1
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Chis-Ciure R, Melloni L, Northoff G. A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 161:105670. [PMID: 38615851 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2024] [Revised: 03/15/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024]
Abstract
Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert Chis-Ciure
- New York University (NYU), New York, USA; International Center for Neuroscience and Ethics (CINET), Tatiana Foundation, Madrid, Spain; Wolfram Physics Project, USA.
| | - Lucia Melloni
- Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Georg Northoff
- University of Ottawa, Institute of Mental Health Research at the Royal Ottawa Hospital, Ottawa, Canada
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2
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Storm JF, Klink PC, Aru J, Senn W, Goebel R, Pigorini A, Avanzini P, Vanduffel W, Roelfsema PR, Massimini M, Larkum ME, Pennartz CMA. An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1531-1552. [PMID: 38447578 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/05/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johan F Storm
- The Brain Signaling Group, Division of Physiology, IMB, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Domus Medica, Sognsvannsveien 9, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
| | - P Christiaan Klink
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Experimental Psychology, Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, 3584 CS Utrecht, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France
| | - Jaan Aru
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
| | - Walter Senn
- Department of Physiology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Rainer Goebel
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Oxfordlaan 55, 6229 EV Maastricht, The Netherlands
| | - Andrea Pigorini
- Department of Biomedical, Surgical and Dental Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20122, Italy
| | - Pietro Avanzini
- Istituto di Neuroscienze, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 43125 Parma, Italy
| | - Wim Vanduffel
- Department of Neurosciences, Laboratory of Neuro and Psychophysiology, KU Leuven Medical School, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA; Department of Radiology, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02144, USA
| | - Pieter R Roelfsema
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France; Department of Integrative Neurophysiology, VU University, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Neurosurgery, Academisch Medisch Centrum, Postbus 22660, 1100 DD Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Marcello Massimini
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences "L. Sacco", Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20157, Italy; Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi, Milan 20122, Italy; Azrieli Program in Brain, Mind and Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Matthew E Larkum
- Institute of Biology, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Neurocure Center for Excellence, Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Center for Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Sciencepark 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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3
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Negro N. (Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae012. [PMID: 38495333 PMCID: PMC10944285 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Revised: 02/02/2024] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/19/2024] Open
Abstract
The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos' philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the 'distinction between prediction and accommodation'; (ii) the model should represent the 'structural relevance' of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the 'boldness' of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Niccolò Negro
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo 69978, Israel
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4
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Cecconi B, Montupil J, Mortaheb S, Panda R, Sanders RD, Phillips C, Alnagger N, Remacle E, Defresne A, Boly M, Bahri MA, Lamalle L, Laureys S, Gosseries O, Bonhomme V, Annen J. Study protocol: Cerebral characterization of sensory gating in disconnected dreaming states during propofol anesthesia using fMRI. Front Neurosci 2024; 18:1306344. [PMID: 38419667 PMCID: PMC10900985 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2024.1306344] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Accepted: 01/29/2024] [Indexed: 03/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Background Disconnected consciousness describes a state in which subjective experience (i.e., consciousness) becomes isolated from the external world. It appears frequently during sleep or sedation, when subjective experiences remain vivid but are unaffected by external stimuli. Traditional methods of differentiating connected and disconnected consciousness, such as relying on behavioral responsiveness or on post-anesthesia reports, have demonstrated limited accuracy: unresponsiveness has been shown to not necessarily equate to unconsciousness and amnesic effects of anesthesia and sleep can impair explicit recollection of events occurred during sleep/sedation. Due to these methodological challenges, our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying sensory disconnection remains limited. Methods To overcome these methodological challenges, we employ a distinctive strategy by combining a serial awakening paradigm with auditory stimulation during mild propofol sedation. While under sedation, participants are systematically exposed to auditory stimuli and questioned about their subjective experience (to assess consciousness) and their awareness of the sounds (to evaluate connectedness/disconnectedness from the environment). The data collected through interviews are used to categorize participants into connected and disconnected consciousness states. This method circumvents the requirement for responsiveness in assessing consciousness and mitigates amnesic effects of anesthesia as participants are questioned while still under sedation. Functional MRI data are concurrently collected to investigate cerebral activity patterns during connected and disconnected states, to elucidate sensory disconnection neural gating mechanisms. We examine whether this gating mechanism resides at the thalamic level or results from disruptions in information propagation to higher cortices. Furthermore, we explore the potential role of slow-wave activity (SWA) in inducing disconnected consciousness by quantifying high-frequency BOLD oscillations, a known correlate of slow-wave activity. Discussion This study represents a notable advancement in the investigation of sensory disconnection. The serial awakening paradigm effectively mitigates amnesic effects by collecting reports immediately after regaining responsiveness, while still under sedation. Ultimately, this research holds the potential to understand how sensory gating is achieved at the neural level. These biomarkers might be relevant for the development of sensitive anesthesia monitoring to avoid intraoperative connected consciousness and for the assessment of patients suffering from pathologically reduced consciousness. Clinical trial registration European Union Drug Regulating Authorities Clinical Trials Database (EudraCT), identifier 2020-003524-17.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benedetta Cecconi
