Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks

Deterministic and stochastic cooperation transitions in evolutionary games on networks

Although the cooperative dynamics emerging from a network of interacting players has been exhaustively investigated, it is not yet fully understood when and how network reciprocity drives cooperation transitions. In this work, we investigate the critical behavior of evolutionary social dilemmas on structured populations by using the framework of master equations and Monte Carlo simulations. The developed theory describes the existence of absorbing, quasiabsorbing, and mixed strategy states and the transition nature, continuous or discontinuous, between the states as the parameters of the system change. In particular, when the decision-making process is deterministic, in the limit of zero effective temperature of the Fermi function, we find that the copying probabilities are discontinuous functions of the system's parameters and of the network degrees sequence. This may induce abrupt changes in the final state for any system size, in excellent agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results. Our analysis also reveals the existence of continuous and discontinuous phase transitions for large systems as the temperature increases, which is explained in the mean-field approximation. Interestingly, for some game parameters, we find optimal "social temperatures" maximizing or minimizing the cooperation frequency or density.

Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory

In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult obstacles lies in making analytical deductions, either qualitative or quantitative, about the long-term outcomes of evolution. The "structure-coefficient" theorem is a well-known approach to this problem for mutation-selection processes under weak selection, but a general method of evaluating the terms it comprises is lacking. Here, we provide such a method for populations of fixed (but arbitrary) size and structure, using easily interpretable demographic measures. This method encompasses a large family of evolutionary update mechanisms and extends the theorem to allow for asymmetric contests to provide a better understanding of the mutation-selection balance under more realistic circumstances. We apply the method to study social goods produced and distributed among individuals in spatially heterogeneous populations, where asymmetric interactions emerge naturally and the outcome of selection varies dramatically, depending on the nature of the social good, the spatial topology, and the frequency with which mutations arise.

Bacterial cooperation through horizontal gene transfer

Cooperation exists across all scales of biological organization, from genetic elements to complex human societies. Bacteria cooperate by secreting molecules that benefit all individuals in the population (i.e., public goods). Genes associated with cooperation can spread among strains through horizontal gene transfer (HGT). We discuss recent findings on how HGT mediated by mobile genetic elements promotes bacterial cooperation, how cooperation in turn can facilitate more frequent HGT, and how the act of HGT itself may be considered as a form of cooperation. We propose that HGT is an important enforcement mechanism in bacterial populations, thus creating a positive feedback loop that further maintains cooperation. To enforce cooperation, HGT serves as a homogenizing force by transferring the cooperative trait, effectively eliminating cheaters.

Seasonal payoff variations and the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be mathematically described as periodic changes. Accordingly, we here study how periodic shifts between different manifestations of social dilemmas affect cooperation. We observe a non-trivial interplay between the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics that characterizes the spreading of cooperation in a particular social dilemma type and the frequency of payoff changes. In particular, we show that periodic changes between two available games with global ordering best be fast, while periodic changes between global and local ordering games best be slow for cooperation to thrive. We also show that the frequency of periodic changes between two local ordering social dilemmas is irrelevant, because then the process is fast and simply the average cooperation level of the two is returned. The structure of the interaction network plays an important role too in that lattices promote local ordering, whilst random graphs hinder the formation of compact cooperative clusters. Conversely, for local ordering the regular structure of the interaction network is only marginally relevant as role-separating checkerboard patterns do not rely on long-range order.

Social clustering in epidemic spread on coevolving networks

Even though transitivity is a central structural feature of social networks, its influence on epidemic spread on coevolving networks has remained relatively unexplored. Here we introduce and study an adaptive susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic model wherein the infection and network coevolve with nontrivial probability to close triangles during edge rewiring, leading to substantial reinforcement of network transitivity. This model provides an opportunity to study the role of transitivity in altering the SIS dynamics on a coevolving network. Using numerical simulations and approximate master equations (AMEs), we identify and examine a rich set of dynamical features in the model. In many cases, AMEs including transitivity reinforcement provide accurate predictions of stationary-state disease prevalence and network degree distributions. Furthermore, for some parameter settings, the AMEs accurately trace the temporal evolution of the system. We show that higher transitivity reinforcement in the model leads to lower levels of infective individuals in the population, when closing a triangle is the dominant rewiring mechanism. These methods and results may be useful in developing ideas and modeling strategies for controlling SIS-type epidemics.

Cocaine use disorder in females is associated with altered social decision-making: a study with the prisoner's dilemma and the ultimatum game

BACKGROUND

Chronic cocaine use is associated with cognitive deficits, including poor performance on neuropsychological tasks of memory, executive functions, theory of mind and decision-making. However, the relationship between cocaine use disorder and social decision-making remains unclear. This is particularly relevant given the fact that many cocaine abusers present impairments in social functioning. In this sense, game theory paradigms have been helping to comprehend the behavior of psychiatric patients when they directly engage in social situations, which may better approximate many of their real-life choices.

METHODS

The present study investigated social decision-making in individuals with or without cocaine use disorder, examining their behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma and in the Ultimatum Game. Thus, 129 females diagnosed with cocaine use disorder and 55 females with no history of substance abuse were recruited and performed both social decision-making tasks. Additional assessments included information about demographics, patterns of substance consumption and executive function performance.

RESULTS

Females with cocaine use disorder opted more often to not defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma, while in the Ultimatum Game they frequently chose to accept the first and unfair offer as responders. These effects were more pronounced within females with long-term history of cocaine use. Associations between cocaine use disorder and altered social decision-making were independent from demographic and executive function variables.

CONCLUSIONS

The influence of cocaine use disorder on social decision-making was detected in both game paradigms, resulting in more cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma and higher acceptance rate of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game. Further studies should focus on investigating these associations to shed light on the putative biopsychosocial factors underlying the observed effects.