Refits, cobbles, and fire: Approaching the temporal nature of an expedient Gravettian lithic assemblage from Lagar Velho (Leiria, Portugal)

Upper Paleolithic lithic assemblages have traditionally been considered a paramount example of the high level of complexity characterizing the technological behavior of prehistoric modern humans. The diversity and standardization of tools, as well as the systematic production of blades and bladelets, show the high investment of time, energy and knowledge often associated with Upper Paleolithic technocomplexes. However, more expedient behaviors have also been documented. In some cases, such low-cost behaviors can be dominant or almost exclusive, giving assemblages of Upper Paleolithic age an "archaic" appearance. In this paper, we address these expedient Upper Paleolithic technologies through the study of a lithic assemblage recovered from a Gravettian-age layer from the Lagar Velho rockshelter (Leiria, Portugal). Due to the specific formation processes characterizing this site, we also discuss the distinction between artifacts and geofacts, an aspect that is particularly difficult in expedient assemblages. Moreover, the combination of lithic refitting and data on thermal damage allows us to approach the temporal nature of the lithic assemblage and the timing of the different agents contributing to its formation.

The transition from animal to human culture-simulating the social protocell hypothesis

The origin of human cumulative culture is commonly envisioned as the appearance (some 2.0-2.5 million years ago) of a capacity to faithfully copy the know-how that underpins socially learned traditions. While certainly plausible, this story faces a steep 'startup problem'. For example, it presumes that ape-like early Homo possessed specialized cognitive capabilities for faithful know-how copying and that early toolmaking actually required such a capacity. The social protocell hypothesis provides a leaner story, where cumulative culture may have originated even earlier-as cumulative systems of non-cumulative traditions ('institutions' and 'cultural lifestyles'), via an emergent group-level channel of cultural inheritance. This channel emerges as a side-effect of a specific but in itself unremarkable suite of social group behaviours. It is independent of faithful know-how copying, and an ancestral version is argued to persist in Pan today. Hominin cultural lifestyles would thereby have gained in complexity and sophistication, eventually becoming independent units of selection (socionts) via a cultural evolutionary transition in individuality, abstractly similar to the origin of early cells. We here explore this hypothesis by simulating its basic premises. The model produces the expected behaviour and reveals several additional and non-trivial phenomena as fodder for future work. This article is part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions'.

Cultural adaptation is maximised when intelligent individuals rarely think for themselves

Humans are remarkable in their reliance on cultural inheritance, and the ecological success this has produced. Nonetheless, we lack a thorough understanding of how the cognitive underpinnings of cultural transmission affect cultural adaptation across diverse tasks. Here, we use an agent-based simulation to investigate how different learning mechanisms (both social and asocial) interact with task structure to affect cultural adaptation. Specifically, we compared learning through refinement, recombination or both, in tasks of different difficulty, with learners of different asocial intelligence. We find that for simple tasks all learning mechanisms are roughly equivalent. However, for hard tasks, performance was maximised when populations consisted of highly intelligent individuals who nonetheless rarely innovated and instead recombined existing information. Our results thus show that cumulative cultural adaptation relies on the combination of individual intelligence and 'blind' population-level processes, although the former may be rarely used. The counterintuitive requirement that individuals be highly intelligent, but rarely use this intelligence, may help resolve the debate over the role of individual intelligence in cultural adaptation.

Modelling persistence over generations in biological and cultural evolution based on differential paces of change

Paces of change are faster in cultural evolution than in biological evolution due to different levels of stability in information storage. This study develops mathematical models to investigate the consequences of differential mutation rates on the ability of groups of information units to survive over many generations. We examined the ability of groups composed of connected units to live on despite the occurrence of deleterious mutations that occur at probabilities ranging from 10^-1 to 10^-6. It appears that the degree of connection between units should be high enough for groups to persist across generations, but this alone did not ensure their survival; when groups of units were limited in size and subjected to high mutation rates, they did not survive for very long. By contrast, a significant proportion of groups were able to survive numerous generations if mutation rates were low and/or group size was large. The results revealed that the mean number of surviving generations was minimized for certain sizes of groups. When allowing information units to duplicate at each generation, simulation showed that a great number of groups avoided extinction even when mutating at the rate of cultural change if the initial group size was large and the duplication rate was high enough to counteract the consequences of environmental perturbations. The modelling described in this study sets out the conditions under which groups of units can survive along generations. It should serve as a basis for further investigations about the links between processes of biological and cultural changes.

