complexities and challenges related to engagement. Moreover, they brought up the power dynamics that are present in GDT research. Respondents stressed the importance of preventing the recurrence of historical injustices and reflected on dilemmas regarding whether and to what extent (foreign) researchers can legitimately make demands regarding local governance. Finally, respondents had diverging views on whether decisions about GDTs should be made in the same way as decisions about other environmental interventions, and on the decision-making model that should be used to decide about GDT deployment.

CONCLUSIONS

The insights obtained in this interview study give rise to recommendations for the design and evaluation of GDT governance. Moreover, these insights point to unresolved normative questions that need to be addressed to move from general commitments to concrete obligations.

Efficient population modification gene-drive rescue system in the malaria mosquito Anopheles stephensi

Cas9/gRNA-mediated gene-drive systems have advanced development of genetic technologies for controlling vector-borne pathogen transmission. These technologies include population suppression approaches, genetic analogs of insecticidal techniques that reduce the number of insect vectors, and population modification (replacement/alteration) approaches, which interfere with competence to transmit pathogens. Here, we develop a recoded gene-drive rescue system for population modification of the malaria vector, Anopheles stephensi, that relieves the load in females caused by integration of the drive into the kynurenine hydroxylase gene by rescuing its function. Non-functional resistant alleles are eliminated via a dominantly-acting maternal effect combined with slower-acting standard negative selection, and rare functional resistant alleles do not prevent drive invasion. Small cage trials show that single releases of gene-drive males robustly result in efficient population modification with ≥95% of mosquitoes carrying the drive within 5-11 generations over a range of initial release ratios.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

A Cross-Sectional Survey of Biosafety Professionals Regarding Genetically Modified Insects

BACKGROUND

Genetic technologies such as gene editing and gene drive create challenges for existing frameworks used to assess risk and make regulatory determinations by governments and institutions. Insect genetic technologies including transgenics, gene editing, and gene drive may be particularly challenging because of the large and increasing number of insect species being genetically modified and the degree of familiarity with these organisms and technologies by biosafety officials charged with making containment decisions.

METHODS

An anonymous online survey of biosafety professionals was distributed to the membership of ABSA International, a global society of biosafety professionals, to investigate their perspectives on their preparedness to meet these new challenges.

RESULTS

Existing guidance used to make containment decisions for nongenetically modified insects was widely seen as adequate, and most respondents thought the available guidance for making containment decisions for genetically modified insects with and without gene drives was inadequate. Most respondents reported having less confidence in their decisions concerning containment of genetically modified insects compared to decisions involving genetically modified microbes, (noninsect) animals, and plants.

CONCLUSIONS

These results reveal a need for additional support for biosafety professionals to improve the quality of and confidence in containment decisions regarding genetically modified insects with and without gene drive. These needs might be addressed by increasing training, updating existing guidance, creating new guidance, and creating a third-party accreditation entity to support institutions. Sixty percent of the respondents said they either would or might use a voluntary third-party accreditation service to support insect containment decisions.

Antiviral Effectors and Gene Drive Strategies for Mosquito Population Suppression or Replacement to Mitigate Arbovirus Transmission by Aedes aegypti

The mosquito vector Aedes aegypti transmits arthropod-borne viruses (arboviruses) of medical importance, including Zika, dengue, and yellow fever viruses. Controlling mosquito populations remains the method of choice to prevent disease transmission. Novel mosquito control strategies based on genetically manipulating mosquitoes are being developed as additional tools to combat arbovirus transmission. Genetic control of mosquitoes includes two basic strategies: population suppression and population replacement. The former aims to eliminate mosquito populations while the latter aims to replace wild populations with engineered, pathogen-resistant mosquitoes. In this review, we outline suppression strategies being applied in the field, as well as current antiviral effector genes that have been characterized and expressed in transgenic Ae. aegypti for population replacement. We discuss cutting-edge gene drive technologies that can be used to enhance the inheritance of effector genes, while highlighting the challenges and opportunities associated with gene drives. Finally, we present currently available models that can estimate mosquito release numbers and time to transgene fixation for several gene drive systems. Based on the recent advances in genetic engineering, we anticipate that antiviral transgenic Ae. aegypti exhibiting gene drive will soon emerge; however, close monitoring in simulated field conditions will be required to demonstrate the efficacy and utility of such transgenic mosquitoes.

Opening the toolkit for genetic analysis and control of Anopheles mosquito vectors

Anopheles is the only genus of mosquitoes that transmit human malaria and consequently the focus of large scale genome and transcriptome-wide association studies. Genetic tools to define the function of the candidate genes arising from these analyses are vital. Moreover, genome editing offers the potential to modify Anopheles population structure at local and global scale to provide complementary tools towards the ultimate goal of malaria elimination. Major breakthroughs in Anopheles genetic analysis came with the development of germline transformation and RNA interference technology. Yet, the field has been revolutionised again by precise genome editing now possible through site-specific nucleases. Here we review the components of the current genetic toolkit available to study Anopheles, focusing particularly on how these technical advances are used to gain insight into malaria transmission and the design of genetic methods to control Anopheles vectors.

Pathway to Deployment of Gene Drive Mosquitoes as a Potential Biocontrol Tool for Elimination of Malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa: Recommendations of a Scientific Working Group†

Gene drive technology offers the promise for a high-impact, cost-effective, and durable method to control malaria transmission that would make a significant contribution to elimination. Gene drive systems, such as those based on clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/CRISPR associated protein, have the potential to spread beneficial traits through interbreeding populations of malaria mosquitoes. However, the characteristics of this technology have raised concerns that necessitate careful consideration of the product development pathway. A multidisciplinary working group considered the implications of low-threshold gene drive systems on the development pathway described in the World Health Organization Guidance Framework for testing genetically modified (GM) mosquitoes, focusing on reduction of malaria transmission by Anopheles gambiae s.l. mosquitoes in Africa as a case study. The group developed recommendations for the safe and ethical testing of gene drive mosquitoes, drawing on prior experience with other vector control tools, GM organisms, and biocontrol agents. These recommendations are organized according to a testing plan that seeks to maximize safety by incrementally increasing the degree of human and environmental exposure to the investigational product. As with biocontrol agents, emphasis is placed on safety evaluation at the end of physically confined laboratory testing as a major decision point for whether to enter field testing. Progression through the testing pathway is based on fulfillment of safety and efficacy criteria, and is subject to regulatory and ethical approvals, as well as social acceptance. The working group identified several resources that were considered important to support responsible field testing of gene drive mosquitoes.