Interoceptive active inference and self-representation in social anxiety disorder (SAD): exploring the neurocognitive traits of the SAD self

When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

Surfing uncertainty with screams: predictive processing, error dynamics and horror films

Despite tremendous efforts in psychology, neuroscience and media and cultural studies, it is still something of a mystery why humans are attracted to fictional content that is horrifying, disgusting or otherwise aversive. While the psychological benefits of horror films, stories, video games, etc. has recently been demonstrated empirically, current theories emphasizing the negative and positive consequences of this engagement often contradict one another. Here, we suggest the predictive processing framework may provide a unifying account of horror content engagement that provides clear and testable hypotheses, and explains why a 'sweet spot' of fear and fun exists in horror entertainment. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

An Integrative Model of Youth Anxiety: Cognitive-Affective Processes and Parenting in Developmental Context

Multiple theoretical frameworks have been proposed to provide a more comprehensive picture of the risk factors that influence anxiety-related developmental trajectories. Nonetheless, there remains a need for an integrative model that outlines: (1) which risk factors may be most pertinent at different points in development, and (2) how parenting may maintain, exacerbate, or attenuate an affective style that is characterized by high negative emotional reactivity to unfamiliar, uncertain, and threatening situations. A developmentally informed, integrative model has the potential to guide treatment development and delivery, which is critical to reducing the public health burden associated with these disorders. This paper outlines a model integrating research on many well-established risk mechanisms for anxiety disorders, focusing on (1) the developmental progression from emotional reactivity constructs early in life to those involving higher-level cognitive processes later in youth, and (2) potential pathways by which parenting may impact the stability of youth's cognitive-affective responses to threat-relevant information across development.

Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

Mixed emotions to social situations: An fMRI investigation

BACKGROUND

Neuroscience research has generally studied emotions each taken in isolation. However, mixed emotional states (e.g., the co-occurrence of amusement and disgust, or sadness and pleasure) are common in everyday life. Psychophysiological and behavioral evidence suggests that mixed emotions may have response profiles that are distinguishable from their constituent emotions. Yet, the brain bases of mixed emotions remain unresolved.

METHODS

We recruited 38 healthy adults who viewed short, validated film clips, eliciting either positive (amusing), negative (disgusting), neutral, or mixed (a mix of amusement and disgust) emotional states, while brain activity was assessed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We assessed mixed emotions in two ways: first by comparing neural reactivity to ambiguous (mixed) with that to unambiguous (positive and negative) film clips and second by conducting parametric analyses to measure neural reactivity with respect to individual emotional states. We thus obtained self-reports of amusement and disgust after each clip and computed a minimum feeling score (shared minimum of amusement and disgust) to quantify mixed emotional feelings.

RESULTS

Both analyses revealed a network of the posterior cingulate (PCC), medial superior parietal lobe (SPL)/precuneus, and parieto-occipital sulcus to be involved in ambiguous contexts eliciting mixed emotions.

CONCLUSION

Our results are the first to shed light on the dedicated neural processes involved in dynamic social ambiguity processing. They suggest both higher-order (SPL) and lower-order (PCC) processes may be needed to process emotionally complex social scenes.

Learned uncertainty: The free energy principle in anxiety

Generalized anxiety disorder is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders and often manifests as persistent and difficult to control apprehension. Despite its prevalence, there is no integrative, formal model of how anxiety and anxiety disorders arise. Here, we offer a perspective derived from the free energy principle; one that shares similarities with established constructs such as learned helplessness. Our account is simple: anxiety can be formalized as learned uncertainty. A biological system, having had persistent uncertainty in its past, will expect uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether uncertainty truly persists. Despite our account’s intuitive simplicity—which can be illustrated with the mere flip of a coin—it is grounded within the free energy principle and hence situates the formation of anxiety within a broader explanatory framework of biological self-organization and self-evidencing. We conclude that, through conceptualizing anxiety within a framework of working generative models, our perspective might afford novel approaches in the clinical treatment of anxiety and its key symptoms.