Cumulative Cultural Evolution within Evolving Population Structures

Our species has the peculiar ability to accumulate cultural innovations over multiple generations, a phenomenon termed 'cumulative cultural evolution' (CCE). Recent years have seen a proliferation of empirical and theoretical work exploring the interplay between demography and CCE. This has generated intense discussion about whether demographic models can help explain historical patterns of cultural changes. Here, we synthesize empirical and theoretical studies from multiple fields to highlight how both population size and structure can shape the pool of cultural information that individuals can build upon to innovate, present the potential pathways through which humans' unique social structure might promote CCE, and discuss whether humans' social networks might partly result from selection pressures linked to our extensive reliance on culturally accumulated knowledge.

The evolution of ‘culture’: Juggling a concept

Although the concept of culture was severely criticized in the second half of the twentieth century, its explanatory use has not been abandoned. Evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists have more recently used the concept in models and theories of culture. This use renews the hope that the concept of culture can be explanatorily useful within the social sciences, especially since the new definition of culture connects with both the idea of evolution and with the other natural sciences. In this paper, I analyze the models of cultural evolution developed by Cultural Evolutionary Science (CES), more specifically gene-culture coevolution theoretical models and dual-inheritance theories. I argue that even if CES scholars mostly claim that for them, culture is equal to information, some of these models have aspirations to bring back cultures as discrete units that resemble the social anthropological models of culture that have been already abandoned. I discuss evolutionists’ and social anthropologists’ objections to these models. I claim that despite the popularity of cultural evolutionist theories, social scientists (cultural anthropologists and historians, for example) should remain skeptical about the possibility that this approach can assume an explanatory role for a concept of culture.

Human niche, human behaviour, human nature

The concept of a 'human nature' or 'human natures' retains a central role in theorizing about the human experience. In Homo sapiens it is clear that we have a suite of capacities generated via our evolutionary past, and present, and a flexible capacity to create and sustain particular kinds of cultures and to be shaped by them. Regardless of whether we label these capacities 'human natures' or not, humans occupy a distinctive niche and an evolutionary approach to examining it is critical. At present we are faced with a few different narratives as to exactly what such an evolutionary approach entails. There is a need for a robust and dynamic theoretical toolkit in order to develop a richer, and more nuanced, understanding of the cognitively sophisticated genus Homo and the diverse sorts of niches humans constructed and occupied across the Pleistocene, Holocene, and into the Anthropocene. Here I review current evolutionary approaches to 'human nature', arguing that we benefit from re-framing our investigations via the concept of the human niche and in the context of the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). While not a replacement of standard evolutionary approaches, this is an expansion and enhancement of our toolkit. I offer brief examples from human evolution in support of these assertions.

Population size does not explain past changes in cultural complexity

Demography is increasingly being invoked to account for features of the archaeological record, such as the technological conservatism of the Lower and Middle Pleistocene, the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition, and cultural loss in Holocene Tasmania. Such explanations are commonly justified in relation to population dynamic models developed by Henrich [Henrich J (2004)Am Antiq69:197-214] and Powell et al. [Powell A, et al. (2009)Science324(5932):1298-1301], which appear to demonstrate that population size is the crucial determinant of cultural complexity. Here, we show that these models fail in two important respects. First, they only support a relationship between demography and culture in implausible conditions. Second, their predictions conflict with the available archaeological and ethnographic evidence. We conclude that new theoretical and empirical research is required to identify the factors that drove the changes in cultural complexity that are documented by the archaeological record.