Development weaves brains, bodies and environments into cognition

Eight-Month-Old Infants Meta-Learn by Downweighting Irrelevant Evidence

Infants learn to navigate the complexity of the physical and social world at an outstanding pace, but how they accomplish this learning is still largely unknown. Recent advances in human and artificial intelligence research propose that a key feature to achieving quick and efficient learning is meta-learning, the ability to make use of prior experiences to learn how to learn better in the future. Here we show that 8-month-old infants successfully engage in meta-learning within very short timespans after being exposed to a new learning environment. We developed a Bayesian model that captures how infants attribute informativity to incoming events, and how this process is optimized by the meta-parameters of their hierarchical models over the task structure. We fitted the model with infants' gaze behavior during a learning task. Our results reveal how infants actively use past experiences to generate new inductive biases that allow future learning to proceed faster.

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.

Look at that: Spatial deixis reveals experience-related differences in prediction

Prediction-based theories posit that interlocutors use prediction to process language efficiently and to coordinate dialogue. The present study evaluated whether listeners can use spatial deixis (i.e., this, that, these, and those) to predict the plurality and proximity of a speaker's upcoming referent. In two eye-tracking experiments with varying referential complexity (N = 168), native English-speaking adults, native English-learning 5-year-olds, and non-native English-learning adults viewed images while listening to sentences with or without informative deictic determiners, e.g., Look at the/this/that/these/those wonderful cookie(s). Results showed that all groups successfully exploited plurality information. However, they varied in using deixis to anticipate the proximity of the referent; specifically, L1 adults showed more robust prediction than L2 adults, and L1 children did not show evidence of prediction. By evaluating listeners with varied language experiences, this investigation helps refine proposed mechanisms of prediction, and suggests that linguistic experience is key to the development of such mechanisms.

Ontogenesis of learning and memory: Biopsychosocial and dynamical systems perspectives

In this article, we review recent empirical and theoretical work on infant memory development, highlighting future directions for the field. We consider the state of the field since Carolyn Rovee-Collier's call for developmental scientists to "shift the focus from what to why," emphasizing the function of infant behavior and the value of integrating fractionized, highly specialized subfields. We discuss functional approaches of early learning and memory, including ecological models of memory development and relevant empirical work in human and non-human organisms. Ontogenetic changes in learning and memory occur in developing biological systems, which are embedded in broader socio-cultural contexts with shifting ecological demands that are in part determined by the infants themselves. We incorporate biopsychosocial and dynamical systems perspectives as we analyze the state of the field's integration of multiple areas of specialization to provide more holistic understanding of the contributing factors and underlying mechanisms of the development of memory.