Constructing a South Asian cardiovascular disease: a qualitative analysis on how researchers study cardiovascular disease in South Asians

BACKGROUND

Debates on the use of race in biomedical research have typically overlooked immigrant groups outside of the black-white racial dichotomy. Recent biomedical research on South Asians and cardiovascular disease provides an opportunity to understand how scientists define race and interpret racial health disparities from an underexamined perspective.

PURPOSE

To examine how researchers in the Mediators of Atherosclerosis in South Asians Living in America (MASALA) study defined a South Asian population, and then compared health differences between South Asians and other populations.

METHODS

Qualitative content analysis was performed on eleven articles from August 2013 to January 2021 that directly compared the South Asian cohort in MASALA to four other groups. The MASALA study design article was also included in this analysis. Articles were analysed for how South Asians were defined, and for how health differences between South Asians and other populations were studied and discussed.

RESULTS

Researchers in MASALA were neither clear nor precise in defining South Asians as either an ancestral group or ethnic group. Their studies also prioritised investigating genetic and molecular causes of the cardiovascular health disparity between South Asians and other populations and failed to examine possible social factors.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings reflect a broader trend in biomedical research in which race and racial health disparities are poorly defined and studied, limiting scientists' understanding of the relationship between race and health. I propose methodologies to help researchers define populations and design studies without relying on biologically reductive assumptions.

Facecraft: Race Reification in Psychological Research With Faces

Faces are socially important surfaces of the body on which various meanings are attached. The widespread physiognomic belief that faces inherently contain socially predictive value is why they make a generative stimulus for perception research. However, critical problems arise in studies that simultaneously investigate faces and race. Researchers studying race and racism inadvertently engage in various research practices that transform faces with specific phenotypes into straightforward representatives of their presumed race category, thereby taking race and its phenotypic associations for granted. I argue that research practices that map race categories onto faces using bioessentialist ideas of racial phenotypes constitute a form of racecraft ideology, the dubious reasoning of which presupposes the reality of race and mystifies the causal relation between race and racism. In considering how to study racism without reifying race in face studies, this article places these practices in context, describes how they reproduce racecraft ideology and impair theoretical inferences, and then suggests counterpractices for minimizing this problem.

Thinking Structurally: A Cognitive Framework for Understanding How People Attribute Inequality to Structural Causes

To make accurate causal inferences about social-group inequalities, people must consider structural causes. Structural causes are a distinct type of extrinsic cause-they are stable, interconnected societal forces that systematically advantage some social groups and disadvantage others. We propose a new cognitive framework to specify how people attribute inequality to structural causes. This framework is rooted in counterfactual theories of causal judgment and suggests that people will recognize structural factors as causal when they are perceived as "difference-making" for inequality above and beyond any intrinsic causes. Building on this foundation, our framework makes the following contributions. First, we propose specific types of evidence that support difference-making inferences about structural factors: within-group change (i.e., observing that disadvantaged groups' outcomes improve under better societal conditions) and well-matched between-group comparisons (i.e., observing that advantaged group members, who have similar baseline traits to the disadvantaged group, experience more favorable societal conditions and life outcomes). Second, we consider contextual, cognitive, and motivational barriers that may complicate the availability and acceptance of this evidence. We conclude by exploring how the framework might be applied in future research examining people's causal inferences about inequality.

Janus-faced race: Is race biological, social, or mythical?

As belief in the reality of race as a biological category among U.S. anthropologists has fallen, belief in the reality of race as a social category has risen in its place. The view that race simply does not exist-that it is a myth-is treated with suspicion. While racial classification is linked to many of the worst evils of recent history, it is now widely believed to be necessary to fight back against racism. In this article, I argue that race is indeed a biological fiction, but I critique the claim that race is socially real. I defend a form of anti-realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups-groups mistakenly believed to be races. I argue that this is the most attractive position about race from a metaphysical perspective, and that it is also the position most conductive to public understanding and social justice.