Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure

Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation.

The Role of Bots in the Disinformation Process in Brazilian Politics between 2014 and 2018

This paper presents the participation of bots in the process of disinformation in the Brazilian political/electoral scenario between 2014 and 2018. The justification for this research was the growth of ideological polarization and the emergence of hate speech linked to political positioning that culminated in a massive campaign of disinformation, evidenced by fake news and other forms of manipulation. In this research multiple case studies were used referring to three moments: the 2014 elections, the 2016 impeachment and the 2018 election. We found studies investigating these events, and they were used as data sources for analysis of the conjuncture and the interpretation of these facts in a chronological perspective pointed toward the role of bots and the results of such actions. It has been observed that the use of bots has occurred since 2014; however, they were only engaged in propagating false content from 2015. The automation of the messages was sophisticated between 2014 and 2018, when bots ceased to be players who replicated posts indiscriminately (spam) to become users’ catalysts with the intention of creating or expanding new bubbles of disinformation. Finally, we observed that the same botnet active in Brazil was also involved in electoral processes around the world, making Brazil simply one more piece in this grand network of disinformation where who is involved and what their purpose might be is not known.

Good agreements make good friends

When starting a new collaborative endeavor, it pays to establish upfront how strongly your partner commits to the common goal and what compensation can be expected in case the collaboration is violated. Diverse examples in biological and social contexts have demonstrated the pervasiveness of making prior agreements on posterior compensations, suggesting that this behavior could have been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze the evolutionary relevance of such a commitment strategy and relate it to the costly punishment strategy, where no prior agreements are made. We show that when the cost of arranging a commitment deal lies within certain limits, substantial levels of cooperation can be achieved. Moreover, these levels are higher than that achieved by simple costly punishment, especially when one insists on sharing the arrangement cost. Not only do we show that good agreements make good friends, agreements based on shared costs result in even better outcomes.