Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

The self and conscious experience

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

The osteopath-parent-child triad in osteopathic care in the first 2 years of life: a qualitative study

Background

Enactivism and active inference are two important concepts in the field of osteopathy. While enactivism emphasizes the role of the body and the environment in shaping our experiences and understanding of the world, active inference emphasizes the role of action and perception in shaping our experiences and understanding of the world. Together, these frameworks provide a unique perspective on the practice of osteopathy, and how it can be used to facilitate positive change in patients. Since the neonatal period is a crucial time for development, osteopaths should aim to create a therapeutic relationship. Arguably, through participatory sense-making, osteopaths can help the baby build a generative model (with positive priors) to deal with stress and needs throughout their life.

Aim

Since the literature considers that interactions with the environment, which enact the patients' experiences, depending on contextual factors and communication between patient and caregiver, this research explored whether there is a correspondence between the indications in the literature and clinical practice in the management of the mother/parent-child dyad during osteopathic care on children aged 0 to 2 years old.

Methods

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of nine osteopaths with experience in the field of pediatrics. Interviews were transcribed verbatim, and constructivist grounded theory was used to conceptualize, collect and analyze data. Codes and categories were actively constructed through an interpretive/constructionist paradigm.

Results

The core category was the idea of the pediatric osteopath as a support for the family, not only for the child. Four additional categories were identified: (1) Preparing a safe environment for both children and parents, (2) Communication, (3) Attachment and synchrony, and (4) Synchronization.

Conclusion

Through participatory sense-making, osteopaths manage contextual factors to establish an effective therapeutic alliance through the osteopath-parent-child triad to facilitate the construction of the child's internal generative model to promote healthy development. The therapeutic encounter is considered an encounter between embodied subjects, occurring within a field of affordances (ecological niche) that allows the interlocutors to actively participate in creating new meanings through interpersonal synchronization. Participatory sense-making and the establishment of a therapeutic alliance through the osteopath-parent-child triad are crucial to promote healthy development in the child.

Posture, gait and self‐disorders: An empirical study in individuals with schizophrenia

AIM

In schizophrenia, subjectively perceived disruptions of the sense of the Self (also referred to as "self-disorders") seem to be intimately associated with a perturbation of the implicit awareness of one's own body. Indeed, an early impairment of the motor system, including posture and gait, is now considered a marker of schizophrenia neurodevelopmental substrate and appears more pronounced in early-onset schizophrenia. Therefore, the present study was aimed at: (1) investigating a possible relationship between self-disorders, symptom dimensions and postural and gait profile in schizophrenia; (2) identifying a specific motor profile in early-onset conditions.

METHODS

A total of 43 schizophrenia outpatients and 38 healthy controls underwent an exhaustive investigation of posture and gait pattern. The positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS), the examination of anomalous self experience scale (EASE) and the abnormal involuntary movement scale (AIMS) were administered to the schizophrenia group. Subsequently, schizophrenia patients were divided into early and adult-onset subgroups and compared with respect to their motor profile.

RESULTS

We found an association between specific postural patterns (impaired sway area), a general disruption of the gait cycle and subjective bodily experiences (concerning the loss of bodily integrity, cohesion and demarcation). Only motor parameters (increased sway area and gait cadence reduction) differentiated between early and adult-onset patients.

CONCLUSION

The results of the present study hint at a link between motor impairment and self-disturbances in schizophrenia and candidate a specific motor profile as a possible marker of early-onset forms.