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Montupil J, Cardone P, Staquet C, Bonhomme A, Defresne A, Martial C, Alnagger NL, Gosseries O, Bonhomme V. The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia. BJA OPEN 2023; 8:100224. [PMID: 37780201 PMCID: PMC10539891 DOI: 10.1016/j.bjao.2023.100224] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/22/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 10/03/2023]
Abstract
Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Javier Montupil
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, Liege, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liege, Belgium
- University Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Citadelle Regional Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Paolo Cardone
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness Thematic Unit, GIGA-Research, Liege University, Liege, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, Liege University Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Cécile Staquet
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, Liege, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liege, Belgium
| | - Arthur Bonhomme
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness Thematic Unit, GIGA-Research, Liege University, Liege, Belgium
| | - Aline Defresne
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, Liege, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liege, Belgium
- University Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Citadelle Regional Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Charlotte Martial
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness Thematic Unit, GIGA-Research, Liege University, Liege, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, Liege University Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Naji L.N. Alnagger
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness Thematic Unit, GIGA-Research, Liege University, Liege, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, Liege University Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Olivia Gosseries
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness Thematic Unit, GIGA-Research, Liege University, Liege, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, Liege University Hospital, Liege, Belgium
| | - Vincent Bonhomme
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, Liege, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liege, Belgium
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Albantakis L, Barbosa L, Findlay G, Grasso M, Haun AM, Marshall W, Mayner WGP, Zaeemzadeh A, Boly M, Juel BE, Sasai S, Fujii K, David I, Hendren J, Lang JP, Tononi G. Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011465. [PMID: 37847724 PMCID: PMC10581496 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 31.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2023] [Accepted: 08/26/2023] [Indexed: 10/19/2023] Open
Abstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Larissa Albantakis
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Leonardo Barbosa
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Fralin Biomedical Research Institute at VTC, Virginia Tech, Roanoke, Virginia, United States of America
| | - Graham Findlay
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Neuroscience Training Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Andrew M. Haun
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - William Marshall
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
| | - William G. P. Mayner
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Neuroscience Training Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Alireza Zaeemzadeh
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Bjørn E. Juel
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Institute of Basic Medical Sciences, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Shuntaro Sasai
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Araya Inc., Tokyo, Japan
| | - Keiko Fujii
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Isaac David
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Jeremiah Hendren
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Graduate School Language & Literature, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
| | - Jonathan P. Lang
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Giulio Tononi
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
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Hanson JR, Walker SI. On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad014. [PMID: 37560334 PMCID: PMC10408361 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/14/2022] [Revised: 04/28/2023] [Accepted: 05/25/2023] [Indexed: 08/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory. Here, we show that despite its widespread application, Φ is not a well-defined mathematical concept in the sense that the value it specifies is non-unique. To demonstrate this, we introduce an algorithm that calculates all possible Φ values for a given system in strict accordance with the mathematical definition from the theory. We show that, to date, all published Φ values under consideration are selected arbitrarily from a multitude of equally valid alternatives. Crucially, both [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are often predicted simultaneously, rendering any interpretation of these systems as conscious or not, non-decidable in the current formulation of IIT.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jake R Hanson
- School of Earth and Space Exploration, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
- Beyond Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
- Association for Mathematical Consciousness Science, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich, BY, Germany
| | - Sara I Walker
- School of Earth and Space Exploration, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
- Beyond Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
- ASU-SFI Center for Biosocial Complex systems, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
- Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA
- Association for Mathematical Consciousness Science, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich, BY, Germany
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Lehmann M, Neumann C, Wasserthal S, Delis A, Schultz J, Hurlemann R, Ettinger U. Ketamine increases fronto-posterior functional connectivity during meta-perceptual confidence ratings. Behav Brain Res 2022; 430:113925. [DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113925] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2021] [Revised: 04/12/2022] [Accepted: 05/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Herzog MH, Schurger A, Doerig A. First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument. Conscious Cogn 2022; 98:103261. [PMID: 35032833 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/03/2021] [Revised: 10/29/2021] [Accepted: 12/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we argue that pure first-person experience cannot be a scientific foundation for IIT because science relies on taking measurements, and pure first-person experience is not measurable except through reports, brain activity, and the relationship between them. We also argue that pure first-person experience cannot be taken as ground truth because science is about backing up theories with data, not about asserting that we have ground truth independent of data. Lastly, we explain why no experiment based on third-person data can test IIT as a theory of consciousness. IIT may be a good theory of something, but not of consciousness. We conclude by exposing a deeper reason for the above conclusions: IIT's consciousness is by construction fully dissociated from any measurable thing and, for this reason, IIT implies that both the level and content of consciousness are epiphenomenal, with no causal power. IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, in which we cannot even trust reports about first-person experiences. But reports about first-person experiences are taken as ground truth and the foundation for IIT's axioms. Therefore, accepting IIT leads to rejecting its own axioms. We also respond to several other criticisms against the UA.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael H Herzog
- Laboratory of Psychophysics, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale De Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Aaron Schurger
- Department of Psychology, Crean College of Health and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Irvine, CA, USA; INSERM, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif sur Yvette 91191, France; Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Direction des Sciences du Vivant, I2BM, NeuroSpin, center, Gif sur Yvette 91191, France
| | - Adrien Doerig
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition & Behaviour, Nijmegen, Netherlands
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