Accusations of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care

Characteristics of Belgian "life-ending acts without explicit patient request": a large-scale death certificate survey revisited

BACKGROUND

"Life-ending acts without explicit patient request," as identified in robust international studies, are central in current debates on physician-assisted dying. Despite their contentiousness, little attention has been paid to their actual characteristics and to what extent they truly represent nonvoluntary termination of life.

METHODS

We analyzed the 66 cases of life-ending acts without explicit patient request identified in a large-scale survey of physicians certifying a representative sample of deaths (n = 6927) in Flanders, Belgium, in 2007. The characteristics we studied included physicians' labelling of the act, treatment course and doses used, and patient involvement in the decision.

RESULTS

In most cases (87.9%), physicians labelled their acts in terms of symptom treatment rather than in terms of ending life. By comparing drug combinations and doses of opioids used, we found that the life-ending acts were similar to intensified pain and symptom treatment and were distinct from euthanasia. In 45 cases, there was at least 1 characteristic inconsistent with the common understanding of the practice: either patients had previously expressed a wish for ending life (16/66, 24.4%), physicians reported that the administered doses had not been higher than necessary to relieve suffering (22/66, 33.3%), or both (7/66, 10.6%).

INTERPRETATION

Most of the cases we studied did not fit the label of "nonvoluntary life-ending" for at least 1 of the following reasons: the drugs were administered with a focus on symptom control; a hastened death was highly unlikely; or the act was taken in accordance with the patient's previously expressed wishes. Thus, we recommend a more nuanced view of life-ending acts without explicit patient request in the debate on physician-assisted dying.

Prevalence of formal accusations of murder and euthanasia against physicians

BACKGROUND

Little is known about how often physicians are formally accused of hastening patient deaths while practicing palliative care.

METHODS

We conducted an Internet-based survey on a random 50% sample of physician-members of a national hospice and palliative medicine society.

RESULTS

The final sample consisted of 663 physicians (response rate 53%). Over half of the respondents had had at least one experience in the last 5 years in which a patient's family, another physician, or another health care professional had characterized palliative treatments as being euthanasia, murder, or killing. One in four stated that at least one friend or family member, or a patient had similarly characterized their treatments. Respondents rated palliative sedation and stopping artificial hydration/nutrition as treatments most likely to be misconstrued as euthanasia. Overall, 25 physicians (4%) had been formally investigated for hastening a patient's death when that had not been their intention-13 while using opiates for symptom relief and six for using medications while discontinuing mechanical ventilation. In eight (32%) cases, another member of the health care team had initiated the charges. At the time of the survey, none had been found guilty, but they reported experiencing substantial anger and worry.

CONCLUSIONS

Commonly used palliative care practices continue to be misconstrued as euthanasia or murder, despite this not being the intention of the treating physician. Further efforts are needed to explain to the health care community and the public that treatments often used to relieve patient suffering at the end of life are ethical and legal.

Attitudes towards end-of-life decisions and the subjective concepts of consciousness: an empirical analysis

Background

People have fought for their civil rights, primarily the right to live in dignity. At present, the development of technology in medicine and healthcare led to an apparent paradox: many people are fighting for the right to die. This study was aimed at testing whether different moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for patients with a severe brain damage.

Methodology

We focused on the ethical decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in patients with severe brain damage. 202 undergraduate students at the University of Padova were given one description drawn from four profiles describing different pathological states: the permanent vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, the locked-in syndrome, and the terminal illness. Participants were asked to evaluate how dead or how alive the patient was, and how appropriate it was to satisfy the patient's desire.

Principal Findings

We found that the moral principles in which people believe affect not only people's judgments concerning the appropriateness of the withdrawal of life support, but also the perception of the death status of patients with severe brain injury. In particular, we found that the supporters of the Free Choice (FC) principle perceived the death status of the patients with different pathologies differently: the more people believe in the FC, the more they perceived patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across pathologies.

Conclusions

These results may shed light on the complex aspects of moral consensus for supporting or rejecting end-of-life decisions.

Collaborated death: an exploration of the Swiss model of assisted suicide for its potential to enhance oversight and demedicalize the dying process

Death, like many social problems, has become medicalized. In response to this medicalization, physician-assisted suicide (PAS) has emerged as one alternative among many at the end of life. And although the practice is currently legal in the states of Oregon and Washington, opponents still argue that PAS is unethical, is inconsistent with a physician's role, and cannot be effectively regulated. In comparison, Switzerland, like Oregon, permits PAS, but unlike Oregon, non-physicians and private organizations play a significant role in assisted death. Could the Swiss model be the answer? The following essay explores the Swiss model of assisted suicide for its potential to enhance the regulation of PAS, reduce physician involvement, and perhaps demedicalize the way we die.

Palliative sedation as part of a continuum of palliative care

Three issues seem to animate those who advocate the move toward a broad allowance of physician-assisted death. The first is the supposed failure of palliative care in extreme cases. We challenge the notion that palliative care ever fails. When palliative sedation is understood to be a routine continuation of palliative care, as opposed to a last-ditch response to a dramatic failure, then palliative care will never fail. The second focuses on helping patients maintain a sense of control in their final days and hours. We believe that continued intimate involvement in each of the final stages that is essential in the palliative care-palliative sedation continuum will be more effective palliative care and still grant control to the patient under the principle of respect for autonomy. The third issue is the charge that palliative sedation is a euphemism for physician-assisted death. We reject that charge.

Palliative sedation: an essential place for clinical excellence

The complexities that converge around palliative sedation invite clinicians to work together to differentiate the issues and come to recommendations and decisions that are humane, ethical, legal, and clinically sound. Whether a crisis or long-term situation exists, the work is essentially the same. It must include critical thinking, clinical expertise, multidimensional assessment, and an array of interventions to assist patients and families in situations where symptoms and suffering are sufficiently intense to warrant exploration of sedation. The many issues inherent in the discussion of sedation at end of life require not that we have the answers but rather that we work with our colleagues to raise relevant questions and integrate both expertise and compassion into end-of-life decisions and care.

Shattering the consensus on end-of-life care: Was the Schiavo case palliative medicine's Humpty Dumpty?

In October of 2005, a two-day conference, “Controversies in End-of-Life Care: Terri Schiavo's Lessons,” was jointly sponsored by Baystate Medical Center and the Smith College School for Social Work. Both the conference and this special issue of the journal are prompted by recognition that the Schiavo case has clearly generated considerable national attention, and it consequently offers palliative medicine, social work, psychiatry, neurology, and allied disciplines a singular opportunity to reflect on our clinical practices and assumptions about the management of catastrophically ill individuals. At the core of the Schiavo case was a bitter family feud, but before it ended, it became a legal battle, a political fight, a disability rights issue, and a macabre media circus. It is heartbreaking that Congress held a midnight session about the health care of one irreparably brain-damaged woman, Terri Schiavo, while ignoring the health crisis of 40 million uninsured Americans (Friedman, 2005).