A neuroimaging investigation of attribute framing and individual differences

Subjective cognitive functioning, depressive symptoms, and objective cognitive functioning in people with treatment-resistant psychosis

Introduction: Relationships between subjective cognitive functioning (SCF), objective cognitive functioning (OCF), and depressive symptoms are poorly understood in treatment-resistant psychosis (TRP). This study (a) compares SCF in TRP using positively and negatively worded scales, (b) assess these scales' accuracy, and (c) explores the association between these scales and depressive symptoms. We hypothesised that both SCF scales would be highly correlated, minimally associated with OCF, and similarly associated with depressive symptoms. Methods: Archival clinical data from 52 TRP inpatients was utilised. OCF composite scores were derived from a broad neuropsychological battery. SCF was assessed using the norm-referenced PROMIS 2.0 Cognitive Abilities (positively worded) and Concerns (negatively worded) subscales. A depressive symptom score was derived from the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Results: SCF ratings were higher in patients than OCF. There was a small but significant correlation between PROMIS subscales (r = .30). Neither PROMIS subscale was associated with OCF (r = -.11, r = .01). Depressive symptoms were correlated with the positively (r = -.29) but not negatively worded scale (r = -.13). Conclusion: Individuals with TRP inaccurately rate their cognitive functioning and tend to overestimate their ability. Positively and negatively worded SCF scales associate variably with depressive symptoms, indicating they may not be used interchangeably in TRP.

Reliability of moral decision-making: Evidence from the trolley dilemma

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgement has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people's moral judgements and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, this study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgements while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In this study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1,040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

Message framing and self-conscious emotions help to understand pro-environment consumer purchase intention: an ERP study

Message framing plays an important role in advertising strategies and has been studied from various perspectives in different behavioral researches. In this study Event Rated Potentials technique helped to examine the neural mechanism of message framing effect on self-conscious emotions of pride and guilt regarding consumer purchase intention in the context of green marketing. Behavioral results showed that participants ranked higher on positive framing compared to negative framing. ERP results declared that N1 component was elicited by positive framed message with emotion of pride and guilt, reflecting use of attentional resources to acquire potential benefits at first stage of processing emotional information. At the second stage P2 was higher for negative framing containing pride and guilt slogan, showing more attention towards processing emotional information about potential loss. At the third stage LPP component portray that both positive and negative framing is supported by guilt emotion when processing emotional information in decision making. Our results delivered strong evidence that how purchase intention can be mediated by message framing under the pride and guilt emotions in the context of green marketing.

Attentional and emotional brain response to message framing in context of green marketing

Background

Message framing plays an important role in advertising strategies and has been studied from various perspectives in different behavioral studies.

New method

This study employs the event-related potential technique to examine attentional and emotional brain processing as influenced by message framing in the context of green marketing.

Results

The behavioral results demonstrated that purchase preference was higher under positive framing compared to negative and neutral framing.

As per the event-related potential results, negative framing elicited a larger P1 component, which reveals that in the first stage of processing information, threatening information attracted more attention. In the second and third stage, N170 and P3, respectively, were higher for positive framing, demonstrating that there was more attention toward the processing of non-threatening emotional information.

Comparison with existing method: Message Framing has been previously examined with behavioral methods. We for the first time examined it with a neuroscientific method like Event Related Brain Potential technique in a green marketing context.

Conclusion

Our results compared to behavioral studies provide stronger evidence from underlying neural perspective for how message framing can be affected by attentional and emotional brain responses in the context of green marketing.

Computations and Connectivity Underlying Aversive Counterfactuals

Background: Mentally simulating counterfactuals (scenarios that have not actually occurred) is a sophisticated human cognitive function underlying creativity, planning, and daydreaming. One example is the "would you rather" game, in which forced choices are made between outlandish negative counterfactuals. Materials and Methods: We measured behavioral and neural correlates while participants made "would you rather" choices framed as approaching or avoiding aversive counterfactual scenarios (e.g., illnesses, car accidents). Results: We found in two independent cohorts that participants were highly susceptible to framing effects when making these decisions, taking significantly longer to respond to approach frames compared with avoidance. Brain imaging showed that choices to approach and avoid resulted in a pattern of activation consistent with a network associated with responding to aversive stimuli, identified via a coordinate-based meta-analysis of 238 studies. Bayesian graph connectivity analysis showed that network connectivity differed by choice frame, with significantly stronger connectivity for approach choices compared with avoidance choices among primarily limbic nodes (putamen, insula, caudate, and amygdala). Computational modeling of behavior revealed that approach frames led to significantly longer nondecision times, increased evidence required to make decisions, and faster evidence accumulation than avoidance frames. Stronger network connectivity between corticostriatal and limbic regions was associated with rate of evidence accumulation and length of nondecision time during approach choices. For avoidance choices, prefrontal connectivity was related to nondecision time. Conclusions: These results suggest that "would you rather" decisions about aversive counterfactuals differentially recruit limbic circuit connectivity based on choice frame. Impact statement We measured brain connectivity and latent cognitive variables underlying aversive counterfactual choices. We found a replicable reaction time effect whereby approach decisions were slower than avoidance decisions. Computational modeling identified that the latent cognitive variable of evidence accumulation was related to strength of connectivity between corticostriatal and limbic nodes during approach decisions. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) and clustering revealed a three-dimensional choice structure that differed between individuals, and between approach and avoidance choices within individuals. Our results suggest that cognitive evaluations of aversive counterfactuals involve flexible representations that can be altered by choice framing. These findings have broad implications for prospective decision making.

Influential Cognitive Processes on Framing Biases in Aging

Factors that contribute to overcoming decision-making biases in later life pose an important investigational question given the increasing older adult population. Limited empirical evidence exists and the literature remains equivocal of whether increasing age is associated with elevated susceptibility to decision-making biases such as framing effects. Research into the individual differences contributing to decision-making ability may offer better understanding of the influence of age in decision-making ability. Changes in cognition underlying decision-making have been shown with increased age and may contribute to individual variability in decision-making abilities. This study had three aims; (1) to understand the influence of age on susceptibility to decision-making biases as measured by framing effects across a large, continuous age range; (2) to examine influence of cognitive abilities that change with age; and (3) to understand the influence of individual factors such as gender and education on susceptibility to framing effects. 200 individuals (28-79 years of age) were tested on a large battery of cognitive measures in the domains of executive function, memory and complex attention. Findings from this study demonstrated that cognitive abilities such as strategic control and delayed memory better predicted susceptibility to framing biases than age. The current findings demonstrate that age may not be as influential a factor in decision-making as cognitive ability and cognitive reserve. These findings motivate future studies to better characterize cognitive ability to determine decision-making susceptibilities in aging populations.

Reason's Enemy Is Not Emotion: Engagement of Cognitive Control Networks Explains Biases in Gain/Loss Framing

In the classic gain/loss framing effect, describing a gamble as a potential gain or loss biases people to make risk-averse or risk-seeking decisions, respectively. The canonical explanation for this effect is that frames differentially modulate emotional processes, which in turn leads to irrational choice behavior. Here, we evaluate the source of framing biases by integrating functional magnetic resonance imaging data from 143 human participants performing a gain/loss framing task with meta-analytic data from >8000 neuroimaging studies. We found that activation during choices consistent with the framing effect were most correlated with activation associated with the resting or default brain, while activation during choices inconsistent with the framing effect was most correlated with the task-engaged brain. Our findings argue against the common interpretation of gain/loss framing as a competition between emotion and control. Instead, our study indicates that this effect results from differential cognitive engagement across decision frames.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The biases frequently exhibited by human decision makers have often been attributed to the presence of emotion. Using a large fMRI sample and analysis of whole-brain networks defined with the meta-analytic tool Neurosynth, we find that neural activity during frame-biased decisions was more significantly associated with default behaviors (and the absence of executive control) than with emotion. These findings point to a role for neuroscience in shaping long-standing psychological theories in decision science.