Resting-State Fluctuations Underlie Free and Creative Verbal Behaviors in the Human Brain

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ~2 s before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

A shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity: Response to the commentators

In our target article, we proposed that curiosity and creativity are both manifestations of the same novelty-seeking process. We received 29 commentaries from diverse disciplines that add insights to our initial proposal. These commentaries ultimately expanded and supplemented our model. Here we draw attention to five central practical and theoretical issues that were raised by the commentators: (1) The complex construct of novelty and associated concepts; (2) the underlying subsystems and possible mechanisms; (3) the different pathways and subtypes of curiosity and creativity; (4) creativity and curiosity "in the wild"; (5) the possible link(s) between creativity and curiosity.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

The neuronal basis of human creativity

Human creativity is a powerful cognitive ability underlying all uniquely human cultural and scientific advancement. However, the neuronal basis of this creative ability is unknown. Here, I propose that slow, spontaneous fluctuations in neuronal activity, also known as "resting state" fluctuations, constitute a universal mechanism underlying all facets of human creativity. Support for this hypothesis is derived from experiments that directly link spontaneous fluctuations and verbal creativity. Recent experimental and modeling advances in our understanding of the spontaneous fluctuations offer an explanation for the diversity and innovative nature of creativity, which is derived from a unique integration of random, neuronal noise on the one hand with individually specified, deterministic information acquired through learning, expertise training, and hereditary traits. This integration between stochasticity and order leads to a process that offers, on the one hand, original, unexpected outcomes but, on the other hand, endows these outcomes with knowledge-based meaning and significance.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

A shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity

Curiosity and creativity are central pillars of human growth and invention. Although they have been studied extensively in isolation, the relationship between them has not yet been established. We propose that both curiosity and creativity emanate from the same mechanism of novelty seeking. We first present a synthesis showing that curiosity and creativity are affected similarly by a number of key cognitive faculties such as memory, cognitive control, attention, and reward. We then review empirical evidence from neuroscience research, indicating that the same brain regions are involved in both curiosity and creativity, focusing on the interplay between three major brain networks: the default mode network, the salience network, and the executive control network. After substantiating the link between curiosity and creativity, we propose a novelty-seeking model (NSM) that underlies them and suggests that the manifestation of the NSM is governed by one's state of mind.

Occupation-modulated language networks and its lateralization: A resting-state fMRI study of seafarers

Introduction

Studies have revealed that the language network of Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area is modulated by factors such as disease, gender, aging, and handedness. However, how occupational factors modulate the language network remains unclear.

Methods

In this study, taking professional seafarers as an example, we explored the resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) of the language network with seeds (the original and flipped Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area).

Results

The results showed seafarers had weakened RSFC of Broca’s area with the left superior/middle frontal gyrus and left precentral gyrus, and enhanced RSFC of Wernicke’s area with the cingulate and precuneus. Further, seafarers had a less right-lateralized RSFC with Broca’s area in the left inferior frontal gyrus, while the controls showed a left-lateralized RSFC pattern in Broca’s area and a right-lateralized one in Wernicke’s area. Moreover, seafarers displayed stronger RSFC with the left seeds of Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area.

Discussion

These findings suggest that years of working experience significantly modulates the RSFC of language networks and their lateralization, providing rich insights into language networks and occupational neuroplasticity.

Executive functioning moderates the decline of retrieval fluency in time

Prevailing theoretical accounts consider that automatic and controlled processes are uniformly engaged in memory retrieval across performance of the semantic verbal fluency (SVF) task. We tested this proposal against the alternative, namely that a rapid automatic retrieval, exploiting stable associative structure in the early stages of the performance, is followed by a slower, more executively demanding, retrieval in later stages. Eighty-five healthy adults completed low- and high-demand SVF tasks that were assessed for retrieval rate, response typicality, and inter-response similarity across the performance. Additional measures of executive functioning were collected to estimate individual differences in executive control. We found that decrease in fluency in time was associated with lower typicality and weaker semantic similarity of the responses. Critically, the time-dependent retrieval slowing was steeper in individuals with less efficient interference control, particularly in high-demand SVF tasks. Steeper retrieval slowing was also associated with poorer working-memory capacity. Our findings show that the relative contribution of automatic and controlled processes to semantic retrieval changes with associative sparsity over time and across task demands, and provide implications for the use of SVF tasks in clinical assessment.

