Evaluation of the effects of the French pay-for-performance program-IFAQ pilot study

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

Changing roles of health insurers in France, Germany, and the Netherlands: any lessons to learn from Bismarckian systems?

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Local Primary Care Incentive Scheme: A Difference-in-Differences Study

National financial incentive schemes for improving the quality of primary care have come under criticism in the United Kingdom, leading to calls for localized alternatives. This study investigated whether a local general practice incentive-based quality improvement scheme launched in 2011 in a city in the North West of England was associated with a reduction in all-cause emergency hospital admissions. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the change in emergency admission rates in the intervention city, to the change in a matched comparison population. Emergency admissions rates fell by 19 per 1,000 people in the years following the intervention (95% confidence interval [17, 21]) in the intervention city, relative to the comparison population. This effect was greater among more disadvantaged populations, narrowing socioeconomic inequalities in emergency admissions. The findings suggest that similar approaches could be an effective component of strategies to reduce unplanned hospital admissions elsewhere.

Relative contributions of hospital versus skilled nursing facility quality on patient outcomes

BACKGROUND

Hospitals and health systems worldwide have adopted value-based payment to improve quality and reduce costs. In the USA, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) are now financially penalised for higher-than-expected readmission rates. However, the extent to which SNFs contribute to, and should thus be held accountable for, readmission rates is unknown. To compare the relative contributions of hospital and SNF quality on readmission rates while controlling for unobserved patient characteristics.

METHODS

Retrospective cohort study of Medicare beneficiaries, 2010-2016. Acute care hospitals and SNFs in the USA. Medicare beneficiaries with two hospitalisations followed by SNF admissions, divided into two groups: (1) patients who went to different hospitals but were discharged to the same SNF after both hospitalisations and (2) patients who went to the same hospital but were discharged to different SNFs. Hospital-level and SNF-level quality, using a lagged measure of 30-day risk-standardised readmission rates (RSRRs). Readmission within 30 days of hospital discharge.

RESULTS

There were 140 583 patients who changed hospitals but not SNFs, and 183 232 who changed SNFs but not hospitals. Patients who went to the lowest-performing hospitals (highest RSRR) had a 0.9% higher likelihood of readmission (p=0.005) compared with patients who went to the highest-performing hospitals (lowest RSRR). In contrast, patients who went to the lowest-performing SNFs had a 2% higher likelihood of readmission (p<0.001) compared with patients to went to the highest-performing SNFs.

CONCLUSIONS

The association between SNF quality and patient outcomes was larger than the association between hospital quality and patient outcomes among postacute care patients. Holding postacute care providers accountable for their quality may be an effective strategy to improve SNF quality.

Hospitalization for acute heart failure: the in-hospital care pathway predicts one-year readmission

In patients with heart failure, some organizational and modifiable factors could be prognostic factors. We aimed to assess the association between the in-hospital care pathways during hospitalization for acute heart failure and the risk of readmission. This retrospective study included all elderly patients who were hospitalized for acute heart failure at the Universitary Hospital Lariboisière (Paris) during 2013. We collected the wards attended, length of stay, admission and discharge types, diagnostic procedures, and heart failure discharge treatment. The clinical factors were the specific medical conditions, left ventricular ejection fraction, type of heart failure syndrome, sex, smoking status, and age. Consistent groups of in-hospital care pathways were built using an ascending hierarchical clustering method based on a primary components analysis. The association between the groups and the risk of readmission at 1 month and 1 year (for heart failure or for any cause) were measured via a count data model that was adjusted for clinical factors. This study included 223 patients. Associations between the in-hospital care pathway and the 1 year-readmission status were studied in 207 patients. Five consistent groups were defined: 3 described expected in-hospital care pathways in intensive care units, cardiology and gerontology wards, 1 described deceased patients, and 1 described chaotic pathways. The chaotic pathway strongly increased the risk (p = 0.0054) of 1 year readmission for acute heart failure. The chaotic in-hospital care pathway, occurring in specialized wards, was associated with the risk of readmission. This could promote specific quality improvement actions in these wards. Follow-up research projects should aim to describe the processes causing the generation of chaotic pathways and their consequences.

Pay for performance for hospitals

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) is a payment model that rewards health care providers for meeting pre-defined targets for quality indicators or efficacy parameters to increase the quality or efficacy of care.

OBJECTIVES

Our objective was to assess the impact of P4P for in-hospital delivered health care on the quality of care, resource use and equity. Our objective was not only to answer the question whether P4P works in general (simple perspective) but to provide a comprehensive and detailed overview of P4P with a focus on analyzing the intervention components, the context factors and their interrelation (more complex perspective).

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, three other databases and two trial registers on 27 June 2018. In addition, we searched conference proceedings, gray literature and web pages of relevant health care institutions, contacted experts in the field, conducted cited reference searches and performed cross-checks of included references and systematic reviews on the same topic.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized trials, cluster randomized trials, non-randomized clustered trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series and repeated measures studies that analyzed hospitals, hospital units or groups of hospitals and that compared any kind of P4P to a basic payment scheme (e.g. capitation) without P4P. Studies had to analyze at least one of the following outcomes to be eligible: patient outcomes; quality of care; utilization, coverage or access; resource use, costs and cost shifting; healthcare provider outcomes; equity; adverse effects or harms.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors independently screened all citations for inclusion, extracted study data and assessed risk of bias for each included study. Study characteristics were extracted by one reviewer and verified by a second.We did not perform meta-analysis because the included studies were too heterogenous regarding hospital characteristics, the design of the P4P programs and study design. Instead we present a structured narrative synthesis considering the complexity as well as the context/setting of the intervention. We assessed the certainty of evidence using the GRADE approach and present the results narratively in 'Summary of findings' tables.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies (20 CBA, 7 ITS) on six different P4P programs. Studies analyzed between 10 and 4267 centers. All P4P programs targeted acute or emergency physical conditions and compared a capitation-based payment scheme without P4P to the same capitation-based payment scheme combined with a P4P add-on. Two P4P program used rewards or penalties; one used first rewards and than penalties; two used penalties only and one used rewards only. Four P4P programs were established and evaluated in the USA, one in England and one in France.Most studies showed no difference or a very small effect in favor of the P4P program. The impact of each P4P program was as follows.Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low.Value-Based Purchasing Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events or quality of care as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Non-payment for Hospital-Acquired Conditions Program: It is uncertain whether this penalty-based program has an impact on adverse clinical events as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: None of the studies that examined this penalty-based program reported mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care (process quality score), equity or resource use outcomes.Advancing Quality Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-/penalty-based program has an impact on mortality as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Financial Incentive to Quality Improvement Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-based program has an impact on quality of care, as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, adverse clinical events, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Subgroup analysis (analysis of modifying design and context factors)Analysis of P4P design factors provides some hints that non-payments compared to additional payments and payments for quality attainment (e.g. falling below specified mortality threshold) compared to quality improvement (e.g. reduction of mortality by specified percent points within one year) may have a stronger impact on performance.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

It is uncertain whether P4P, compared to capitation-based payments without P4P for hospitals, has an impact on patient outcomes, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low (or we found no studies on the outcome) for all P4P programs. The effects on patient outcomes of P4P in hospitals were at most small, regardless of design factors and context/setting. It seems that with additional payments only small short-term but non-sustainable effects can be achieved. Non-payments seem to be slightly more effective than bonuses and payments for quality attainment seem to be slightly more effective than payments for quality improvement.