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Javier Montupil
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- University Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Régional de la Citadelle (CHR Citadelle), Liège, Belgium
| | - Sepehr Mortaheb
- Physiology of Cognition Research Lab, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liege, Belgium
| | - Rajanikant Panda
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Robert D. Sanders
- Central Clinical School, Sydney Medical School & NHMRC Clinical Trials Centre, University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia
- Department of Anaesthetics & Institute of Academic Surgery, Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Camperdown, NSW, Australia
| | - Christophe Phillips
- GIGA-CRC—In vivo Imaging—Neuroimaging, Data Acquisition and Processing, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Naji Alnagger
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Emma Remacle
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Aline Defresne
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- University Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Régional de la Citadelle (CHR Citadelle), Liège, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liège University Hospital, Liège, Belgium
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Psychiatry, Wisconsin Institute for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, United States
| | - Mohamed Ali Bahri
- GIGA-CRC—In vivo Imaging—Aging & Memory, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Laurent Lamalle
- GIGA-CRC—In vivo Imaging—Aging & Memory, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Steven Laureys
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Cervo Brain Research Centre, University Institute in Mental Health of Quebec, Québec, QC, Canada
- Consciousness Science Institute, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Olivia Gosseries
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Vincent Bonhomme
- Anesthesia and Perioperative Neuroscience Laboratory, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine, Liège University Hospital, Liège, Belgium
| | - Jitka Annen
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, GIGA Institute, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Department of Data Analysis, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium
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5
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Gomez-Marin A. The Consciousness of Neuroscience. eNeuro 2023; 10:ENEURO.0434-23.2023. [PMID: 37963655 PMCID: PMC10646881 DOI: 10.1523/eneuro.0434-23.2023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2023] [Accepted: 10/25/2023] [Indexed: 11/16/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Alex Gomez-Marin
- Instituto de Neurociencias de Alicante, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 03550 San Juan de Alicante, Spain
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6
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Owen M, Huang Z, Duclos C, Lavazza A, Grasso M, Hudetz AG. Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023:1-21. [PMID: 37850471 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000543] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2023]
Abstract
Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew Owen
- Philosophy Department, Yakima Valley College, Yakima, WA, USA
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Zirui Huang
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Catherine Duclos
- Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Department of Neuroscience, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Centre for Advanced Research in Sleep Medicine, Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux (CIUSSS) du Nord-de-l'île-de-Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholars Program, Toronto, ON, Canada
| | - Andrea Lavazza
- Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy
- University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Center for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
| | - Anthony G Hudetz
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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7
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Cea I, Negro N, Signorelli CM. The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0's Realist Idealism. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:1453. [PMID: 37895574 PMCID: PMC10606349 DOI: 10.3390/e25101453] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2023] [Revised: 09/29/2023] [Accepted: 10/05/2023] [Indexed: 10/29/2023]
Abstract
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory's most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just "operational". However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT's idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT's realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one's own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ignacio Cea
- Center for Research, Innovation and Creation, Temuco Catholic University, Temuco 4813302, Chile
- Faculty of Religious Sciences and Philosophy, Temuco Catholic University, Temuco 4813302, Chile
| | - Niccolo Negro
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel;
| | - Camilo Miguel Signorelli
- FNRS, GIGA Institute, University of Liege, Rue d’Egmont 5, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium;
- Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK
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8
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Albantakis L, Barbosa L, Findlay G, Grasso M, Haun AM, Marshall W, Mayner WGP, Zaeemzadeh A, Boly M, Juel BE, Sasai S, Fujii K, David I, Hendren J, Lang JP, Tononi G. Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011465. [PMID: 37847724 PMCID: PMC10581496 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2023] [Accepted: 08/26/2023] [Indexed: 10/19/2023] Open
Abstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Larissa Albantakis
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Leonardo Barbosa
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Fralin Biomedical Research Institute at VTC, Virginia Tech, Roanoke, Virginia, United States of America
| | - Graham Findlay
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Neuroscience Training Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Andrew M. Haun
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - William Marshall
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
| | - William G. P. Mayner
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Neuroscience Training Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Alireza Zaeemzadeh
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Bjørn E. Juel
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Institute of Basic Medical Sciences, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Shuntaro Sasai
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Araya Inc., Tokyo, Japan
| | - Keiko Fujii
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Isaac David
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Jeremiah Hendren
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
- Graduate School Language & Literature, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
| | - Jonathan P. Lang
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
| | - Giulio Tononi
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
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9
