Beyond Biosecurity by Taxonomic Lists: Lessons, Challenges, and Opportunities

Annotation of Functions of Sequences of Concern and Its Relevance to the New Biosecurity Regulatory Framework in the United States

Introduction

Recent regulations from United States Government agencies reshape the screening of synthetic nucleic acids. These take a step away from categorizing hazard on the basis of "bad" taxa and invoke the function of the sequence in pathogenesis or intoxication. Ascertaining functions related to pathogenesis and distinguishing these from other molecular abilities that are unproblematic is not simple. Some have suggested that this information can be readily obtained from existing databases of pathogens.

Objectives

We evaluate how virulence factors are described in current databases of pathogens and their adequacy for biothreat data science. We discuss limitations of how virulence factors have been conceived and propose using the sequence of concern (SoC) term to distinguish sequences with biothreat from those without. We discuss ways in which databases of SoCs might be implemented for research and regulatory purposes. We describe ongoing work improving functional descriptions of SoCs.

Methods

We assess the adequacy of descriptions of virulence factors in pathogen databases following extensive engagement with the literature in microbial pathogenesis.

Results/Conclusions

Descriptions of virulence factors in pathogen databases are inadequate for understanding biothreats. Many are not biothreats and would not be concerning if transferred to another pathogen. New gene ontology terms have been authored, and those specific to pathogenic viral processes are being generalized to make them relevant to other pathogenic taxa. This allows better understanding by humans and better recognition by machines. A database of annotated functions of SoCs could benefit the evolving biosecurity regulatory framework in the United States.

Practical Questions for Securing Nucleic Acid Synthesis

Introduction

Affordable and accurate nucleic acid synthesis is foundational to modern biotechnology, but raises security concerns because it facilitates the construction of pathogens and other potentially dangerous biological agents. Nucleic acid synthesis screening can reduce the risk of providing potentially harmful nucleic acids to those without a legitimate use for them. Governments, industry associations, and biosecurity organizations have offered guidance on synthesis screening for a decade, and are now considering how to translate industry best practices into regulatory frameworks.

Methods

A review of existing guidance documents, policy proposals, and other published literature was performed.

Results

We distinguish five categories of practical questions for policymakers: challenges associated with customer screening, sequence screening, the interaction between domestic and global regulations, commercial implications of screening, and finally, challenges associated with benchtop nucleic acid synthesis devices. There are a number of recommendations in public literature that target the implementation of robust customer and sequence screening, several of which have been incorporated into the recent United States White House Executive Order on artificial intelligence. There appears to be fewer solutions proposed to address challenges associated with the global screening landscape, or the commercial implications of screening requirements, and limited discussion on securing the benchtop synthesis landscape.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper aims at providing a comprehensive resource for policymakers, outlining a set of questions governments, and other stakeholders, must answer when implementing screening requirements to secure nucleic acid synthesis.

Data hazards in synthetic biology

Data science is playing an increasingly important role in the design and analysis of engineered biology. This has been fueled by the development of high-throughput methods like massively parallel reporter assays, data-rich microscopy techniques, computational protein structure prediction and design, and the development of whole-cell models able to generate huge volumes of data. Although the ability to apply data-centric analyses in these contexts is appealing and increasingly simple to do, it comes with potential risks. For example, how might biases in the underlying data affect the validity of a result and what might the environmental impact of large-scale data analyses be? Here, we present a community-developed framework for assessing data hazards to help address these concerns and demonstrate its application to two synthetic biology case studies. We show the diversity of considerations that arise in common types of bioengineering projects and provide some guidelines and mitigating steps. Understanding potential issues and dangers when working with data and proactively addressing them will be essential for ensuring the appropriate use of emerging data-intensive AI methods and help increase the trustworthiness of their applications in synthetic biology.

Developing a Common Global Baseline for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening

Introduction

Nucleic acid synthesis is a powerful tool that has revolutionized the life sciences. However, the misuse of synthetic nucleic acids could pose a serious threat to public health and safety. There is a need for international standards for nucleic acid synthesis screening to help prevent the misuse of this technology.

Methods

We outline current barriers to the adoption of screening, which include the cost of developing screening tools and resources, adapting to existing commercial practices, internationalizing screening, and adapting screening to benchtop nucleic acid synthesis devices. To address these challenges, we then introduce the Common Mechanism for DNA Synthesis Screening, which was developed in consultation with a technical consortium of experts in DNA synthesis, synthetic biology, biosecurity, and policy, with the aim of addressing current barriers. The Common Mechanism software uses a variety of methods to identify sequences of concern, identify taxonomic best matches to regulated pathogens, and identify benign genes that can be cleared for synthesis. Finally, we describe outstanding challenges in the development of screening practices.

Results

The Common Mechanism is a step toward ensuring the safe and responsible use of synthetic nucleic acids. It provides a baseline capability that overcomes challenges to nucleic acid synthesis screening and provides a solution for broader international adoption of screening practices.

Conclusion

The Common Mechanism is a valuable tool for preventing the misuse of synthetic nucleic acids. It is a critical step toward ensuring the safe and responsible use of this powerful technology.

Open-endedness in synthetic biology: A route to continual innovation for biological design

Design in synthetic biology is typically goal oriented, aiming to repurpose or optimize existing biological functions, augmenting biology with new-to-nature capabilities, or creating life-like systems from scratch. While the field has seen many advances, bottlenecks in the complexity of the systems built are emerging and designs that function in the lab often fail when used in real-world contexts. Here, we propose an open-ended approach to biological design, with the novelty of designed biology being at least as important as how well it fulfils its goal. Rather than solely focusing on optimization toward a single best design, designing with novelty in mind may allow us to move beyond the diminishing returns we see in performance for most engineered biology. Research from the artificial life community has demonstrated that embracing novelty can automatically generate innovative and unexpected solutions to challenging problems beyond local optima. Synthetic biology offers the ideal playground to explore more creative approaches to biological design.