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Parvizi-Wayne D, Severs L. When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2024; 24:660-680. [PMID: 38777988 PMCID: PMC11233343 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-024-01189-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/15/2024] [Indexed: 05/25/2024]
Abstract
Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.
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Affiliation(s)
- D Parvizi-Wayne
- Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, London, UK.
| | - L Severs
- Centre for the Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
- Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institute of Philosophy II, Bochum, Germany
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Parvizi-Wayne D, Sandved-Smith L, Pitliya RJ, Limanowski J, Tufft MRA, Friston KJ. Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1354719. [PMID: 38887627 PMCID: PMC11182004 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2023] [Accepted: 04/26/2024] [Indexed: 06/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Darius Parvizi-Wayne
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Lars Sandved-Smith
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
| | - Riddhi J. Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Jakub Limanowski
- Institute of Psychology, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | - Miles R. A. Tufft
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Albarracin M, Bouchard-Joly G, Sheikhbahaee Z, Miller M, Pitliya RJ, Poirier P. Feeling our place in the world: an active inference account of self-esteem. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae007. [PMID: 38562605 PMCID: PMC10984624 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2023] [Revised: 12/21/2023] [Accepted: 02/20/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Self-esteem, the evaluation of one's own worth or value, is a critical aspect of psychological well-being and mental health. In this paper, we propose an active inference account of self-esteem, casting it as a sociometer or an inferential capacity to interpret one's standing within a social group. This approach allows us to explore the interaction between an individual's self-perception and the expectations of their social environment.When there is a mismatch between these perceptions and expectations, the individual needs to adjust their actions or update their self-perception to better align with their current experiences. We also consider this hypothesis in relation with recent research on affective inference, suggesting that self-esteem enables the individual to track and respond to this discrepancy through affective states such as anxiety or positive affect. By acting as an inferential sociometer, self-esteem allows individuals to navigate and adapt to their social environment, ultimately impacting their psychological well-being and mental health.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mahault Albarracin
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Gabriel Bouchard-Joly
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Zahra Sheikhbahaee
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, University of Montreal, 5757, Av. Decelles bureau 500, Montreal, QC H3S 2C3, Canada
| | - Mark Miller
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melboume, Australia
- Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
| | - Riddhi J Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology Oxford University, Oxford OX1 2JD, United Kingdom
| | - Pierre Poirier
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
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Buchborn T, Kettner HS, Kärtner L, Meinhardt MW. The ego in psychedelic drug action - ego defenses, ego boundaries, and the therapeutic role of regression. Front Neurosci 2023; 17:1232459. [PMID: 37869510 PMCID: PMC10587586 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1232459] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2023] [Accepted: 08/18/2023] [Indexed: 10/24/2023] Open
Abstract
The ego is one of the most central psychological constructs in psychedelic research and a key factor in psychotherapy, including psychedelic-assisted forms of psychotherapy. Despite its centrality, the ego-construct remains ambiguous in the psychedelic literature. Therefore, we here review the theoretical background of the ego-construct with focus on its psychodynamic conceptualization. We discuss major functions of the ego including ego boundaries, defenses, and synthesis, and evaluate the role of the ego in psychedelic drug action. According to the psycholytic paradigm, psychedelics are capable of inducing regressed states of the ego that are less protected by the ego's usual defensive apparatus. In such states, core early life conflicts may emerge that have led to maladaptive ego patterns. We use the psychodynamic term character in this paper as a potential site of change and rearrangement; character being the chronic and habitual patterns the ego utilizes to adapt to the everyday challenges of life, including a preferred set of defenses. We argue that in order for psychedelic-assisted therapy to successfully induce lasting changes to the ego's habitual patterns, it must psycholytically permeate the characterological core of the habits. The primary working principle of psycholytic therapy therefore is not the state of transient ego regression alone, but rather the regressively favored emotional integration of those early life events that have shaped the foundation, development, and/or rigidification of a person's character - including his or her defense apparatus. Aiming for increased flexibility of habitual ego patterns, the psycholytic approach is generally compatible with other forms of psychedelic-assisted therapy, such as third wave cognitive behavioral approaches.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tobias Buchborn
- Institute of Psychopharmacology, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Hannes S. Kettner
- Centre for Psychedelic Research, Department of Medicine, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
- Psychedelics Division, Neuroscape, Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Laura Kärtner
- Centre for Psychedelic Research, Department of Medicine, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Molecular Neuroimaging, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Marcus W. Meinhardt
- Institute of Psychopharmacology, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
- Department of Molecular Neuroimaging, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
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Kersten L. A Model Solution: On the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and Embodied Cognition. Minds Mach (Dordr) 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s11023-022-09617-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
AbstractPredictive processing (PP) and embodied cognition (EC) have emerged as two influential approaches within cognitive science in recent years. Not only have PP and EC been heralded as “revolutions” and “paradigm shifts” but they have motivated a number of new and interesting areas of research. This has prompted some to wonder how compatible the two views might be. This paper looks to weigh in on the issue of PP-EC compatibility. After outlining two recent proposals, I argue that further clarity can be achieved on the issue by considering a model of scientific progress. Specifically, I suggest that Larry Laudan’s “problem solving model” can provide important insights into a number of outstanding challenges that face existing accounts of PP-EC compatibility. I conclude by outlining additional implications of the problem solving model for PP and EC more generally.
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Deane G. Machines That Feel and Think: The Role of Affective Feelings and Mental Action in (Artificial) General Intelligence. ARTIFICIAL LIFE 2022; 28:289-309. [PMID: 35881678 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00368] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
What role do affective feelings (feelings/emotions/moods) play in adaptive behaviour? What are the implications of this for understanding and developing artificial general intelligence? Leading theoretical models of brain function are beginning to shed light on these questions. While artificial agents have excelled within narrowly circumscribed and specialised domains, domain-general intelligence has remained an elusive goal in artificial intelligence research. By contrast, humans and nonhuman animals are characterised by a capacity for flexible behaviour and general intelligence. In this article I argue that computational models of mental phenomena in predictive processing theories of the brain are starting to reveal the mechanisms underpinning domain-general intelligence in biological agents, and can inform the understanding and development of artificial general intelligence. I focus particularly on approaches to computational phenomenology in the active inference framework. Specifically, I argue that computational mechanisms of affective feelings in active inference-affective self-modelling-are revealing of how biological agents are able to achieve flexible behavioural repertoires and general intelligence. I argue that (i) affective self-modelling functions to "tune" organisms to the most tractable goals in the environmental context; and (ii) affective and agentic self-modelling is central to the capacity to perform mental actions in goal-directed imagination and creative cognition. I use this account as a basis to argue that general intelligence of the level and kind found in biological agents will likely require machines to be implemented with analogues of affective self-modelling.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Deane
- University of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences.
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