Huang SS, Bowblis JR. The principal-agent problem and owner-managers: An instrumental variables application to nursing home quality.
HEALTH ECONOMICS 2018;
27:1653-1669. [PMID:
29968263 DOI:
10.1002/hec.3792]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/21/2017] [Revised: 04/16/2018] [Accepted: 05/28/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
The literature on provider ownership has primarily focused broadly on for-profits compared with nonprofits and chains versus nonchains. However, the understanding of more nuanced ownership arrangements within individual facilities is limited. Utilizing the principal-agent and managerial control frameworks, we study the role of managerial ownership and its relationship to quality among for-profit nursing homes (NHs). We identify NH administrators with more than 5% ownership (owner-manager) from Ohio Medicaid Cost Reports (2005-2010) and link these data to long-stay resident records in the Minimum Data Set. Using differential distance to the nearest NHs with a salaried manager relative to an owner-manager, we address the differential selection into these two types of NHs. After instrumenting for admissions to owner-managed NHs, quality among long-stay residents at owner-managed NHs is generally better than NHs with salaried managers. We find suggestive evidence that the magnitudes of quality difference are larger when the principal-agent problem is likely more pronounced, such as when NHs that are part of a multifacility chain and located in more concentrated markets.
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