Bioinformatics for biodefense: challenges and opportunities

Precognition of Known And Unknown Biothreats: A Risk-Based Approach

Data mining and artificial intelligence algorithms can estimate the probability of future occurrences with defined precision. Yet, the prediction of infectious disease outbreaks remains a complex and difficult task. This is demonstrated by the limited accuracy and sensitivity of current models in predicting the emergence of previously unknown pathogens such as Zika, Chikungunya, and SARS-CoV-2, and the resurgence of Mpox, along with their impacts on global health, trade, and security. Comprehensive analysis of infectious disease risk profiles, vulnerabilities, and mitigation capacities, along with their spatiotemporal dynamics at the international level, is essential for preventing their transnational propagation. However, annual indexes about the impact of infectious diseases provide a low level of granularity to allow stakeholders to craft better mitigation strategies. A quantitative risk assessment by analytical platforms requires billions of near real-time data points from heterogeneous sources, integrating and analyzing univariable or multivariable data with different levels of complexity and latency that, in most cases, overwhelm human cognitive capabilities. Autonomous biosurveillance can open the possibility for near real-time, risk- and evidence-based policymaking and operational decision support.

Known and Unknown Transboundary Infectious Diseases as Hybrid Threats

The pathogenicity, transmissibility, environmental stability, and potential for genetic manipulation make microbes hybrid threats that could blur the distinction between peace and war. These agents can fall below the detection, attribution, and response capabilities of a nation and seriously affect their health, trade, and security. A framework that could enhance horizon scanning regarding the potential risk of microbes used as hybrid threats requires not only accurately discriminating known and unknown pathogens but building novel scenarios to deploy mitigation strategies. This demands the transition of analyst-based biosurveillance tracking a narrow set of pathogens toward an autonomous biosurveillance enterprise capable of processing vast data streams beyond human cognitive capabilities. Autonomous surveillance systems must gather, integrate, analyze, and visualize billions of data points from different and unrelated sources. Machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms can contextualize capability information for different stakeholders at different levels of resolution: strategic and tactical. This document provides a discussion of the use of microorganisms as hybrid threats and considerations to quantitatively estimate their risk to ensure societal awareness, preparedness, mitigation, and resilience.

What We Need to Consider During and After the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic

Even though extreme containment and mitigation strategies were implemented by numerous governments around the world to slow down the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), the number of critically ill patients and fatalities keeps rising. This crisis has highlighted the socioeconomic disparities of health care systems within and among countries. As new CoVID policies and responses are implemented to lessen the impact of the virus, it is imperative (1) to consider additional mitigation strategies critical for the development of effective countermeasures, (2) to promote long-term policies and strict regulations of the trade of wildlife and live animal markets, and (3) to advocate for necessary funding and investments in global health, specifically for the prevention of and response to natural and manmade pandemics. This document considers some of these challenges.

Global Spread of Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses: Predicting Pandemics

As successive epidemics have swept the world, the scientific community has quickly learned from them about the emergence and transmission of communicable diseases. Epidemics usually occur when health systems are unprepared. During an unexpected epidemic, health authorities engage in damage control, fear drives action, and the desire to understand the threat is greatest. As humanity recovers, policy-makers seek scientific expertise to improve their "preparedness" to face future events.Global spread of disease is exemplified by the spread of yellow fever from Africa to the Americas, by the spread of dengue fever through transcontinental migration of mosquitos, by the relentless influenza virus pandemics, and, most recently, by the unexpected emergence of Ebola virus, spread by motorbike and long haul carriers. Other pathogens that are remarkable for their epidemic expansions include the arenavirus hemorrhagic fevers and hantavirus diseases carried by rodents over great geographic distances and the arthropod-borne viruses (West Nile, chikungunya and Zika) enabled by ecology and vector adaptations. Did we learn from the past epidemics? Are we prepared for the worst?The ultimate goal is to develop a resilient global health infrastructure. Besides acquiring treatments, vaccines, and other preventive medicine, bio-surveillance is critical to preventing disease emergence and to counteracting its spread. So far, only the western hemisphere has a large and established monitoring system; however, diseases continue to emerge sporadically, in particular in Southeast Asia and South America, illuminating the imperfections of our surveillance. Epidemics destabilize fragile governments, ravage the most vulnerable populations, and threaten the global community.Pandemic risk calculations employ new technologies like computerized maintenance of geographical and historical datasets, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Next Generation sequencing, and Metagenomics to trace the molecular changes in pathogens during their emergence, and mathematical models to assess risk. Predictions help to pinpoint the hot spots of emergence, the populations at risk, and the pathogens under genetic evolution. Preparedness anticipates the risks, the needs of the population, the capacities of infrastructure, the sources of emergency funding, and finally, the international partnerships needed to manage a disaster before it occurs. At present, the world is in an intermediate phase of trying to reduce health disparities despite exponential population growth, political conflicts, migration, global trade, urbanization, and major environmental changes due to global warming. For the sake of humanity, we must focus on developing the necessary capacities for health surveillance, epidemic preparedness, and pandemic response.