The default network is causally linked to creative thinking

Creative thinking represents a major evolutionary mechanism that greatly contributed to the rapid advancement of the human species. The ability to produce novel and useful ideas, or original thinking, is thought to correlate well with unexpected, synchronous activation of several large-scale, dispersed cortical networks, such as the default network (DN). Despite a vast amount of correlative evidence, a causal link between default network and creativity has yet to be demonstrated. Surgeries for resection of brain tumors that lie in proximity to speech related areas are performed while the patient is awake to map the exposed cortical surface for language functions. Such operations provide a unique opportunity to explore human behavior while disrupting a focal cortical area via focal electrical stimulation. We used a novel paradigm of individualized direct cortical stimulation to examine the association between creative thinking and the DN. Preoperative resting-state fMRI was used to map the DN in individual patients. A cortical area identified as a DN node (study) or outside the DN (controls) was stimulated while the participants performed an alternate-uses-task (AUT). This task measures divergent thinking through the number and originality of different uses provided for an everyday object. Baseline AUT performance in the operating room was positively correlated with DN integrity. Direct cortical stimulation at the DN node resulted in decreased ability to produce alternate uses, but not in the originality of uses produced. Stimulation in areas that when used as network seed regions produced a network similar to the canonical DN was associated with reduction of creative fluency. Stimulation of areas that did not produce a default-like network (controls) did not alter creative thinking. This is the first study to causally link the DN and creative thinking.

Comparing stimulus-evoked and spontaneous response of the face-selective multi-units in the human posterior fusiform gyrus

The stimulus-evoked neural response is a widely explored phenomenon. Conscious awareness is associated in many cases with the corresponding selective stimulus-evoked response. For example, conscious awareness of a face stimulus is associated with or accompanied by stimulus-evoked activity in the fusiform face area (FFA). In addition to the stimulus-evoked response, spontaneous (i.e. task-unrelated) activity in the brain is also abundant. Notably, spontaneous activity is considered unconscious. For example, spontaneous activity in the FFA is not associated with conscious awareness of a face. The question is: what is the difference at the neural level between stimulus-evoked activity in a case that this activity is associated with conscious awareness of some content (e.g. activity in the FFA in response to fully visible face stimuli) and spontaneous activity in that same region of the brain? To answer this question, in the present study, we had a rare opportunity to record two face-selective multi-units in the vicinity of the FFA in a human patient. We compared multi-unit face-selective task-evoked activity with spontaneous prestimulus and a resting-state activity. We found that when activity was examined over relatively long temporal windows (e.g. 100–200 ms), face-selective stimulus-evoked firing in the recorded multi-units was much higher than the spontaneous activity. In contrast, when activity was examined over relatively short windows, we found many cases of high firing rates within the spontaneous activity that were comparable to stimulus-evoked activity. Our results thus indicate that the sustained activity is what might differentiate between stimulus-evoked activity that is associated with conscious awareness and spontaneous activity.

