Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative

Teaching respect for body donors: A US medical student perspective

Recent controversies over the mismanagement of body donors in US medical schools have raised public concerns over the ethical treatment of bodies in "anatomical gift" programs. Despite widespread moral outrage at such cases, medical students may still make seemingly inconsequential mistakes or jokes that in fact constitute acts of disrespect. This may partially be attributed to the process of desensitization in working with human remains, and indicates a further need to inculcate into medical students the ethical responsibilities of working with body donors. Donation agreement statements that lack specific information about the respectful treatment of bodies in the anatomy laboratory may serve as an additional point of concern for potential donors seeking reassurance about the future treatment of their bodies. This viewpoint draws from the anecdotal experiences of medical students to portray two scenarios of medical students' disrespectful conduct toward body donors, and constructs an account of moral respect for human remains based on respect for posthumous autonomy and respect in attitude. It then provides suggestions for US medical schools to incorporate this ethical framework into their anatomy curricula to instill respectful dispositions in its students and facilitate a more robust informed consent process for potential donors who entrust their bodies to medical students.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.