The Altruism Requirement as Moral Fiction

It is widely agreed that living kidney donation is permitted but living kidney sales are not. Call this the Received View. One way to support the Received View is to appeal to a particular understanding of the conditions under which living kidney transplantation is permissible. It is often claimed that donors must act altruistically, without the expectation of payment and for the sake of another. Call this the Altruism Requirement. On the conventional interpretation, the Altruism Requirement is a moral fact. It states a legitimate constraint on permissible transplantation and is accepted on the basis of cogent argument. The present paper offers an alternative interpretation. I suggest the Altruism Requirement is a moral fiction-a kind of motivated falsehood. It is false that transplantation requires altruism. But the Requirement serves a purpose. Accepting it allows kidney donation but not kidney sale. It, in short, rationalizes the Received View.

Gift Discourse in Transplant and Its Implications in Anonymous Living Liver Donation

The Gift of Life metaphor is prevalent in pro-donation dialogue, aiming to promote transplant programs and conceptualize the act of organ donation. To obtain a better understanding of living donor perceptions on the term Gift of Life, we analyzed thematic views presented by anonymous living donors (ALLDs). Twenty-six ALLDs completed a semi-structured qualitative interview consisting of questions regarding their motivations, experiences, and perceptions on donation. The following 5 major themes relating to the Gift of Life terminology were elucidated: (1) Complete agreement with the term and its relevance to donation. (2) Their donation did not represent a Gift of Life. (3) The term was too grandiose. (4)A belief that the term has more meaning for the recipient rather than donor. (5 )That the "gift" goes both ways, with the donor also benefiting from the experience.

Organ Vouchers and Barter Markets: Saving Lives, Reducing Suffering, and Trading in Human Organs

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: (1) What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? (2) Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? (3) Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification of human body parts? (4) Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges (e.g., organ exchanges, organ chains, and organ vouchers), would save more lives and further reduce human suffering.

Why public moralities matter--the relevance of socioempirical premises for the ethical debate on organ markets

The ongoing bioethical debate about organ markets rests not only on theoretical premises, but also on assumptions regarding public views of and attitudes toward organ donation that need closer socioempirical examination. Summarizing results from our previous qualitative social research in this field, this paper illustrates the ethical significance of such public moralities in two respects: On one hand, it analyzes the implicit bias of the common rhetoric of "organ scarcity" which motivates much of the commercialization debate. On the other hand, it explores the blind spots of the paradigm of "altruistic donation" which informs many arguments against commercialization. We conclude that the ethical discourse has to appreciate the social nature of organ donation as a reciprocal interaction between different parties with irreducibly different but equally relevant viewpoints. We criticize the neglect of such well-founded public considerations in certain philosophical-ethical approaches and stress the need for further systematic and comparative socioempirical studies about peoples' actual perspectives in bioethics.

Bioethics of organ transplantation

As the ability to transplant organs and tissues has grown, the demand for these procedures has increased as well--to the point at which it far exceeds the available supply creating the core ethical challenge for transplantation--rationing. The gap between supply and demand, although large, is worse than it appears to be. There are two key steps to gaining access to a transplant. First, one must gain access to a transplant center. Then, those waiting need to be selected for a transplant. Many potential recipients do not get admitted to a program. They are deemed too old, not of the right nationality, not appropriate for transplant as a result of severe mental impairment, criminal history, drug abuse, or simply because they do not have access to a competent primary care physician who can refer them to a transplant program. There are also financial obstacles to access to transplant waiting lists in the United States and other nations. In many poor nations, those needing transplants simply die because there is no capacity or a very limited capacity to perform transplants. Although the demand for organs now exceeds the supply, resulting in rationing, the size of waiting lists would quickly expand were there to suddenly be an equally large expansion in the number of organs available for transplantation. Still, even with the reality of unavoidable rationing, saving more lives by increasing organ supply is a moral good. Current public policies for obtaining organs from cadavers are not adequate in that they do not produce the number of organs that public polls of persons in the United States indicate people are willing to donate.

Assessing the likely harms to kidney vendors in regulated organ markets

Advocates of paid living kidney donation frequently argue that kidney sellers would benefit from paid donation under a properly regulated kidney market. The poor outcomes experienced by participants in existing markets are often entirely attributed to harmful black-market practices. This article reviews the medical and anthropological literature on the physical, psychological, social, and financial harms experienced by vendors under Iran's regulated system of donor compensation and black markets throughout the world and argues that this body of research not only documents significant harms to vendors, but also provides reasons to believe that such harms would persist under a regulated system. This does not settle the question of whether or not a regulated market should be introduced, but it does strengthen the case against markets in kidneys while suggesting that those advocating such a system cannot appeal to the purported benefits to vendors to support their case.

A market price for organs?

Has not the time fully come to lift the prohibition on a regulated market in organs for transplantation? Is there a price for such a market that would be too high to pay? The author revisits the cases for and against organ markets in the light of cultural shifts in society and asks whether the traditional insistence on altruism represents a hindrance to much needed developments or a safeguard for much valued public goods.

Addressing the shortage of kidneys for transplantation: purchase and allocation through chain auctions

Transplantation is generally the treatment of choice for those suffering from kidney failure. Not only does transplantation offer improved quality of life and increased longevity relative to dialysis, it also reduces end-stage renal disease program expenditures, providing savings to Medicare. Unfortunately, the waiting list for kidney transplants is long, growing, and unlikely to be substantially reduced by increases in the recovery of cadaveric kidneys. Another approach is to obtain more kidneys through payment to living "donors," or vendors. Such direct commodification, in which a price is placed on kidneys, has generally been opposed by medical ethicists. Much of the ethical debate, however, has been in terms of commodification through market exchange. Recognizing that there are different ethical concerns associated with the purchase of kidneys and their allocation, it is possible to design a variety of institutional arrangements for the commodification of kidneys that pose different sets of ethical concerns. We specify three such alternatives in detail sufficient to allow an assessment of their likely consequences and we compare these alternatives to current policy in terms of the desirable goals of promoting human dignity, equity, efficiency, and fiscal advantage. This policy analysis leads us to recommend that kidneys be purchased at administered prices by a nonprofit organization and allocated to the transplant centers that can organize the longest chains of transplants involving willing-but-incompatible donor-patient dyads.

Autonomy and organ sales, revisited

In this paper I develop and defend my arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of a legal market for human body parts in response to the criticisms that have been leveled at them by Paul M. Hughes and Samuel J. Kerstein.

Why should we compensate organ donors when we can continue to take organs for free? A response to some of my critics

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective-and morally justified-means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where "market-place morality" is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves.