Mortality among active-duty male French Armed Forces, 2006-10

Suicide rates in the UK Armed Forces, compared with the general workforce and merchant shipping during peacetime years since 1900

INTRODUCTION

The main objective was to compare suicide rates and their trends across the three UK Armed forces (Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force) from 1900 to 2020. Further objectives were to compare suicide rates with those in the corresponding general population and in UK merchant shipping and to discuss preventative measures.

METHODS

Examination of annual mortality reports and returns, death inquiry files and official statistics. The main outcome measure was the suicide rate per 100 000 population employed.

RESULTS

Since 1990, there have been significant reductions in suicide rates in each of the Armed Forces, although a non-significant increase in the Army since 2010. Compared with the corresponding general population, during the most recent decade from 2010 up to 2020, suicide rates were 73% lower in the Royal Air Force, 56% lower in the Royal Navy and 43% lower in the Army. Suicide rates have been significantly decreased in the Royal Air Force since the 1950s, in the Royal Navy since the 1970s and in the Army since the 1980s (comparisons for the Royal Navy and the Army were not available from the late 1940s to the 1960s).During the earliest decades from 1900 to the 1930s, suicide rates in the Armed Forces were mostly quite similar or moderately increased compared with the general population, but far lower than in merchant shipping. Following legislative changes in the last 30 years, suicide rates through poisoning by gases and through firearms or explosives have fallen sharply.

CONCLUSIONS

The study shows that suicide rates in the Armed Forces have been lower than in the general population over many decades. The sharp reductions in suicide rates over the last 30 years suggest the effectiveness of recent preventative measures, including reductions in access to a method of suicide and well-being initiatives.

Erosion of the healthy soldier effect in veterans of US military service in Iraq and Afghanistan

Background

This research explores the healthy soldier effect (HSE) – a lower mortality risk among veterans relative to the general population—in United States (US) veterans deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (OEF/OIF/OND). While a HSE has been affirmed in other OEF/OIF/OND populations, US veterans of OEF/OIF/OND have not been systematically studied.

Methods

Using US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administrative data, we identified veterans who (1) had been deployed in support of OEF/OIF/OND between 2002 and 2011 and (2) were enrolled in the VA health care system. We divided the VA population into VA health care utilizers and non-utilizers. We obtained Department of Defense (DOD) administrative data on the OEF/OIF/OND population and obtained VA and DOD mortality data excluding combat deaths from the analyses. Indirect standardization was used to compare VA and DOD cohorts to the US population using total population at risk to compute the Standardized Mortality Ratio (SMR). A directly standardized relative risk (DSRR) was calculated to enable comparisons between cohorts. To compare VA enrollee mortality on military specific characteristics, we used a DOD population standard.

Results

The overall VA SMR of 2.8 (95% Confidence Interval [CI] 2.8-2.9), VA utilizer SMR of 3.2 (95% CI 3.1-3.3), VA non-utilizer SMR of 0.9 (95% CI 0.8-1.1), and DOD SMR of 1.5 (95% CI 1.4-1.5) provide no evidence of a HSE in any cohort relative to the US standard population. Relative to DOD, both the total VA population SMR of 2.1 (95% CI 2.0-2.2) and the SMR for VA utilizers of 2.3 (95% CI 2.3-2.4) indicate mortality twice what would be expected given DOD mortality rates. In contrast, the VA enrollees who had not used clinical services had 40% lower than expected mortality relative to DOD.

Conclusions

No support was found for the HSE among US veterans of OEF/OIF/OND. These findings may be attributable to a number of factors including post-deployment risk-taking behavior, an abbreviated follow up period, and the nature of the OEF/OIF/OND conflict.