Crowdsourced direct-to-consumer genomic analysis of a family quartet

Background

We describe the pioneering experience of a Spanish family pursuing the goal of understanding their own personal genetic data to the fullest possible extent using Direct to Consumer (DTC) tests. With full informed consent from the Corpas family, all genotype, exome and metagenome data from members of this family, are publicly available under a public domain Creative Commons 0 (CC0) license waiver. All scientists or companies analysing these data (“the Corpasome”) were invited to return results to the family.

Methods

We released 5 genotypes, 4 exomes, 1 metagenome from the Corpas family via a blog and figshare under a public domain license, inviting scientists to join the crowdsourcing efforts to analyse the genomes in return for coauthorship or acknowldgement in derived papers. Resulting analysis data were compiled via social media and direct email.

Results

Here we present the results of our investigations, combining the crowdsourced contributions and our own efforts. Four companies offering annotations for genomic variants were applied to four family exomes: BIOBASE, Ingenuity, Diploid, and GeneTalk. Starting from a common VCF file and after selecting for significant results from company reports, we find no overlap among described annotations. We additionally report on a gut microbiome analysis of a member of the Corpas family.

Conclusions

This study presents an analysis of a diverse set of tools and methods offered by four DTC companies. The striking discordance of the results mirrors previous findings with respect to DTC analysis of SNP chip data, and highlights the difficulties of using DTC data for preventive medical care. To our knowledge, the data and analysis results from our crowdsourced study represent the most comprehensive exome and analysis for a family quartet using solely DTC data generation to date.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12864-015-1973-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorised users.

Biosurveillance enterprise for operational awareness, a genomic-based approach for tracking pathogen virulence

To protect our civilians and warfighters against both known and unknown pathogens, biodefense stakeholders must be able to foresee possible technological trends that could affect their threat risk assessment. However, significant flaws in how we prioritize our countermeasure-needs continue to limit their development. As recombinant biotechnology becomes increasingly simplified and inexpensive, small groups, and even individuals, can now achieve the design, synthesis, and production of pathogenic organisms for offensive purposes. Under these daunting circumstances, a reliable biosurveillance approach that supports a diversity of users could better provide early warnings about the emergence of new pathogens (both natural and manmade), reverse engineer pathogens carrying traits to avoid available countermeasures, and suggest the most appropriate detection, prophylactic, and therapeutic solutions. While impressive in data mining capabilities, real-time content analysis of social media data misses much of the complexity in the factual reality. Quality issues within freeform user-provided hashtags and biased referencing can significantly undermine our confidence in the information obtained to make critical decisions about the natural vs. intentional emergence of a pathogen. At the same time, errors in pathogen genomic records, the narrow scope of most databases, and the lack of standards and interoperability across different detection and diagnostic devices, continue to restrict the multidimensional biothreat assessment. The fragmentation of our biosurveillance efforts into different approaches has stultified attempts to implement any new foundational enterprise that is more reliable, more realistic and that avoids the scenario of the warning that comes too late. This discussion focus on the development of genomic-based decentralized medical intelligence and laboratory system to track emerging and novel microbial health threats in both military and civilian settings and the use of virulence factors for risk assessment. Examples of the use of motif fingerprints for pathogen discrimination are provided.

Biodefense Oriented Genomic-Based Pathogen Classification Systems: Challenges and Opportunities

Countermeasures that will effectively prevent or diminish the impact of a biological attack will depend on the rapid and accurate generation and analysis of genomic information. Because of their increasing level of sensitivity, rapidly decreasing cost, and their ability to effectively interrogate the genomes of previously unknown organisms, Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) technologies are revolutionizing the biological sciences. However, the exponential accumulation microbial data is equally outpacing the computational performance of existing analytical tools in their ability to translate DNA information into reliable detection, prophylactic and therapeutic countermeasures. It is now evident that the bottleneck for next-generation sequence data analysis will not be solved simply by scaling up our computational resources, but rather accomplished by implementing novel biodefense-oriented algorithms that overcome exiting vulnerabilities of speed, sensitivity and accuracy. Considering these circumstances, this document highlights the challenges and opportunities that biodefense stakeholders must consider in order to exploit more efficiently genomic information and translate this data into integrated countermeasures. The document overviews different genome analysis methods and explains concepts of DNA fingerprints, motif fingerprints, genomic barcodes and genomic signatures. A series of recommendations to promote genomics and bioinformatics as an effective form of deterrence and a valuable scientific platform for rapid technological insertion of detection, prophylactic, therapeutic countermeasures are discussed.