Local neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience

While most theories of consciousness posit some kind of dependence on global network activities, I consider here an alternative, localist perspective-in which localized cortical regions each underlie the emergence of a unique category of conscious experience. Under this perspective, the large-scale activation often found in the cortex is a consequence of the complexity of typical conscious experiences rather than an obligatory condition for the emergence of conscious awareness-which can flexibly shift, depending on the richness of its contents, from local to more global activation patterns. This perspective fits a massive body of human imaging, recordings, lesions and stimulation data but opens a fundamental problem: how can the information, defining each content, be derived locally in each cortical region. Here, I will discuss a solution echoing pioneering structuralist ideas in which the content of a conscious experience is defined by its relationship to all other contents within an experiential category. In neuronal terms, this relationship structure between contents is embodied by the local geometry of similarity distances between cortical activation patterns generated during each conscious experience, likely mediated via networks of local neuronal connections. Thus, in order for any conscious experience to appear in an individual's mind, two central conditions must be met. First, a specific configural pattern ("bar-code") of neuronal activity must appear within a local relational geometry, i.e. a cortical area. Second, the individual neurons underlying the activated pattern must be bound into a unified functional ensemble through a burst of recurrent neuronal firing: local "ignitions".

Spontaneous perception: a framework for task-free, self-paced perception

Flipping through social media feeds, viewing exhibitions in a museum, or walking through the botanical gardens, people consistently choose to engage with and disengage from visual content. Yet, in most laboratory settings, the visual stimuli, their presentation duration, and the task at hand are all controlled by the researcher. Such settings largely overlook the spontaneous nature of human visual experience, in which perception takes place independently from specific task constraints and its time course is determined by the observer as a self-governing agent. Currently, much remains unknown about how spontaneous perceptual experiences unfold in the brain. Are all perceptual categories extracted during spontaneous perception? Does spontaneous perception inherently involve volition? Is spontaneous perception segmented into discrete episodes? How do different neural networks interact over time during spontaneous perception? These questions are imperative to understand our conscious visual experience in daily life. In this article we propose a framework for spontaneous perception. We first define spontaneous perception as a task-free and self-paced experience. We propose that spontaneous perception is guided by four organizing principles that grant it temporal and spatial structures. These principles include coarse-to-fine processing, continuity and segmentation, agency and volition, and associative processing. We provide key suggestions illustrating how these principles may interact with one another in guiding the multifaceted experience of spontaneous perception. We point to testable predictions derived from this framework, including (but not limited to) the roles of the default-mode network and slow cortical potentials in underlying spontaneous perception. We conclude by suggesting several outstanding questions for future research, extending the relevance of this framework to consciousness and spontaneous brain activity. In conclusion, the spontaneous perception framework proposed herein integrates components in human perception and cognition, which have been traditionally studied in isolation, and opens the door to understand how visual perception unfolds in its most natural context.

How do the blind 'see'? The role of spontaneous brain activity in self-generated perception

Spontaneous activity of the human brain has been well documented, but little is known about the functional role of this ubiquitous neural phenomenon. It has previously been hypothesized that spontaneous brain activity underlies unprompted (internally generated) behaviour. We tested whether spontaneous brain activity might underlie internally-generated vision by studying the cortical visual system of five blind/visually-impaired individuals who experience vivid visual hallucinations (Charles Bonnet syndrome). Neural populations in the visual system of these individuals are deprived of external input, which may lead to their hyper-sensitization to spontaneous activity fluctuations. To test whether these spontaneous fluctuations can subserve visual hallucinations, the functional MRI brain activity of participants with Charles Bonnet syndrome obtained while they reported their hallucinations (spontaneous internally-generated vision) was compared to the: (i) brain activity evoked by veridical vision (externally-triggered vision) in sighted controls who were presented with a visual simulation of the hallucinatory streams; and (ii) brain activity of non-hallucinating blind controls during visual imagery (cued internally-generated vision). All conditions showed activity spanning large portions of the visual system. However, only the hallucination condition in the Charles Bonnet syndrome participants demonstrated unique temporal dynamics, characterized by a slow build-up of neural activity prior to the reported onset of hallucinations. This build-up was most pronounced in early visual cortex and then decayed along the visual hierarchy. These results suggest that, in the absence of external visual input, a build-up of spontaneous fluctuations in early visual cortex may activate the visual hierarchy, thereby triggering the experience of vision.