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Ruan Z. The necessary and sufficient mechanism of consciousness in a layered mind. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1280959. [PMID: 37842721 PMCID: PMC10568493 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1280959] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Accepted: 09/14/2023] [Indexed: 10/17/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Zenan Ruan
- Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- Department of Automation, School of Mechanical Engineering and Automation, Zhejiang SCI-TECH University, Hangzhou, China
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10
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McQueen KJ, Tsuchiya N. When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad013. [PMID: 37275559 PMCID: PMC10237036 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2022] [Revised: 04/02/2023] [Accepted: 05/23/2023] [Indexed: 06/07/2023] Open
Abstract
Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kelvin J McQueen
- Philosophy Department, Chapman University, California, United States
| | - Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- *Correspondence address. Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health & School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing, and Health Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. E-mail:
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11
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Ruan Z. The fundamental challenge of a future theory of consciousness. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1029105. [PMID: 36710768 PMCID: PMC9878380 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1029105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2022] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Zenan Ruan
- Zhejiang University—University of Luxembourg Joint Laboratory on AIs, Robotics and Reasoning (ZLAIRE), School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
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12
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Sevenius Nilsen A, Juel BE, Thürer B, Aamodt A, Storm JF. Are we really unconscious in "unconscious" states? Common assumptions revisited. Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:987051. [PMID: 36277049 PMCID: PMC9581328 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.987051] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/05/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
In the field of consciousness science, there is a tradition to categorize certain states such as slow-wave non-REM sleep and deep general anesthesia as "unconscious". While this categorization seems reasonable at first glance, careful investigations have revealed that it is not so simple. Given that (1) behavioral signs of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, (2) subjective reports of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, and, (3) states presumed to be unconscious are not always devoid of reported experience, there are reasons to reexamine our traditional assumptions about "states of unconsciousness". While these issues are not novel, and may be partly semantic, they have implications both for scientific progress and clinical practice. We suggest that focusing on approaches that provide a more pragmatic and nuanced characterization of different experimental conditions may promote clarity in the field going forward, and help us build stronger foundations for future studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andre Sevenius Nilsen
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Bjørn E. Juel
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
- School of Medicine and Public Health, Wisconsin Institute for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States
| | - Benjamin Thürer
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Arnfinn Aamodt
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Johan F. Storm
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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13
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Koculak M, Wierzchoń M. How much consciousness is there in complexity? Front Psychol 2022; 13:983315. [PMID: 36204731 PMCID: PMC9530911 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.983315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2022] [Accepted: 08/29/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The notion of complexity currently receives significant attention in neuroscience, mainly through the popularity of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). It has proven successful in research centred on discriminating states of consciousness, while little theoretical and experimental effort was directed toward studying the content. In this paper, we argue that exploring the relationship between complexity and conscious content is necessary to understand the importance of information-theoretic measures for consciousness research properly. We outline how content could be experimentally operationalised and how rudimental testable hypotheses can be formulated without requiring IIT formalisms. This approach would not only allow for a better understanding of aspects of consciousness captured by complexity but could also facilitate comparison efforts for theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marcin Koculak
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
- Centre for Brain Research, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
- Centre for Brain Research, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
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14
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Ellia F, Chis-Ciure R. Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory. Conscious Cogn 2022; 100:103281. [PMID: 35325632 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2021] [Revised: 01/14/2022] [Accepted: 01/15/2022] [Indexed: 02/03/2023]
Abstract
In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Ellia
- School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States.
| | - Robert Chis-Ciure
- School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States; Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania
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15
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Abstract
The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory (IIT) and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. Finally, it highlights that IIT's account of experience - a cause-effect structure quantified by integrated information - has nothing to do with "information transfer."
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16
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Skokowski P. Sensing Qualia. Front Syst Neurosci 2022; 16:795405. [PMID: 35359622 PMCID: PMC8962373 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2021] [Accepted: 02/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind-Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory-will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul Skokowski
- St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Symbolic Systems, Center for the Explanation of Consciousness, Stanford, CA, United States
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17
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Hight D, Sleigh J. Consciousness and the outside world: is there anyone listening? Br J Anaesth 2022; 128:895-897. [DOI: 10.1016/j.bja.2022.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2022] [Revised: 01/27/2022] [Accepted: 02/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
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