Controlling Antimicrobial-Resistant Pathogens

Epidemiology of Methicillin-ResistantStaphylococcus aureusand Vancomycin-ResistantEnterococcusin a Rural State

Background.

Most data on methicillin-resistantStaphylococcus aureus(MRSA) and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) isolates come from large tertiary care centers. Infection control personnel need to understand the epidemiology of MRSA and VRE across the continuum of care, including small rural hospitals, to develop effective control strategies.

Objective.

To describe the epidemiology of MRSA and VRE in Iowa.

Setting.

Fifteen hospitals in Iowa.

Methods.

Between July 1998 and June 2001, a total of 1,968S. aureusisolates and 1,845Enterococcusisolates from patients infected with these pathogens were examined. Multivariate models were developed to evaluate patient and institutional risk factors for MRSA infection and VRE infection.

Results.

The proportion ofS. aureusisolates resistant to methicillin was 31%, and the proportion ofEnterococcusisolates resistant to vancomycin was 6%. Independent risk factors for MRSA infection included residence in a long-term care facility, age of more than 60 years, hospitalization in a hospital with less than 200 short-term care beds, and acquiring the infection in the hospital. Independent risk factors for VRE infection included use of a central venous catheter, residence in a long-term care facility, acquisition of infection in the hospital, and hospitalization in a hospital with more than 200 short-term care beds.

Conclusions.

In Iowa, the epidemiology of MRSA differ from those of VRE. MRSA has become established in small rural hospitals. Effective MRSA control strategies may require inclusion of all hospitals in a state or region.

Surveillance for vancomycin-resistant enterococci: type, rates, costs, and implications

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate 2 active surveillance strategies for detection of enteric vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) in an intensive care unit (ICU).

DESIGN

Thirty-month prospective observational study.

SETTING

ICU at a university-affiliated referral center.

PATIENTS

All patients with an ICU stay of 24 hours or more were eligible for the study.

INTERVENTION

Clinical active surveillance (CAS), involving culture of a rectal swab specimen for detection of VRE, was performed on admission, weekly while the patient was in the ICU, and at discharge. Laboratory-based active surveillance (LAS), involving culture of a stool specimen for detection of VRE, was performed on stool samples submitted for Clostridium difficile toxin detection.

RESULTS

Enteric colonization with VRE was detected in 309 (17%) of 1,872 patients. The CAS method initially detected 280 (91%) of the 309 patients colonized with VRE, compared with 25 patients (8%) detected by LAS; colonization in 4 patients (1%) was initially detected by analysis of other clinical specimens. Most patients with colonization (76%) would have gone undetected by LAS alone, whereas use of the CAS method exclusively would have missed only 3 patients (1%) who were colonized. CAS cost Dollars 1,913 per month, or Dollars 57,395 for the 30-month study period. Cost savings of CAS from preventing cases of VRE colonization and bacteremia were estimated to range from Dollars 56,258 to Dollars 303,334 per month.

CONCLUSIONS

A patient-based CAS strategy for detection of enteric colonization with VRE was superior to LAS. In this high-risk setting, CAS appeared to be the most efficient and cost-effective surveillance method. The modest costs of CAS were offset by the averted costs associated with the prevention of VRE colonization and bacteremia.

2004 Lowbury Lecture: the Western Australian experience with vancomycin-resistant enterococci – from disaster to ongoing control

The first hospital outbreak of a vancomycin-resistant enterococcus (VRE) in Western Australia (WA) started in the Royal Perth Hospital in July 2001 and initially involved the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and the Nephrology and Dialysis Units. The outbreak was caused by vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREF) of the vanB genotype. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and plasmid analysis of the isolates demonstrated a single-strain outbreak. Despite the isolation of carriers and implementation of all the additional precautions recommended to control VRE, VREF spread rapidly. Two months after the index patient was detected, the epidemic strain had spread to 22 wards and units and one outpatient unit (Satellite Dialysis). Four patients were infected and 64 were colonized. A Hospital VRE Executive Group, which included the Chief Executive and Directors of Clinical Services and Nursing, was formed to eradicate the outbreak and to prevent the epidemic strain from becoming endemic in the hospital. The WA Department of Health agreed to provide substantial extra funding to enable the hospital to use expensive enhanced infection control practices, as follows. Control was handicapped by the slowness of conventional laboratory methods, which took four to five days to identify VRE and allowed environmental contamination and nosocomial transmission to occur before carriers were detected and isolated. A laboratory procedure to make rapid provisional identification of VRE within 30-48h was developed by performing multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for vanA and vanB genes directly on 24-h selective enrichment broth cultures. On average, four rectal swabs, each collected on separate days, were needed to detect >90% of carriers. In total, 1977 ward contacts were screened after discharge from hospital and 54 (2.73%) were found to be carrying VREF. The electronic labelling and active follow-up of ward contacts resulted in a significant number of carriers being detected who otherwise posed a risk of initiating further outbreaks in hospital if they were re-admitted. The outbreak was terminated after five months and the cost of the enhanced infection control practices was 2,700 000 Australian dollars (1,000,000 pounds sterlings). Ongoing control has been facilitated by targeted active surveillance cultures: on admission to high-risk units (ICU, Burns, Nephrology, Haematology, Bone Marrow Transplant Unit), on transfer out of the ICU to other hospital units, by monthly screening of patients regularly attending Dialysis Units, and by opportunistic laboratory screening of inpatient faecal specimens submitted for Clostridium difficile culture and toxin. Vigilance needs to be maintained as the epidemic strain of VREF remains in the Perth community. Ward contacts of the first outbreak have caused small outbreaks in two hospitals, and seven to 19 sporadic new carriers have been detected annually since the first outbreak. The key elements of the VRE control programme are as follows: To date, this programme has prevented VRE from becoming established in any WA hospital.